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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to examine the claim on Islamic banking offers a more stable financial 
environment as opposed to their conventional counterparts, from the dimension of their 
financing behaviour.  Business cycle theories suggest that one of the factors that lead to 
the instability is banks’ lending behaviour that tends to over-lend during the booming 
period and restrict lending during recession.  Islamic finance principles work 
differently, where banks, while could capitalise the opportunity to lend during the 
booming period, cannot ignore the need to build up the provision for bad and doubtful 
financing as the financing increases.  This helps to moderate the financing growth of 
booming period.  Employing an unbalanced panel data analysis onto global Islamic 
banks, the findings suggest that the growth of Islamic bank financing is independent of 
the growth of business cycle indicators.  Even when analysed on the fixed rate financing 
the results hold, suggests that even if the modes of financing is akin to their 
conventional counterparts, Islamic bank fixed rate financing behaviour is distinct from 
the conventional ones.   In addition to that, an examination of bank provision provides 
empirical support that Islamic banks do build up contingency reserves accordingly 
following growth of financing.  Collectively, these empirical evidences suggest that 
where financing behaviour is concerned, Islamic banks are able to offer an economic 
environment that is more stable. Although the evidence did not claim that their 
operations are counter-cyclical, but their financing growth is independent of the 
business cycle.  Besides, Islamic banks do practice in building up enough provisioning 
to support their financing growth. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menilai dakwaan bahawa perbankan Islam menawarkan 
persekitaran kewangan yang lebih stabil berbanding dengan perbankan konvensional 
dari dimensi gelagat pembiayaan mereka. Teori kitaran perniagaan mencadangkan 
bahawa salah satu faktor yang membawa kepada ketidakstabilan adalah gelagat 
pinjaman bank yang cenderung untuk menyalur pinjaman secara berlebihan dalam 
tempoh ekonomi mengembang dan menyekat pinjaman semasa kemelesetan. Prinsip 
kewangan Islam pula adalah berbeza, walaupun bank-bank boleh mengambil 
kesempatan untuk meningkatkan pemberian pembiayaan dalam tempoh yang 
berkembang pesat, dalam masa yang sama tidak mengabaikan keperluan untuk 
membina peruntukan bagi pembiayaan lapuk dan ragu kerana kenaikan pembiayaan. Ini 
membantu untuk menyederhana pertumbuhan pembiayaan dalam tempoh berkembang 
pesat. Menggunakan analisis panel data taksetara ke atas bank-bank Islam secara global, 
penemuan mencadangkan bahawa pertumbuhan pembiayaan bank Islam adalah bebas 
daripada pertumbuhan petunjuk kitaran perniagaan. Apabila dianalisis ke atas 
pembiayaan kadar tetap, walaupun bentuk operasi pembiayaan adalah hampir serupa 
dengan perbankan konvensional, tetapi keputusan turut menunjukkan bahawa gelagat 
pembiayaan tetap bank Islam adalah berbeza daripada perbankan konvensional. Ujian 
empirikal ke atas peruntukan rizab kontingensi oleh bank turut membuktikan bahawa 
bank Islam juga membina rizab kontingensi sewajarnya berikutan pertumbuhan dalam 
pembiayaan. Secara kolektif, terdapat bukti secara empirikal menunjukkan gelagat 
pembiayaan oleh perbankan Islam mampu menawarkan satu persekitaran ekonomi yang 
lebih stabil walaupun tidak ada bukti kukuh yang dapat mendakwa bahawa operasi 
mereka adalah bergelagat menentang kitaran, tetapi pertumbuhan pembiayaan mereka 
adalah bebas daripada kitaran perniagaan. Selain itu, bank-bank Islam juga 
menyediakan peruntukan yang mencukupi untuk menyokong pertumbuhan pinjaman 
mereka.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In 1990s, several developing countries faced sudden financial crises shocks followed by 
severe real economic activity slumps. Many countries experienced instability of their 
economic environments due to the instability of the financial market, especially, after 
the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation, followed by the Asian financial crises in 1997-
1998, and the Russian default of 1998. This financial market instability has much to do 
with the improper management of banks’ lending operations. The subprime crises in 
2007 that shocked the United States economy and the Greece financial crisis that 
stunned the European nations were the latest twists in the global recession felt globally 
related to the banks’ lending operations.  
 
A more perturbing issue connected to the instability of the financial market and has 
recently come to the lime light is the interest-based bank lending operation that has an 
intrinsic tendency to behave pro-cyclically to the business cycle. This pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the bank lending operation has worsened the economic crisis rather than 
smoothing the economic activities fluctuation.  
 
Many empirical studies have provided evidence of the existence of a pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based bank lending operations to the business cycle episode 
(example of latest studies such as by Gruss and Sgherri, 2009; Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009; Rochet, 2008; Adrian and Hyun, 2008; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Quagliariello, 2007 and Nan and Hung, 2007). Some studies even show that to some 
extent it may even exacerbate the swing resulting in “credit crunch” incidents. This is 
consistent with the economic fluctuation events for the past twenty years.  
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1.1 Overview of The Study 
Scholars, regulators, and financial market participants have expressed much concern 
about this excessive pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending 
operations to the business cycle occurrence. This pro-cyclical behaviour of banks 
lending will intensify the business cycle swing of the macro economy and may hamper 
the economic recoveries from recessions. The increasing numbers of economic 
environment turbulence, unpredictable fluctuation, and complexity related to the pro-
cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending operations have become one of the 
hottest issues debated by economists, policy makers, and practitioners.  
 
This pro-cyclical behaviour of the currently practised bank lending activities will create 
a serious implication on the financial market stability and real economic performances. 
Pro-cyclical behaviour of bank lending operations without doubt will disrupt the 
progression of economic growth. This unconstructive bank lending behaviour in fact 
will increase the unsteadiness of economic growth especially in the developing 
countries that have integrated largely into international financial markets (Kroszner et 
al. 2007 and Prasad et al. 2003 provide empirical evidence on this). The pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the existing banking system will bring a huge negative impact on the 
banking industry development and other economic sector growth in the short term and 
long term as well. This bank lending pro-cyclical behaviour will definitely intensify the 
risks of every economic sector.  
 
This apparent excessive pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending is 
harmful to the economic atmosphere, it is crucial to economists, regulators, and 
practitioners to explore the causes, gaining thorough knowledge about the nature of this 
pro-cyclical behaviour and mitigating it. Public confidence in the banking system will 
diminish if they failed to do so. For instance, during the 1930’s great depression 
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episode, one of the major reasons that worsen the economic crush on the United States 
was the deteriorating confidence in the banking system. The bank weaknesses were 
apparent at that time, banks closing their lending doors followed by a growing number 
of firms that had failed. Chain reactions started to crop up and spread the economic 
depression not just in the United States, but also throughout the globe. 
 
The recent financial turmoil that has shaken the global economic environment is a direct 
result of an unexceptional increase in lending growth and financial leverage within the 
financial system during an upward growth of the economic activities. The United States 
2007 subprime crisis for instance was caused by the excessive lending operation by 
banks of high-risk customers and the transaction of financial debt instruments such as 
the Collateralised Debt Obligations and Mortgage Backed Securities. The European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010 related to the Greece's financial crisis is the latest 
financial crisis that is closely related to the excessive rise of credit growth and financial 
leverage due to the speculative financial and commercial transaction during the 
economic activities expansion within the interest-based financial system.  
 
There is a similarity between the current financial crisis and other previous financial 
crisis occurrences. In all the financial crisis occurrences, they started with a period of 
strong economic growth followed by a rapid growth in credit volume and real asset 
prices rising sharply. Indiscriminate lending to the corporate and household sector is 
evident prior to the crises. For example, prior to the Asian financial crisis, investment 
activity was excessive with the investment to gross domestic product ratios exceeding 
35 per cent for many economies in the region (Aziz, 2009). Similarly, the imprudent 
lending practices originated the subprime crisis. The low interest rate environment also 
accentuated the build-up of the excesses and rising asset values. Aziz (2009) also 
reported, Asia domestic credit had increased to unsustainable levels reaching 180 per 
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cent of gross domestic product during this period and in the United States, the increase 
was close to 240 per cent in 2007. 
 
In the subprime financial crisis episodes, then again, the excessive increase in lending 
activities and risk taking have reinforced the formation of asset bubbles. This growth 
continuously increases to the asset bubbles reached their edges. At this level of the 
‘overheated’ United States economic atmosphere, the economic growth then 
experiences a downturn and enters a contraction. As a result, the lending activities of 
banking institutions become slower and the over pessimistic behaviour to the downturn 
of economic activities worsens the business cycle scenario.  
 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) reported that in the United States’ case when the 
economic condition reversed in the last quarter of 2008, new loans by banking sector to 
large borrowers fell by 47 per cent during the peak of the crisis relative to the prior 
quarter. New loans by the banking sector to large borrowers fell by 79 per cent relative 
to the peak of the credit boom that was in the second quarter of 2007. New lending for 
real investment of working capital and capital expenditures fell by 14 per cent in the last 
quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as the new lending for restructuring 
(LBOs, M&A, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom.  
 
Many empirical studies show that the interest-based bank’s lending operations are 
behaving in a pro-cyclical manner associated with the loose management practices on 
the provision for loan losses and credit rating policy (Albertazzi and Gambacorta 2009; 
Adrian and Hyun 2008; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Quagliariello, 2007; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005; and Bliss and Kaufman, 2002). A survey by Economist 
Intelligence Unit and SAS in 2009 showed that more than 70 per cent of the world 
leading financial service executives believed that losses stemmed from credit crisis were 
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largely due to the inherent failure in addressing the risk management issues during the 
expanding of economic activities.  
 
Empirical studies also show that the profit driven enthusiasm might as well have 
contributed to the pro-cyclical behaviour in connection with the short term business 
cycles (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Bikker and Hu, 2002). Some commentators 
also argued, the reforms of international bank regulation (Basel I and Basel II) and 
accounting rules (IAS 39) are likely to amplify the pro-cyclicality behaviour of the 
interest-based banking activities in the future (Gruss and Sgherri, 2009; and Rochet, 
2008).  
 
Muslim scholars, on the contrary, stated that the root of this undesirable behaviour is the 
exercise in certain unfavourable financial instruments, investment, and other financial 
transaction activities from the Islamic ruling or the shariah point of view. The most 
undesirable instrument used in financial and commercial operations, according to them, 
will be the interest-based instruments that bear the characteristic of riba (usury). They 
pointed out that the international monetary crises largely connected to the institution of 
interest-based instruments and that trade cycles are in no small measure attributable to 
the phenomenon of interest (Siddiqi, 1981; Ziauddin et al., 1983; Khan, 1986; Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1986 and 1989; and Chapra, 2008b).  
 
Others have also argued that interest is not a very effective instrument of monetary 
policy even in capitalist economies and have questioned the efficacy of the rate of 
interest as a determinant of saving and investment (Ariff, 1982; Darrat, 1988 and 2002; 
and many more). Tlemsani and Matthews (2002) in criticising the interest-based 
instrument mentioned that Fisher (1930), Simons (1948), and Friedman (1969) all 
agreed that the interest-based financial systems are not sound. Khan (1968) and Ahmad 
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(1952) in addition, even assured that interest as a financial instrument being a pre-
determined cost of production tends to prevent full employment.  
 
The holy Quran and prophet Muhammad (saw) himself does not explicitly spell out the 
rationales for prohibiting riba, however, the Islamic scholars’ argument is that the 
underlying principle of the prohibition on riba is the calls for fairness and justice. It is in 
response to the unfair and unjust allocation of the realised income generated from the 
interest-based instruments. It is an income created without engaging in any productive 
effort.  
 
There are also other forms of financial and commercial transactions practiced by the 
interest-based bank that go against the Islamic values.  The existence of forbidden 
(haram) financial and commercial transaction activities involving speculative feature, 
ambiguous and uncertain transaction, and trading of financial risk instruments by the 
interest-based banks according to the Islamic scholars are the main contributing factors 
to the economic instability.  
 
The increase in the volatility of economic activity since 1970s, which became highly 
erratic after 1990s, has raised concern on the effectiveness of the currently practised 
interest-based financial system. This has become one of the most debated issues for the 
last ten years. The issues are whether the current interest-based banking system 
practices, policies, and instruments that we are using are able to smooth the economic 
instability.  
 
These continuous financial crises happening to the global financial system during the 
past decades have signalled the incompetence of the interest-based financial system. 
The interest-based banking systems, the policies implemented, and even the instruments 
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currently used by most countries are now opened with discussion of its capability to 
make the economic atmosphere become more stable and resilient. In some countries, the 
regulators have even introduced higher capital requirements, tighter loan classification, 
and provisioning rules, tighter collateral, tighter eligibility criteria, and other 
constructive rules, yet they have failed to smooth the economic atmosphere. Further 
instability of economic atmosphere can be expected if the current financial system is 
still being practiced by the economy. 
 
Many studies have argued that the instability in the banking sector in particular has 
contributed to the fragility of the economic atmosphere for the past thirty years. There is 
increasing amount of academic literature discussing both the theoretical and practical 
viewpoint to reconsider the effectiveness of the existing interest-based financial system 
and its banking system, in particular, for maintaining the economic stability.  
 
The existing of flaws in the interest-based bank operational systems from the Islamic 
rulings or the shariah, Muslim scholars asserted that the Islamic economic system in 
general and the Islamic financial system in particular have the solution to stabilise the 
economic environment. With the shariah compliant operations such as applying the 
sharing of profit and loss instrument as well as sharing the risk and with the 
nonexistence of interest-based related operations, the Islamic financial system and 
institutions would be more stable and resilient.  
 
The Islamic banking proponents even claim further that the shariah compliant financing 
operations would make the Islamic bank behaving counter-cyclical to the business 
cycle. Thus, the Islamic banking operations will be able to stabilise the macroeconomic 
condition, smoothen the economic activities, and handle the fluctuation of the economic 
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activity and financial crisis better. Increasing the share of equity and reducing that of 
debt will reduce the volatility in the financial market. 
 
The failure of the interest-based financial system to play its role in stabilising the 
economic environment added with the continuous global economic disorder related to 
the interest-based system has sparked global attention on the Islamic financial system. 
At present, there are an increasing number of acceptances among the non-Muslim 
economists and financial practitioners on the Islamic financial instruments. Some of 
them have even regarded the Islamic financial system to be superior to the interest-
based financial system. Interestingly, some major non-majority Muslim countries such 
as Germany, United Kingdom, and United State have started providing some Islamic 
financial instruments and even establishing Islamic financial institutions.  
 
The Islamic bank runs the same activities as the interest-based bank operation. The 
operation of Islamic bank includes practically all aspects of business, commerce, and 
investment as provided by the interest-based bank institution. From monetary 
economics stances, Islamic bank plays the role as the matchmaker between the suppliers 
of funds to those who are short of funds of the economy. The financing portfolio is the 
major source of income for the Islamic banks’ business activities. The only difference 
compared to interest-based bank institution operation is that Islamic bank operations are 
without the infringement of Islamic principles.  
 
The pertinent question is that does the Islamic bank financing operation have a tendency 
to behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle event.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
For the past 20 years, many studies on the interest-based bank have clearly shown the 
bank’s lending operation acting’s pro-cyclically to the business cycle occurrence. The 
financial crisis of the 1990s until the present has greatly increased the attention to the 
economists, regulators, and practitioners on the issues of pro-cyclical behaviour of 
interest-based bank lending.  
 
The pro-cyclicality behaviour of interest-based bank’s lending has a lot to do with its 
failure of managing the provision for loan losses and capital policy in the event of 
economic fluctuations (examples of recent studies are by Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 
2009; Adrian and Hyun, 2008; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Quagliariello, 2007; and 
Nan and Hung 2007). Failing to manage the provision for loan losses and capital, thus, 
the amount of interest-based bank’s lending has the tendency to increase excessively 
from the upward phase of economic activities because of over optimistic behaviour. At 
the time of economic activities downtrends, the interest-based banks have the tendency 
to overreact and decrease the credit supply significantly for the reason of over 
pessimistic behaviour. 
 
On the other hand, Muslim scholars believed that the banking system would be able to 
manage the economic atmosphere and financial market better with the existence of 
financial and commercial transactions practice in accordance with the Islamic 
principles, compared to banks that do not adhere to the Islamic values and norms. 
Majorities of prominent contemporary Muslims economists’ scholars like Siddiqi 
(1981), Khan (1985), Khan (1986), Khan and Mirakhor (1988), Ziauddin et al. (1994), 
and Chapra (1996), to name a few, also believe that the virtue of the Islamic financial 
system will bring stability to the macroeconomic environment.  
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The superiority over the Islamic financial intermediaries comes with its unique 
characteristics such as forbidding any financial and commercial transaction involving 
speculative activities, ambiguous and uncertain financial transactions, and transactions 
of financial risk alongside with the exclusion of all interest-based instruments practices.  
 
With those unique characteristics, the Islamic bank project financing and investment are 
more transparent for the reason that its operation is within the moral value structure, 
very selective and cautious in the selection of projects. For those reasons as well, the 
scholars further believed that the Islamic bank would be more resilient and stable 
through its operations especially with the profit and risk sharing instruments. 
 
With unique characteristics underneath the operation of the Islamic financial system, 
proponents of the Islamic banking promote the idea that it will behave counter-
cyclically to the business cycle incidence. They alleged that the Islamic bank operation 
is able to weather the economy and financial crisis better. They also put forward that 
long term financing through shariah compliant instruments is able to promote a stable 
economic growth. They even said that the Islamic banking framework would ensure a 
more stable monetary system that will lead to an equitable distribution of wealth 
(Siddiqi 1983 and Chapra 1996).  
 
The concern is that much of the views presented by the scholars are theoretical in 
concepts and descriptive in nature with very little support of empirical evidence. In 
today’s highly developed and objective world, it has become a necessity to unify all the 
theoretical foundation and conceptual rationalisation with the empirical evidence to 
support the proposition and consideration brought forward. Thus, in-depth empirical 
evidence should follow the theoretical and conceptual framework to explain the nature 
of Islamic bank behaviour and not mere theoretical and conceptual description. Hence, 
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it is important to provide empirical evidence of the views made on the Islamic bank 
behaviour, capability, and superiority.  
 
The perturbing issue that needs to be raised as well are the large amount of trade-based 
financing utilised by the Islamic bank of the present instead of the original idea that is 
the equity-based financing structure. The more worrying issue is the financing rate for 
trade-based financing instruments are in the form of fixed rate financing and not in the 
form of profit and risk sharing instruments as proposed by scholars (Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000; and Bakar, 2006).  
 
This trade-based financing currently used by the Islamic bank is a debt-like instrument 
with a fixed financing rate of nature that will bring a fixed return to the bank. According 
to some of the Islamic scholars, this currently practiced debt-alike instrument might 
resemble the characteristic of riba (usury). Some of the scholars condemn the Islamic 
bank of using the debt-alike instrument as not adhering to the ideal Islamic banking 
principles. 
 
The volume of fixed rates financing instruments by most Islamic banks on average 
comprised 60 per cent to 80 per cent of the total financing delivered by the Islamic bank 
institution. In Malaysia for instance, the profit and risk sharing instrument is less than 5 
per cent at present. Currently, the Islamic bank operations in Malaysia are more 
concentrated on the trade-based financing instrument (Rosly and Bakar, 2003; Sanusi 
and Ismail, 2005; and Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008). Survey such as by Khan and 
Bhatti (2008) shows that the use of profit and risk sharing instrument has even reduced 
in size by an average of 11 per cent since mid-1990s.  
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With the large amount of debt-like instruments currently used and with the marginal 
amount of profit and risk sharing financing presently practiced by the Islamic bank, the 
capability of Islamic bank to smooth the macroeconomic condition is doubtful. With 
such financing operations and with the vulnerable economic atmosphere at present, will 
the Islamic bank financing operation behaving counter-cyclical to the business cycle 
event. With the increasing pressure in economic turbulence, complexity, dynamism, and 
unpredictable economic atmosphere, will the Islamic bank be more resilient and stable? 
 
1.3 Research Question 
This fragility of economic environment related to the interest-based financial system 
instability lately needs immediate discussion. Economists have started arguing that the 
existing system and the policy instrument itself failed to solve or manage the current 
economic issues. This continuous global financial disorder and the failure of interest-
based financial systems to stabilise the economy has sparked the interest in the Islamic 
financial system, especially so when Muslim scholars proposed that the Islamic 
financial system virtue will bring stability to the economic environment. Muslim 
economic scholars for the past three decades have confidently recommended that the 
Islamic financial model had the answer. They have presented the theoretical foundation 
and conceptual description on the potential of Islamic bank in mellowing the 
unpredictable fluctuation of economic activities.  
 
The Islamic scholars theoretically believe the Islamic financial system with the special 
characteristics and divine guidance underpinning would be able to stabilise the 
economic environment. The Islamic bank frees of the ordinary interest-based financial 
and commercial transaction practices and with its special characteristics is expected to 
be more stable compared to its counterpart. Thus, as believed by most Islamic bank 
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proponents, the Islamic bank will behave counter-cyclically to the business cycle 
happening.  
 
With the unpredictable financial economic environment and coarse volatility of business 
cycle of late, will the Islamic bank financing operations in fact be very independent of 
the aggregate economic activities fluctuation? With the large amount of fixed rate 
financing instruments used in its operations, will the Islamic bank financing operations 
behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle event?  
 
With those questions in mind, the idea of Islamic bank capability to smoothen the rise 
and falls of economic activities is now questionable. At present, empirical evidence of 
Islamic bank financing behaviour of the business cycle phenomena is yet to be 
attempted. Therefore, with the theoretical thought and descriptive explanations on the 
Islamic bank stability and sturdiness brought up by the Islamic banking proponents, the 
present research has the intention to investigate empirically the questions on 
1. Do the Islamic bank’s total financing activities behave counter-cyclically to the 
business cycle occurrence? 
2. Do the Islamic bank’s fixed rate financing activities behave counter-cyclically to 
the business cycle occurrence? 
 
The research questions arise from the reason for the absence of empirical evidence to 
support the Islamic bank proponents’ proposition on the potential of the shariah 
compliant financing instruments to smoothen the economic fluctuations. In addition, the 
proposition on the Islamic bank stability and resiliency is yet to be proven. The Islamic 
scholars theoretically believe that the Islamic bank is supposed to be stable and resilient 
in the event of economic fluctuations, therefore, it is necessary to conduct an empirical 
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analysis to verify the capability, stability, and resiliency of Islamic banks in the event of 
business cycles.  
 
As part of the theoretical framework explaining the nature of Islamic bank operations, it 
should be followed by intense empirical evidence and not merely a theoretical 
description. It is important to provide empirical evidence on view made of the Islamic 
bank behaviour and its capability to resolve the uncertain and volatile economic 
environment. At the least, the present empirical study tries to investigate whether the 
Islamic banking system practice currently is able to provide a way to minimise the 
degree of economic fluctuation. Western economists and financial practitioners now 
have also begun to show some interest and acceptance in the Islamic banking system. 
Some major countries including the United States and some major industrial countries 
in Europe have even started providing Islamic financial instruments and established 
Islamic financial institutions. 
 
It is indisputable that banks behave differently at different stages of the business cycle. 
It is crucial to examine empirically the propagated effect of business cycle incidents on 
the Islamic bank financing operations. Analysing empirically the potential of shariah 
compliant financing instruments in stabilising the economic atmosphere is important 
too.  
 
With the issues on the fixed rate financing instruments, which is widely practised by the 
Islamic bank currently, the unforeseen and unpredicted consequences might arise from 
the operation related to the business cycle. Malaysia Islamic banking sectors for 
example during the 1997 financial turmoil, the excessive use of the fixed rate financing 
instruments have badly affected the Islamic bank investment operation (Rosly and 
Bakar 2003). The tight liquidity situation has put pressure on the operations of the 
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Islamic bank. The 1997 turmoil revealed structural weakness for the Malaysian Islamic 
banking operations particularly under a volatile economic environment. On the other 
hand, Aziz (2010) stated the proponents of the Islamic finance system claimed that the 
current financial crisis impacts on the Islamic bank are very limited. The uniqueness of 
portfolio asset management are said to be the reason for this mild concussion faced by 
the Islamic bank. 
 
Therefore, the primary question that requires immediate consideration is whether the 
aggregate economic fluctuation in reality has any influence on the Islamic bank 
financing operation. In some ways with the unstable and unpredictable economic 
environment of the past few years, there is a need to assess the cyclical behaviour of 
Islamic bank financing. The stability and resiliency of Islamic bank are verified by the 
influence of economic activity fluctuations on the Islamic bank financing operation 
since financing is the main source of income to the bank. 
 
The second question queries about the possibility of financing instruments currently 
used by the Islamic bank, namely the fixed rates financing to counter-cycle the 
economic fluctuation. With special characteristics underpinning its operation, 
fluctuation in real gross domestic product, changes in the money supply, and the general 
price level as indicators of business cycle occurrences should respectively have a 
modest shock on the Islamic bank financing operation. To prove that the Islamic bank is 
capable of smoothing out the economic environment and hence behaves counter-
cyclically, the financing should increase with decreasing rate relatives of the growth of 
real gross domestic product, money supply, and the general price level.  
 
To answer the above questions, this particular study investigates and analyses the 
Islamic bank financing behaviour in the business cycle event. From this study, it is 
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hoped that it will be able to provide a better viewpoint and bridge the gap between 
theoretical and conceptual literature with empirical evidence on the potential of the 
Islamic banking system. It will also determine the source of the problem of Islamic bank 
operation related to the business cycle event, if there is any. 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
The failure of the interest-based financial system in reducing the heat of the business 
cycle has inspired Muslim economists to recommend the Islamic financial system, and 
in particular, the Islamic banking system as an alternative to the current ineffective 
interest-based banking system. With the small amount of profit and risk sharing 
instrument and with the large usage of the fixed rate financing instrument, whether the 
Islamic bank financing operation will behave counter-cyclically is a matter that needs an 
immediate confirmation. With that in mind, in general, this particular study is an 
attempt to investigate the association of Islamic bank financing activities to the business 
cycle occurrence. More importantly, the aspiration of the study is to evaluate the 
cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank financing.  
 
To be specific, from the issues brought forward in this study, this particular research 
empirically examines the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank total financing and 
the cyclicality behaviour of the fixed rate financing activities in the event of business 
cycle phenomena. Therefore, this paper attempts to: 
1. Examine the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operations. 
2. Examine the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank fixed rate financing 
operations. 
3. Analyse the Islamic bank management on provision for bad and doubtful financing 
and contingency reserve growth in order to manage the counter-cyclical behaviour 
of Islamic bank financing. 
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This study specifically differentiates between total bank financing operations and fixed 
rate financing operations.  This is because fixed rate financing is akin to interest-based 
bank modes of financing, which have proven to be pro-cyclical. Hence, it is in the 
interest of the study to examine into the case of Islamic banks, whether the fixed rate 
financing also follows the interest-based banks financing pattern or Islamic banks 
behave differently.  If the evidence support that even with fixed rates financing, Islamic 
bank behave differently from its conventional counterpart, than it offers an indication 
that Islamic banks financing behaviour is unique as compared to the interest-based 
bank. 
 
The first objective looks at the association for the expansion and contraction of the 
business cycle to the Islamic bank total financing operations. This will provide some 
evidence on the cyclical behaviour of Islamic bank financing activities.  The cyclical 
behaviour is shown by the direction of associations for real gross domestic product 
growths of the main business cycle indicators to the Islamic bank financing growth 
activities.  
 
Evidence of Islamic bank counter-cyclical behaviour, the Islamic bank financing growth 
should have a negative relationship to the real gross domestic product growth. The 
negative relationship shows that the financing activities are supposed to grow at a 
diminishing rate or at a slower rate during economic expansions. The diminishing 
growths of the Islamic bank financing activities during economic expansion are for the 
institutional safety due to the increase in the economic risk of the expansion of 
economic activity. If the Islamic bank behaviour is healthy, stable, and resilient as 
expected by scholars, then the degree of its financing growth is minor and less 
significant than the degree of growth in the real gross domestic product.  
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On the contrary, during an economic downturn, the Islamic bank financing growth is 
supposed to be growing at an increasing rate to boost up the economic environment. 
During this contraction period of economic activities, the financing operation of the 
Islamic bank is supposed to grow at a faster rate. The more rapid growth of Islamic 
bank financing during economic contractions is to augment on economic activities.  
 
The Islamic bank feature mentioned above is because of obeying Allah’s (swt) 
instruction in chapter Yusuf (12:47-48), which is to reduce spending on economic 
upturns and to increase spending in the event of an economic downturn.  
“He said, “For seven years you shall sow continuously, then what you reap 
leave 5 it on the ear, except a little whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter 
there shall come upon you seven hard years, in which you shall devour all 
that you have reserved for them, except a little you keep in store (48). 
(Yusuf: 46-48). 
 
The study also examines the expansion and contraction of the Islamic bank financing 
operation when the amount of money supplies circulating in the market change. This 
will also provide some evidence on the Islamic bank capability to stabilise the economic 
environment. It is beyond doubt that money supply also tends to increase from 
economic expansion. Along with the growth of money supply, the Islamic bank 
financing should be growing at a diminishing rate so that it is able to smooth out the 
expansion of economic activities. A negative relationship between the growths of 
money circulating in the market to financing growths provides the evidence of slower 
Islamic bank financing growth. With the decreasing rate of the Islamic bank financing 
growth during the economic upturns, it will be able to trim down the overheating of the 
economic activities.  
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Another indicator used to measure the cyclical behaviour of the Islamic banking 
industry to the business cycle is the relationship between the general price level growths 
and the Islamic banks financing growth. As the economic activities are growing so does 
the general price level indicated by the increase in the consumer price index.  For 
security reasons, the Islamic bank should tighten its financing activities. Therefore, the 
consumer price index and the Islamic bank financing growths should be negatively 
related. The negative growth of financing volumes also shows that it is increasing with 
diminishing rate. 
 
The second objective of the thesis is to explore the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank 
fixed rate financing instruments as the economic activities expand or contract. With the 
large amount of fixed rate financing employed currently by the Islamic bank, will the 
Islamic bank financing operations behaving pro-cyclically to the business cycle event 
just like how the interest-based bank lending behaves. Thus, the analysis will provide 
empirical evidence for the cyclical behaviour of the fixed rate shariah compliant 
financing instruments and its likelihood to smooth out the business cycle event.  
 
Besides evaluating the relationship between the business cycle indicator growths and 
the Islamic bank financing growth as evidence of the counter-cyclicality behaviour, the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing growths should also 
behave positively to the economic growth. It is important to examine the capability of 
Islamic bank contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing policy in 
managing the Islamic bank financing growth in the event of the business cycle. It will 
verify the capability of these bank buffers to control the Islamic bank financing volume 
to smooth out the business cycle event. In a way the contingency reserve and provision 
for bad and doubtful financing movement also shows the effectiveness of the Islamic 
bank in managing its operation to the business cycle risk.  
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The Quran, through chapter Yusuf (12), from verse 46 to 49, clearly implies the 
importance of contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing 
instruments for individuals and firms in managing the business cycle. Allah’s (swt) 
instruction in these verses is that the spending activities have to be reduced during high 
economic growth. In the event of economic downturns to generate the economy, 
spending has to be raised.  
 
With the intention of reducing the investment, spending, and profit driven enthusiasm in 
the event of growing economy, the contingency reserve and provision for bad and 
doubtful financing are able to play that role. In the event of lower income growth, the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing will now be used to 
increase the investment spending in the economy. Hence, the banks’ buffering policy 
provided by the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing 
movement is supposed to moderate the financing growth in the event of business cycle.  
 
The contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing instruments 
should be able to control the financing growth so that it is able to put pressure on the 
financing activity in the event of economic expansion. During the contraction of 
economic, the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing growth 
should be able to amplify the financing activities. Therefore, the contingency reserve 
and provision for bad and doubtful financing growth should have a positive relationship 
with bank financing growth for it to behave counter-cyclically. These buffers policy 
effectiveness also pictures the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank financing 
operations.  
 
Taken as a whole, the entire objectives of the study are to provide empirical evidence of 
the Islamic bank superiority and to answer the main issues whether the Islamic bank is 
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able to smooth out the economic environment. If the Islamic bank is found to react 
counter-cyclically to the business cycle, hence, the Islamic banking sector is in a good 
position and this supports the views proposed to the Islamic bank superiority. Thus, the 
study aspiration is to evidence the capability of the Islamic bank operations to play the 
role as the economic stabiliser agent.  
 
At this point, with its fast growth and increasing acceptability in the financial scene it is 
important to observe the likelihood of the Islamic bank operations in contributing to the 
economic stability. Although the market size of Islamic bank today is still marginal 
relative to the interest-based bank, the competitive environment is expected to stimulate 
the Islamic banking growth. Therefore, it is vital to observe the Islamic banking system 
in terms of its microeconomic behaviour and the macroeconomic capability.  
 
It is essential to observe the potential for managerial and regulatory purposes well as. 
Without persistent monitoring, existing problems can remain unnoticed and could lead 
to the financial failure in the future. The strength and speed in utilising the assets for 
financing activities are also vital for the Islamic bank to perform the monetary 
transmission mechanism role. The slower the transmitter works and the longer the lag, 
the slower and lesser will be the effectiveness of monetary policy on business cycles. 
This particular study will shed some light on the Islamic bank capability in moderating 
the business cycle events.  
 
1.5 Scope of Study 
Evaluating the banking operational behaviour in particular is vital for the reason that the 
banking sector is one of the key sectors that support and contribute economic growth 
and development. For the importance of financial markets and institutions, this study 
focuses on the behaviour of Islamic banks’ financing operations to the fluctuation in the 
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economic activities and relates them to the cyclicality behaviour. As one of the earliest 
and the most significant Islamic financial institution, it is essential to monitor the 
institutional development to make it acceptable to the global financial market. 
 
The focus on this study is to examine the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank 
financing to the business cycle occurrences. It investigates whether the trade-based 
financing instruments with a fixed financing rate tend to behave pro-cyclically to the 
business cycle event. The study analyses the stability and sturdiness of the Islamic bank 
institutions in facing the turbulence, complexity, dynamism, and unpredictable 
economic activity fluctuation. Hence, this study provides some empirical evidence for 
the bank financing operations potential for stabilising the economic environment and 
smoothing up the business cycle event if it adheres to the Islamic values or shariah 
compliant. 
 
To comprehend the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operations, this 
particular research mainly focuses on the direction of the Islamic bank total financing 
growth and the fixed rate financing growth related to the growth of the real gross 
domestic product, money supply, and general price level given by the consumer price 
index. Real gross domestic product, money supply, and consumer price index are the 
main indicators of the business cycle event.  
 
The study includes the contingency reserve, provision for loan losses and capital items 
in the analysis. The Islamic bank needs to use the above instruments in order to regulate 
the banks’ financing operation behaviour and protecting their institutions against any 
changes in the economic atmosphere. The Quran directly mentions the importance of 
those instruments in chapter Yusuf (12) verses 46 to 49. The contingency reserve and 
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provision for loan losses will directly control the volumes of credit creation capability 
by the Islamic banks.  
 
The Islamic bank provision for bad and doubtful financings as an indicator of bank 
anticipation on financing risk management is included in the analysis and evaluated to 
confirm the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing behaviour. To account 
for the future losses on financing defaults, the Islamic bank creates provision for bad 
and doubtful financings. More importantly, the contingency reserve and provision for 
bad and doubtful financings act as the behaviour regulator on the institution financing 
activities. To protect the possibility of not getting back the financing provided to the 
fund borrowers, the institutions set provision for bad and doubtful financing.  
 
In order to obtain a clear and comprehensive understanding on the Islamic bank 
cyclicality behaviour to the business cycle episode this study analyse across countries 
Islamic banks time series data.  
 
1.6 Significance of The Study 
In spite of the popular notion on the Islamic bank, we do not know of any credible 
empirical work on the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing to the 
fluctuations in the economic environment. Empirical study of the cyclical behaviour of 
the Islamic banking financing to economic fluctuations is so far insufficient hence, the 
topic discussed in this paper is essential.  
 
As far as this study is concerned, it is the breaking ground attempt on providing 
empirical evidence of the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing. It is vital 
to identify the cyclical behaviour of the Islamic banks financing for its future 
development and global acceptance. A well functioning Islamic banking system is 
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supposed to help smoothen the economic fluctuations or the business cycle and enhance 
the progress of economic growth. A pro-cyclicality of bank financing behaviour then 
again may worsen the economic fluctuations and hamper economic recoveries from 
recessions. This is vital because countries with lower macroeconomic volatility tend to 
grow faster. Gurley and Shaw (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), among 
others have provided considerable evidence for supporting this argument. 
 
The Islamic banking industry is growing at an extreme pace after its introduction thirty 
years ago with an encouraging acceptance among the business community. With the 
absence of the interest instrument in the Islamic bank operation, it is crucial to have a 
good understanding of the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour. It is important to provide 
empirical evidence for views made on the Islamic bank behaviour and capability. Apart 
from the theoretical framework explaining the nature of the Islamic banks, intense 
empirical evidence is necessary to prove the uniqueness of the Islamic bank. The 
interest instrument is a powerful tool of the monetary policy particularly in the interest 
rate regime in influencing the business cycle through the banking activities.  
 
This particular study will bridge the gap between theoretical and conceptual literature 
and empirical evidence on the potential of the Islamic bank. By pooling various 
countries Islamic bank data, thus, the findings allowed us to make a generalisation on 
the Islamic bank cyclical behaviour. This will provide a better viewpoint on the 
operation and function of Islamic banks in improving the economic environment. The 
empirical evidence provided with this research is then able to support the scholars’ 
theoretical and conceptual views on the superiority of the Islamic banking system. 
 
Empirical evidence for the capability of the Islamic bank to perform as one of the 
significant agents in stabilising the economy through its operations is yet to be studied. 
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Accordingly, this particular study will shed some light on the Islamic bank capability in 
stabilising the economy through its operation. This study also systematically documents 
a comprehensive theoretical foundation of an ideal Islamic bank financing behaviour. It 
also shows how Islamic bank should be operated, including multifactor explanations, 
not only the religious motivation but also its assets management factors. For a bank to 
perform as the economy stabilisation agent it has a lot to do with bank management on 
its contingency reserve, provisioning for loan losses and capital management policy.  
 
Thus far, very few researchers have attempted to analyse empirically on the Islamic 
bank financing management particularly its relationship to the economic environment. 
Previous researchers mostly assess on the Islamic banks operational performances. In 
analysing the Islamic bank performances, they usually compare it with the performance 
of interest-based banks. They measure the Islamic bank success based on its capability 
to mobilise and pool the fund resources, then allocate and distribute the fund resources 
efficiently to generate comparable returns for the depositors and shareholders.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, research focusing on the relationship between the Islamic 
bank financing activities to the economic activity fluctuation are scanty from the scene 
compared to the case of the interest-based banks. This is mainly to the recent nature of 
the Islamic bank. Therefore, this study contributes to enriching the empirical literature 
on the banking industry and especially for the Islamic bank in particular. It will also 
provide a deeper understanding of the issues relating to the risk management of the 
Islamic bank. 
 
For the monetary authority, the information and knowledge on the relative behaviour of 
the Islamic bank is useful in policy decision making. The result of this research will be 
useful in gauging the financial standing of the Islamic banking industry, which in turn 
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can serve as the basis of decision-making. More importantly, the conclusion of this 
study might be useful in Islamic banking model building and policy making particularly 
in a volatile, complex, dynamic, and unpredictable economic conditions. Proper 
understanding of the Islamic bank financing behaviour is crucial to addressing 
important policy questions about the uniqueness of the Islamic financial system. 
Understanding of the issues may help in the selection of appropriate policy rule, and 
enable us to avoid the unexpected and sometimes undesirable consequences associated 
with the economic policy. 
 
With the empirical evidence provided for the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank 
financing operation, it will verify the superiority over the system and increase non-
Muslims acceptance of the Islamic financial system. More importantly it is to build the 
confidence and readiness of the major non-majority Muslim countries to start providing 
the shariah compliant financial instrument and establishing the Islamic financial 
institutions. Although the market size of the Islamic banking industry today is still 
marginal, the dynamism and competitive environment will be able to stimulate the 
provision of new Islamic banking facilities. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the 
Islamic banking system in terms of its behaviour to the unpredictable and competitive 
economic atmosphere. 
 
Monitoring the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour is essential for managerial 
and regulatory purposes as well. On behalf of the Islamic bank regulators, they are 
concerned about the safety and soundness of the Islamic banking system itself and the 
economy as a whole. Without persistent monitoring of the Islamic bank financing 
cyclicality behaviour, existing problems can remain unnoticed and will lead to financial 
failure in the future. It is worth noting that the understandings on Islamic bank financing 
cyclicality behaviour will improve our knowledge on the Islamic bank’s ability to play 
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its role as the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy, which is important to the 
policy makers.  The findings also will likely shed some lights on the issues of Islamic 
bank market stability. Through this study, it will show that the Islamic banking system 
outcomes may have important real effects on the economy and may have a significant 
contribution to the real economy.  
 
1.7 Research Contributions to The Bodies of Knowledge 
The most significant contributions to knowledge enhancement of this study come 
especially in the forms of providing a systematic theoretical account of how the banks 
should be able to behave counter-cyclically to the economic fluctuations of directly 
providing the needs of banks’ buffer instruments. The study anticipates that fluctuations 
in the macroeconomic environment might influence significantly the Islamic bank 
financing operation if the contingency reserve, provision for loan losses and capital 
management policy fail to put weight on the Islamic bank financing growth. The Quran 
in chapter Yusuf (12:46-49) clearly states the importance of the contingency reserve and 
provision for loan losses.  
 
A further significant contribution to the body of knowledge comes especially in the 
forms of providing empirical evidence and valuable information on the Islamic bank 
financing cyclicality behaviour to the business cycle. Previous researchers concentrate a 
lot on conceptual and theoretical ideas of the Islamic bank. Empirical research is very 
scanty and difficult to come across. Thus, this study provides empirical evidence of the 
Islamic bank financing cyclical behaviour whether it follows the theoretical expectation 
or vice versa.  This will enrich the evidence of the feasibility of Islamic banking and 
financing principles to be adopted as the main framework for the new financial 
architecture.   
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To the best of our knowledge, compared to the case of interest-based banks, studies 
directly concerning the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing in the event 
of business cycles are yet to be attempted. The limited analysis of the Islamic bank 
cyclicality behaviour is attributable to the recent nature of the Islamic banking industry 
and the availability of comprehensive data. In this regard, this study contributes to 
enriching the literature on the cyclicality behaviour, sustainability, and healthiness of 
the Islamic bank. It also provides a deeper understanding of the issues relating to the 
market behaviour of the Islamic bank. 
 
Finally yet importantly, the analyses also provide empirical evidence of the Islamic 
bank financing cyclicality behaviour from using the trade-based financing instrument in 
its operations. Empirical evidence of this research will verify the theoretical and 
conceptual design brought forward by the proponents of Islamic bank and the 
superiority of the Islamic bank institutions. Indirectly it gives some near the beginning 
verification on the capability of Islamic banking system in stabilising the economy. This 
study also highlights the needs for the existence of a banking system that is able to 
reduce economic fluctuations should it adheres to the Islamic principles. 
 
1.8 Organisation of The Research  
In conducting the research, this study is organised into six chapters and in this first 
chapter, the background of the research has been given. This chapter discusses the 
major issues related to the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending and 
the potential for Islamic bank financing in stabilising the economic fluctuations that 
encourage the need of this research. The following chapter provides a literature review 
of the business cycle phenomenon, theories, and empirical evidences of pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based bank lending. This chapter discusses the analysis and 
theoretical foundation by previous researchers on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
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interest-based bank lending activities. The pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based 
bank lending activities and the theories brought forward by scholars is critically 
examined in this chapter. The chapter also looks at previous studies on the Islamic bank 
financing operations and the existing gap that brings in the need of this research.  
 
Chapter three of the study discusses both the modern financial intermediary’s 
foundation and the Islamic banking sector background including the historical 
perspective and the pillars underpinning its operations. The framework of modern 
financial intermediaries and the role of banking institutions in the economy are also 
discussed in this chapter. This chapter also discusses the mode of financing instruments 
currently used by the Islamic bank.  
 
Chapter four describes the research methodology. This research methodology chapter 
consists of various subtopics including the theoretical framework, conceptual 
framework, and the research framework. The foundation and conceptual idea of Islamic 
bank cyclicality behaviour is thoroughly described in this chapter. The chapter also 
describes the research design of the thesis including the research model and statistical 
inference method. In this part the definition of the analytical tool for measuring Islamic 
bank market reaction to changes in macroeconomic performance indicators is given.  
 
The subsequent chapter discusses the empirical evidence, statistical inference, and 
analysis. The last chapter provides the research conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Overview 
For the past thirty years, the global economy has experienced hundreds of distinct 
economic crises related to the unsoundness of the financial market. According to Aziz 
(2009) out of those, more than 124 global economic crises are related to the instability 
of the interest-based banking sector. The 1990’s and 2000’s global economic disorder 
are empirically proven to be directly related to the unsteadiness and pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based bank lending. The recent business cycle event related to 
the financial market turmoil without a doubt is a direct result of an intolerable increase 
in credit growth and financial leveraging within the interest-based financial system 
during soaring economic growth.  
 
At present, this apparent excessive pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank 
lending activities have become one of the most attention-grabbing issues discussed in 
many monetary and financial economics conferences. Concerns and empirical 
investigations on the possible pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending 
to the business cycle occurrence in actual fact started to arise at the end of 1980’s and 
early 1990’s.  
 
Among the earliest empirical evidence for the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-
based bank lending is provided by Guttentag and Herring (1984), Bernanke and Lown 
(1991), Rajan (1994), and Asea and Blomberg (1998). The wariness on the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based bank lending is for the reason that it will amplify the 
economic environment instability, complexity, and unpredictable rise and fall of the 
economic activities.  
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The issue on pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-based bank lending has attracted 
worldwide attention on the Islamic financial system. With the unique characteristics 
guided by the shariah (Islamic law), proponents of the Islamic banking system 
theoretically believe the Islamic bank financing operations have the tendency to behave 
counter-cyclically to the business cycles. They also believe that the system will 
eventually stabilise the economic environment.  
 
While a broad empirical analysis literature exists surrounding the pro-cyclical behaviour 
of the interest-based bank lending to the business cycle event, empirical analysis of the 
Islamic bank financing behaviour, quite the opposite, is absent from the scene. Due to 
the lack of empirical evidence for supporting the academic study of the Islamic banking 
system, leads to this study.  
 
This present paper assesses and provides empirical evidence on the possible potential of 
Islamic banking system in managing and stabilising the economic atmosphere. Whether 
the Islamic bank financing operations have the tendency to behave counter-cyclically 
and whether the financing activities of the Islamic bank are tied to the fluctuations in the 
economic activities, surely need some empirical verification.  
 
Reflecting the study aim to obtain a comprehensive empirical analysis and 
understanding of the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing to the business 
cycle, the review of literature is divided into three parts. Firstly, the review of literature 
is on the business cycle concepts and theory, followed by the literature on the related 
issues and theories on the role of modern banking institutions, money and credit 
operations in contributing to the business cycle phenomenon. Secondly, the chapter 
reviews previous studies on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank 
lending operations to the business cycle and their relevant theories. The literature 
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explores and analyse on the pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-based bank lending 
operation that aggravated the business cycle happening. The last part reviewed literature 
on the Islamic bank related to the business cycle phenomena.  
 
2.1 Literatures on Business Cycle Phenomenon 
Modern economic history has recorded a large number of macroeconomic fluctuations 
occurrences of the 19th century, which the business activities recorded an outstanding 
rise of aggregate output, followed by an undesirable increase in the general price level. 
Occasionally, there is sudden shock of market declines followed by corporate failures 
and bankruptcies as well as mounting unemployment. Movements towards this 
undesired economic activity may also extend over periods of years because of the 
dynamism and complexity of today’s modern economic atmosphere. The economists 
refer to it as the business cycle. The level of changes in national production, prices, and 
employment measures this episodic rise and fall phenomenon in the general rate of 
economic activities.  
 
Business cycle is the upswing and downswing or the fluctuation of aggregate economic 
activities of which may span over months or even years. The growth rate of real gross 
domestic product is the main indicator used to measure these upswings and downswings 
of economic activities. The nature of this economic activity fluctuation shown by the 
expansion and contraction of real gross domestic product does not actually follow any 
mechanical or predictable periodic pattern.  
 
During the period of economic upswings, the real gross domestic product increases the 
amount of money circulating in the market and the general price level tends to increase. 
On the contrary, throughout an economic downturn, decreases in the real gross domestic 
 33 
 
product appear with slower growth of money supply and the unemployment rate starts 
to increase. 
 
Economists are conscious of this apparent cyclical behaviour of the economic growth 
development since the works of ‘classical economist’ such as Adam Smith in 1776, 
David Ricardo in 1810, Clement Juglar in 1860 and many others. The works of some 
classical economists and other early modern economists show the awareness and 
anxiety on the economic growth fluctuations and certain characteristics of the swing.  
 
Marx and Engels (1848) on the other hand, in their 1848 Communist Manifesto, 
referred the incident of economic activity fluctuations or the business cycle as the 
‘commercial crises’. Alternatively, Burns and Mitchell (1946) provide the now standard 
definition of business cycles. In 1946, Burn and Mitchell (1946) produced a manuscript 
entitled ‘Measuring Business Cycles’ and their effort is considered as one landmark 
study on business cycle phenomenon. Their empirical writing was among the first that 
analyse the fact about business cycles and had a worldwide acceptance by the 
economists.  
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) pioneers the business cycle 
research in the United States. They are the final arbiter of the dates of the peaks and 
troughs of the business cycle in the United States. The National Bureau of Economic 
Research develops and continues to update the business cycle chronology, a detailed 
history of business cycles in the United States. National Bureau of Economic Research 
defines recession as a persistent period of declining in total output, income, 
employment, and trade, usually lasting from six months to a year and marked by a 
widespread contraction in many sectors of the economy. 
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The alternating period of this economic growth situation is the ‘expansion’ or ‘boom’ 
and ‘contraction’ or ‘bust’ of the economic activities. In the event of economic 
expansion, the economy reaches its prosperity with growing real gross domestic product 
rates and low rate of unemployment. Periodically interruption in declining national 
output, contraction of aggregate income and aggregate spending and rising of 
unemployment are a common phenomenon during this economic expansion.  
 
Sometime this downturn can be severed and extended for several years. A new 
phenomenon adding to this economic fluctuation problem arises from the third quarter 
of the last century is the stagflation problem. Stagflation is a period of slow economic 
growth and high unemployment (deflation) added with a sustained rise in the general 
price level (inflation). In simple word, the occurrence of inflation situation is 
accompanied by a stagnant economic growth and high unemployment rate or the 
recession. 
 
The western economists have come up with lots of views and theories to explain on the 
business cycle phenomenon since the 19th century. Two categories of theories identified 
with explaining the characteristics and causes of business cycles are the traditional 
business cycle theory and modern business cycle theory.  
 
Schumpeter in 1911, 1931, and 1939 reviewed the types and causes of business cycle 
based on the traditional business cycle models and named them after their discoverers or 
researchers (Legrand and Hagemann, 2007). Some main types of business cycles based 
on time duration reviewed are: 
1. Juglar fixed investment cycles of 7 to 11 years (after Clement Juglar, 1860),  
2. Kitchin inventory cycles of 3 to 5 years (after Joseph Kitchin, 1923), 
3. Kondratieff wave or cycles of 45 to 60 years (after Nikolai Kondratieff, 1925),  
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4. Kuznets infrastructural investment cycles of 15 to 25 years (after Simon 
Kuznets, 1940),  
5.  Forrester cycles of 200 years (after Jay Wright Forrester).  
6.  Toffler civilization cycles of 1000 to 2000 years (after Alvin Toffler).  
 
Clement Juglar (1860) is among the first researchers to use the statistical methods 
originally, intensively, and rigorously to explore the business cycle phenomena. He is a 
French physician and statistician that appeared as a founder of the modern business 
cycle model. Legrand and Hagemann (2007) noted that Juglar in his writing, call for an 
economic theory explanation of the cycle, to investigate the causes, and to signal the 
effects of commercial crises that happened in Europe and the United States during the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Clement Juglar, in 1860, identified the business cycles base on periodicity of roughly 7 
to 11 years (later known as the Juglar cycle). The crisis rooted during the prosperous 
period in 1860 is the basis of Juglar analysis of business cycles. He argued that the 
speculative activities fuelled by easy credit are the causes for the overheated economy 
and the alternating periods of crisis and prosperity. On the other hand, Schumpeter 
suggested that the technological innovations of medium size are the driven factor of the 
occurrences of classical business cycles (Legrand and Hagemann, 2007). 
 
Over the years, alternative interpretations of business cycles have come from two most 
significant modern theories. They are the Real Business Cycle theory and Endogenous 
Business Cycle theory. Both of the theories describe the characteristics and causes of 
the business cycles from the perspective of the modern economic environment. The 
Real Business Cycle theory explains that the economic fluctuation arises from the 
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exogenous shocks, otherwise the economic environment is stable (Slutzky, 1927; 
Frisch, 1933; and Kydland and Prescott, 1982).  
 
The Endogenous Business Cycle theory proposition, on the other hand, suggests that it 
is the intrinsic processes that endogenously destabilise the economic system and creates 
the economic fluctuation (Harrod, 1939; Samuelson, 1939; Goodwin, 1967; Chiarella et 
al., 2005). Both hypotheses have their strengths and limitations. Currently in economic 
literature, it is the Real Business Cycle theory garners the consensus (Hallegatte and 
Ghil, 2007). 
 
The theory that currently becomes the mainstream approach in analysing the business 
cycle event is the Real Business Cycle theory. The approach was popularised by Finn E. 
Kydland and Edward C. Prescott in their 1982 seminal work “Time to Build and 
Aggregate Fluctuations”. The Real Business Cycle theory originally comes from the 
efforts of Slutzky (1927) and Frisch (1933) are based on the idea of rational 
expectations and hypotheses of perfect markets.  
 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) envisioned that the factors contributed to the business 
cycle event are technological shocks and processes rather than purely monetary. They 
envision that the random fluctuations in the productivity level that shifted up or down 
the constant growth trend. Examples of such shocks include innovations, bad weather, 
imported oil price increases, stricter environmental and safety regulations, and so forth. 
The general gist is that something occurs that directly changes the effectiveness of 
capital and (or) labour. This in turn affects the decisions on workers and firms, who in 
turn change what they buy and produce, thus, eventually affects output.  
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Real Business Cycle models predict time sequences of allocation for consumption, 
investment, and so forth that give these shocks (Kydland and Prescott 1982). They 
implied that the economic environment could be modelled as stable, that is, after any 
exogenous shocks that perturb the economic environment, the economy will return to its 
stable condition.  
 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) analysis that followed this Real Business Cycle theory 
using the dynamic General Equilibrium Model approach provides a breakthrough for 
the business cycle theory. Their analysis went further than just the qualitative 
assessment on model properties that had dominated the macroeconomics theoretical 
work. In their analytical paper, Kydland and Prescott (1982) introduced the 
mathematical model in explaining the Real Business Cycle. Their model explains the 
condition that is capable of reproducing the economic fluctuations. However, Hallegatte 
and Ghil (2007) stated that The Real Business Cycle models, while reproducing rather 
well the standard deviation from most macroeconomic variables, encounter substantial 
difficulties in reproducing the co-movements of and correlations between variables. 
 
2.1.1 Islamic Views in Business Cycle Phenomenon 
Looking at the business cycle phenomenon from the Islamic view, it is directly 
mentioned in chapter Yusuf (Quran: 12:46-49) and was reported in the hadith (a 
tradition based on reports of the sayings and conducts of Prophet Muhammad (saw) and 
narrated by his companions). Despite the fact that the business cycle phenomena are not 
odd in the Islamic economy, however, to our knowledge it is difficult to trace any 
exhaustive academic literature by the scholars on the business cycle.  
 
 38 
 
Verses in the Quran from the chapter of Yusuf (12:46-49) provide a clear incident of the 
business cycle phenomena and the guideline on managing this unwanted observable 
fact: 
“ O truthful Yusuf, explain to us, seven fat cows which seven lean ones 
devoured, and seven green ears, and seven other dry, that I might return to 
the people that they may know (46). He said, “For seven years you shall 
sow continuously, then what you reap leave 5 it on the ear, except a little 
whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter there shall come upon you seven hard 
years, in which you shall devour all that you have reserved for them, except 
a little you keep in store (48). Then there shall come after that a year in 
which the people shall have rain and in which they shall press (fruit & oil) 
(49). (Quran; Yusuf (12):46-49) 
 
Besides the Quran, there are also hadith mentioning the occurrence of market 
disturbances during the life of Prophet Muhammad (saw). Based on the hadith narrated 
by Anas ibn Malik (ra), there was a time when price levels went up.  
 
“The people said: Apostle of Allah, prices has shot up, so fix prices for us. 
Thereupon the Apostle of Allah (saw) said: “Verily, Allah (swt) determines 
the climate of economic affluence and gloom. I do not want to take any 
action to fix the prices because I do not want, later in hereafter, any among 
you to demand for the return of your property and blood from me because of 
my tyranny (in fixing the prices).” Narrated by Anas ibn Malik in Sunan 
Abu Dawud. 
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In other incidence, 
A person came to him asking him to fix the market price of a certain good at 
lower than the market price. The Prophet (saw) said no! After 2 more 
requests from the person and the same reply, the Prophet (saw) told the 
person to ask Allah to decrease the price that is to increase supply.” 
Narrated by Abu Dawud. 
 
Narrated by Abu Hurayrah and by Ali Ibn Abi Talib: 
“A man came and said: Apostle of Allah, fix prices. He said: (No), but I 
shall pray. Again the man came and said: Apostle of Allah, fix prices. He 
said: It is Allah Who makes the prices low and high. I hope that when I meet 
Allah, none of you have any claim on me for doing wrong regarding blood 
and property”. Narrated by Abu Dawud. 
 
Based on the Quran verses (Yusuf; 12:46-49) and the hadith cited above, the occurrence 
of business cycles is definitely not an out of the ordinary and nevertheless it is an 
undesirable phenomenon. Chapter Yusuf (12:46-49) and hadith in a way inform us on 
the alternating periods of the ups and downs in the economic activities, the economic 
crisis and prosperity with the role of market mechanism, and the mechanism needed in 
managing and avoiding the happening of the economic fluctuations. 
 
On the other hand, one of the most influential early descriptive writing by Muslim 
scholars was by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 AD). He described the first ever explanation 
of the business cycle phenomena. Khaldun indirectly explained the role of market 
mechanisms in determining the progression of economic growth of his famous 
“Muqaddimah” (M) about six hundred years ago.  
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Chapra (2008a) discussed Khaldun’s view in business cycles where Khaldun described 
a rise in incomes and wealth leads to the expansion of economic opportunities and 
greater development. The immigration of skilled and unskilled labour and scholars from 
other places furthers strengthening the human and intellectual capital. This in turn, 
induces a natural rise in populations. Such a rise in population boosts the supply and 
demand for goods and services in the market and thereby promotes industries (al-sanai), 
raises incomes, promotes sciences and education, and further accelerates development 
(M: p. 363 and p. 403; (Rozenthal (R) (1967) II: p. 277 and p. 351-52). 
 
In the beginning, prices tend to decline from the rise in development and production. 
However, if demand keeps on rising and the supply is unable to keep pace of it, 
scarcities develop, leading to a rise in the prices of goods and services. The prices of 
necessities tend to rise faster than the luxuries and prices in urban areas rise faster than 
in rural areas. The cost of labour also rises and so do tax. This leads to a further rise in 
prices, which creates a hardship for people and leads to a reversal in the flow of 
population, development declines and along with it prosperity and civilization (M: p. 
168 and p. 363-5; R: I. p. 339-42 and II: p. 276-85), hence, when incomes decline so do 
the tax revenues. The state is in turn unable to spend on development and well-being. 
Development declines, the recession deepens further and the forces of decay are 
accelerated (M: 168 and 279-82; R: I. 339-42 and II. 89-92) (Chapra, 2008). 
 
The business cycle occurrence mentioned in the Quran (Yusuf, 12: 46-49), hadith and 
the early works by Khaldun from the Islamic worldview went missing after the fall of 
the Muslim empire. It was then continued by the western scholars that explore the 
knowledge but with the absence of the divine guidance values and principles revealed 
by the almighty Allah (swt) as the guidance. In other words, the self-interest (nafs) and 
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the animal spirit was the guiding mechanism of the western scholars in their attempt to 
maximise the wealth of nations lying within the concept of ‘homoeconomicus’.  
 
Only in the early 20th century, new effort arose with some significant efforts and works 
by Muslim scholars to recognise and reinstate the Islamic economic system particularly 
in the Muslim majority countries. Islamisation effort in the field of modern economics 
and finance started more than fifty years ago and the hard work in establishing the 
Islamic financial institutions started to emerge some forty years ago. 
 
Regarding the inflation phenomenon, mentioned by the hadith, early Islamic scholars 
realised the existence of this episode as the consequences of a mismatch in the market 
supply and demand in causing the sustained increase of general price level. Chapra 
(2008a) mentioned in his writing, Al-Jahiz (869 AD), Taymiyyah (1328 AD) and 
Khaldun (1406 AD) had explained how the movement of the market supply and demand 
had caused the market price level to fluctuate.  
 
The unemployment and inflation phenomena might also occur in an Islamic economic 
environment. Based on the Quranic verses (Yusuf; 12:46-49) and hadith, the business 
cycle happening is not impossible though the fundamental underpinning of households 
and producers behaviour in an Islamic economy is guided by the Quran and hadith. The 
pillars underpin the behaviour of economic agents’ behaviour from the Islamic economy 
perspective is the Quran and hadith that describe how men as the economic units should 
behave.  
 
With respect to the effort in hunting for wealth and ways of spending the wealth, the 
Quran and hadith describe what is right and what is wrong. Ebrahim and Safadi (1993) 
wrote that Al-Shiabani (750-804 AD) gave an in depth discussion on this area in his 
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book Al-Iktisab or ‘Earnings’. However, in reality, the majority of men do not act as 
instructed by the Quran and Hadith; although they were repeatedly instructed and 
reminded to do so (Quran, 3:110). With the decline in religious consciousness, then the 
self (nafs) guides the norms, values, and behaviours, hence, the instability of the 
economic environment tends to transpire due to the overconsumption by households and 
overinvestment by the firms. 
 
From the Prophet Muhammad’s (saw) and Khaldun’s description on how an economy 
develops, they indirectly described the three main economic units that have a role in 
developing the economy, that is, the households, producers and the government. They 
also described the interaction of market supply and demand (the market mechanism 
forces as they are called today) determines the market price and brings to the economic 
expansion and prosperity. They also described the mismatch of market supply and 
demand in the market will finally bring to the expansion and contraction of the 
economic activities. 
 
2.2 Financial Intermediaries, Money Market, and The Economic Fluctuations 
The thesis will not be proper without discussing the relationship between financial 
institutions as the intermediaries in the financial market and the use of money as the 
medium of transactions in facilitating and prospering the economic activities. Therefore, 
this particular section explores the relationship of financial intermediaries, money 
market, and the economic activities.  
 
Comprehensive academic discussions on the relationship between the economic 
activities with money and financial institutions have already existed since the beginning 
of the 20th century. Literature on the role of money and financial intermediaries, banks 
in particular, has existed since the period of ‘classical economist’ as the mainstream 
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economics school of thought from roughly 1775 to 1930. Adam Smith through his 
writing in 1776 recognised the importance of money and financial intermediary roles 
that could make the economy grow. The most influential writing of the ‘Classical 
Economist’ on the relationship of money with the economy will be the Fisher’s 
‘Quantity Theory of Money’ (Fisher, 1911).  
 
Currently there are three well-known competing hypotheses concerning the influence of 
money in business cycle phenomena. They are the traditional monetarists, real business 
cycle economists, and new classical economists. The traditional monetarists lead by 
Brunner and Meltzer (1993) as Keynesians claim that changes in the money supply will 
affect the production activities for the reasons of sticky prices and wages. Real business 
cycle economists on the other hand believe that changes in the money supply have no 
significant effects on real output (King and Plosser, 1984). Whilst Lucas (1973 and 
1975) on the new classical economists, conjecture that changes in the money supply 
affect output only as much as they induce producers to deviate from their plans.  
 
Literature on money from Islamic scholars on the other hand, is traceable even before 
the era of ‘classical economists’. Conventional Muslims’ scholars gave discussants on 
the concepts and role of money.  Ahmad ibn Hambal (d. 23/644) was among the earlier 
scholars discussed the concepts of money. He concluded that anything that generally 
accepted by the people could be adopted as currency. Ibn Hazim (d 456/1064) in his 
discussion on the concepts of money did not find any reason for the Muslims to confine 
their currency to gold and silver only. The dirham and dinar according to Ibn 
Taymiyyah (d 505/1328) were not desired for their own sake but rather because of their 
ability to serve as media of exchange (Chapra, 1996). These early views on the role of 
money and literature contributed by the Islamic scholars, however, went missing after 
the collapse of the Muslims empire. 
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From the Islamic view, money is simply a potential capital and not considered as capital 
(Akacem and Gillian, 2002). Thus, to get a return to holding money requires the 
services of other economic agents such as firms or the producers for instance, to 
transform it into a more productive use. Hence, transforming money into a productive 
use and undertaking a risk is necessary to justify for any return out of it. In an interest-
based banking system, converting money into capital or by using it productively has 
nothing to do with the depositors. From the shariah view, obtaining a return to money 
placed in a bank of no transforming it into a productive use is definitely unacceptable. 
Furthermore, even though the depositors’ money is transformed into any productive and 
risky used no fixed returns to the depositors can be set regardless of the profits. 
 
2.2.1 Contemporary Views on Money, Credit, and Banking 
Today’s households and firms rely heavily on debt to finance the consumption 
expenditure spending and working capital expenses. In most cases, the internally 
generated funds are not enough to finance the households consumption spending and 
firms investment spending for any additional assets. Therefore, the economic agents 
will have to consider the external sources of funds to cover the deficit. Households 
represent the ultimate source of funds of the economic agents with most of the loans is 
channelled through the financial intermediaries, particularly banking institutions.  
 
With the advancement in modern economic activity and with it becomes very much 
complicated, bring to the needs for the existence of modern financial intermediaries to 
facilitate and support the growing economic activities. Without the financial 
intermediary active participation, the banking system in particular, the progress of 
economic growth is inconceivable. The economy will grow faster with financial 
intermediation deepening or more advance, active, and develop financial intermediation 
system. The existing of these highly advanced and sophisticated credit facilities, 
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however, can create a serious mismatch of aggregate supply and demand that will bring 
to a severe fluctuation of the economic activity. 
 
An economist by the name of Schumpeter (1911) explained the role of financial 
intermediaries in spurring innovations and growth by identifying and funding 
productive investment. According to his theory, the role of financial intermediaries acts 
on behalf of the society in general to satisfy the demand for credit by entrepreneurs’ 
selection of firms that are regarded as worthies of obtaining the loans. It also assesses 
the firms’ risks and evaluates the borrowers’ creditworthiness.  
 
Following the famous Keynes’ “General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
(1936) and the monetarist theory (1960s), the early consideration brought by the 
classical economists on the important role of the credit markets was largely forgotten 
and ignored. It was until 1970’s, the literature and foundations being redeveloped that 
conjecture the important role of the credit market. The idea embarks upon the 
recognition of the presence of asymmetric information issue caused by the imperfect 
market and imperfect information phenomenon.  
 
New theoretical foundation and empirical work developments started to revive the 
concerns on the bank’s lending role in the business cycle phenomenon after the 
beginnings of Frediric S. Mishkin’s empirical work in 1978 involving reconsideration 
on the part of financial markets and institutions role in the Great Depression episode. 
Analysing the data onto a more sophisticated statistical method, Mishkin (1978) 
determines whether the financial factors have an effect on consumer spending in the 
event of the Great Depression. The study shows the households’ net financial positions 
significantly determined the consumer demand. With the deflation condition and 
declining incomes, the consumer real indebtedness also increased. This observable fact 
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has driven the consumers to reduce their spending in the economy. This scenario 
consecutively magnifies the recession and further deteriorates the economic depression 
phenomenon.  
 
Bernanke (1983) analysed further on the significance of monetary variables relatively 
against the financial aspects in the event of the Great Depression. One important 
determinant of the depression’s intensity was the collapse of the financial system. The 
extensive number of debtors’ insolvency and the loss of faith with the financial 
institutions, particularly the commercial banks are the two major gears that collapsed 
the financial system of that undesirable economic event.  
 
The view raised by Bernanke’s (1983) is that, the 1930-33 market disturbances had 
disrupted the financial market effectiveness in performing the nontrivial market making 
and inflation gathering services. As markets for financial claims were imperfect, 
intermediation between lenders and borrowers needed those services. In that economic 
events, some borrowers found that the credit facilities had become so expensive and 
difficult to obtain as the real costs of intermediation had increased. The impact on the 
aggregate demand of this credit squeeze had contributed to the turning of severe 
economic downturns of 1929-30 to an extended economic depression. 
 
Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) analyses provide support on the significance of 
the debt-deflation theory brought by Fisher’s (1933). The results of their studies prove 
that the condition of financial markets has a role in propagating the Great Depression 
event in particular and the business cycle phenomenon in general. 
 
Following the historical fact after a long absent, literature on significant relationship 
between economic growths and efficient financial markets actually arose in 1950’s. It 
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began with the publication of writing by John Gurley and Edward Stone Shaw that is 
the “Financial Aspects of Economic Development” in 1955. Gurley’s and Shaw’s 
(1955) writing emphasis on the financial intermediation function in credit creation 
processes. The financial intermediation deepening and a very much-organised financial 
system exist in the developed countries. They argue that the economic development is 
hindered if merely self-finance and direct finance are accessible and financial 
intermediaries are not involved. Thus, the existence of financial intermediaries improves 
the efficiency of intertemporal trade, which is an important factor that governs the 
smooth running of the economic activities. 
 
2.3 Interest-Based Bank Lending’s and Business Cycle 
The idea of banking institutions plays a significant role in creating a real economic 
effect of the credit creation activities is not new. Adam Smith in 1776, through his 
writing, recognised the importance of money and financial intermediary role that could 
make the economy grow. A more technical discussion of the classical economists’ 
views on how the role of banking institutions affected the economic activities through 
the credit creation process began with the writing by Knut Wicksell in 1906 in 
‘Monetary Dynamics’ and Irvin Fisher’s in 1933 in ‘The Debt–Deflation Theory Of 
Great Depressions’. In their writing, they explain the fluctuations of economic activities 
are because of the expansion and contraction of credit and they explain how the banks’ 
lending activities have augmented the cyclical fluctuations. 
 
According to Wicksell’s (1906) through the ‘loanable fund theory’, banks’ lending and 
money supply have the tendency to expand in the periods of growing economy and 
strong demand for loanable fund. He used the concept of “natural rate of interest” (the 
rate of interest at which the demand for loan on capital and the supply of savings exactly 
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agrees, which depends on the expected profitability of an investment) to explain the 
scenario.  
 
Wicksell (1906) explains that the market interest rate tends to be sticky or the market 
interest rate responds slowly and with a delay to any changes in the demand for funds. 
Because of the market interest rates stickiness, an increase in the natural rate makes the 
natural rate go above the market interest rate for some time. This will lower the supply 
of saving and increase the demand for loans. With the increase in investment and 
borrowing activities, spending and prices will increase. This will lead to higher 
expectations on the investment profitability. This in fact will further the investment 
spending and increase prices. This snowballing process continues until the banks’ 
excess reserve run-out and the banks raise the market interest rate. 
 
On the other hand, according to Fisher (1933), the Great Depression experience is the 
consequences of “over-indebtedness”. Falling prices further aggravate the economic 
downturn. High leverage of borrowers and heavy burden of debt, consequently attribute 
to the severity of the Great Depression. Business downturn precipitated a wave of 
bankruptcies and enhancing the downturn.  
 
Fisher (1933) elucidated that “easy money” as the “great causes for over-borrowing”. 
The “over-indebtedness” of highly leveraged borrowers led to the “over-production”. 
Due to excess supply, thus, prices start to fall. The large decrease in the market price led 
to the occurrence of under production. Falling output created excess demand and 
causing severe cyclical fluctuations in the output market. The direct effect was an 
increase in bankruptcies and furthering the economic downturn. The indirect impact was 
price deflation.  
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The real debt burdens increase greatly with the extended fall in prices and real incomes, 
given the fact that the debt contract is in nominal terms. Deflation and falling output 
pressured the economy further down and continued the twisting of economic 
depression. Fisher (1933) furthers to show that creditors had to cut back on current 
expenditures and future commitments due to the decline in distribution of wealth from 
debtors to creditors.   
 
Views on the important role of credit markets went missing after Wicksell (1906) and 
Fisher (1933) developed the foundations. Reconsideration and redevelopment of the 
foundations on the important role of credit market began with the acknowledgment of 
the economics of imperfect information or information asymmetry in 1970s. Before the 
1970s, the focused of analyses were more on the role of money in the economy. The 
early works of Wicksell (1906) and Fisher (1933) were left by the wayside following 
the famous Keynes “General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), and 
monetarist theory (1960s) further reinforced this abstraction.  
 
Following the influential writing by Keynes (1936), the macroeconomics literature 
largely ignored any links between the credit market conditions with economic activities 
and growth in output. Despite the fact that the credit market condition is important to 
influence the investment behaviour, Keynes (1936) argued that the financial institutions 
have a less explicit role in the determination of aggregate output. Rather than the credit 
market, the most relevant financial variable determinant of economic activity is the 
money.  
 
The key determinant of investment is the ‘state of confidence’. State of confidence is 
the borrowers’ belief considering the condition of credit and the potential yields from an 
investment. The lenders’ confidence in financing the borrowers determined the state of 
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credit and the prospective yields from the investment. A distraction from confidence 
either of the lenders’ or borrowers’ is sufficient to bring about an economic downturn.  
 
The work of Gurley and Shaw in 1955 redirected the attention towards the interaction 
between financial structure and the real economic activity. The attempt made by Gurley 
and Shaw (1955) highlighted on the efficiency of intertemporal trade and economic 
growth that can be improved by the existence of financial intermediaries. Their works 
highlight on the important role of financial intermediaries in extending borrowers’ 
financial capacity, particularly the credit creation processes. The basis of their proposal 
was on the observed connection between the financial intermediation system and 
economic development. According to them, a more significant determinant compared to 
money in determining the macroeconomic behaviour is the overall economic ‘financial 
capacity’.  
 
Financial capacity measures the capability of the borrowers in absorbing the debt, 
without having to reduce spending to avoid default. It is one of the significant 
determinants of firms’ balance sheets and economic aggregate demand stability. 
Financial capacity is the key determinant of intertemporal trade. The economic growth 
will augment the changes in spending and amplify the economic fluctuation or business 
cycles. This earlier works of Gurley and Shaw (1955) was however sideways with the 
work of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) on theory of investment.  
 
According to Modigliani’s and Miller’s (1958) theory of investment, the financial 
structure has no influence on the real economic decisions. The theorem explains when 
the capital markets are perfectly competitive and information is costless whether a firm 
finances a given project or its investment decisions through debt or equity is irrelevant. 
In other words, they stated that sources of finance are irrelevant to the firm’s value and 
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decisions on investment. Firms could rely on other financial institution or to the equity 
market in obtaining the required funds if a bank declined to finance the firm’s valuable 
project. Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem proposed that in this frictionless world, 
given an appropriate set of prices, all markets would be at equilibrium, including the 
credit markets. 
 
In the early 1960s, Milton Friedman and his disciples published a series of studies that 
promoted the case of a strong effect of money on economic activities. They emphasised 
on the basic principle of stabilisation policy of a steady growth of money supply. 
Friedman and his followers, later known as the ‘monetarist’, argued the fiscal policy on 
itself having no significant impact on the course of real economic activities or on the 
economic fluctuation.  
 
Friedman’s and Schwartz’s (1963) work in explaining the Great Depression, 
emphasised on the importance of money and the role of financial markets. Friedman and 
Meiselman (1963), by using single equation estimation, conducted a study on monetary 
and fiscal policy effectiveness in determining the nominal income. Their study shows 
the relationship between money and output is much more statistically significant and 
stable compared to the relationship between government expenditure and output. 
Andersen’s and Jordon’s (1968) later study in the United States supported Friedman and 
Meiselman (1963) finding with a significant correlation between money and nominal 
income.  
 
Both contended Keynesian economists and monetarists further toughened the idea. 
Keynes (1936), with the liquidity preference theory deliberately directed economists to 
focus on the interaction of money demand and money supply as the determinants of the 
interest rate. Monetarist theory, alternatively, also led to an emphasis on money but not 
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credit. The most influential writing comes, in particular, in Friedman’s and Schwartz’s 
(1963) “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960” that describes the United 
States monetary system history. 
 
Apparently, views on the economics of imperfect information and the economic role of 
financial intermediaries started to appear in 1970s. Early literature on financial markets 
generally discussed the existence and foundation of financial intermediaries and its 
association with the information asymmetry and costs of transaction. Akerlof (1970) 
and Spence (1973) were among the pioneers in contributing its literature. The 
assumption of zero information or the perfect information and zero transaction costs has 
come with growing criticism from the work of Akerlof’s (1970). Akerlof (1970) 
seminal paper points on how the market can be malfunctioned with the existence of 
imperfect information on buyers and sellers.  
 
There are two strands of theories established in the literature explaining the existence 
and foundation of financial intermediaries. The first path emphasises on the financial 
intermediaries as the liquidity provider. The other path focuses on the ability of 
financial intermediaries’ in transforming the asset risk features. Theoretically, both 
strands describe the capability of financial intermediation in achieving a more effective 
and efficient allocation of resources through reducing cost in channelling funds between 
lenders and borrowers. 
 
An effective and efficient financial market entails a systematic financial market and 
mechanisms to overcome the problem of asymmetric information or imperfect 
information. Asymmetric information exists on lenders and borrowers in the financial 
markets. Lenders generally know less about an investment project than the borrowers do 
therefore this creates the asymmetric information. Hence, the financial intermediaries 
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who are specialised in collecting, gathering, and assembling information are able to 
evaluate and monitor on the borrowers’ and project performance. Consequently, this can 
prevail over the information asymmetry problem. Thus, the need of financial 
intermediaries is because of the increase in information and transaction costs that come 
from asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. This argument with 
asymmetric information implies that the assumptions of Modigliani-Miller theorem do 
not hold. 
 
2.3.1 Contemporary Theories on Interest-Based Bank Cyclical Behaviour  
In view of the fact that the empirical study of the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour is 
difficult to trace, it is necessary to look at studies on the cyclicality behaviour of 
interest-based banks.  The intention of analysing the literature on interest-based bank’s 
lending is to have a good grip on the cyclicality behaviour of banks’ financing activities 
and the appropriate methodology used in evaluating their behaviour. More importantly, 
the empirical works of literature on interest-based bank cyclicality behaviour is more 
apparent and significant in contributing to the economic instability since 1990s. 
 
The works of literature have statistically very well documented the pro-cyclical nature 
of the interest-based banks’ behaviour. Hypothetically, the pro-cyclical nature of the 
interest-based banks’ behaviour originates from the asymmetric information on lenders 
and borrowers as proposed by Bernanke and Lown (1991), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), Kashyap and Stein (1994). During the upswing of economic activities, the 
interest-based banks’ attitude is upturns. Households and business enterprises, with 
loose conditions in obtaining loans as well as easy to obtain loans, facilitating and 
strengthening the process of economic growth. During economic downturns even 
profitably projects and without problems are not guaranteed of obtaining loans due to 
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asymmetric information. Accordingly, this interest-based banks’ behaviour will 
aggravate further the existing crisis.  
 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Adrian and Hyun (2008), Quagliariello M (2007), 
Nan and Hung (2007) provide the latest empirical evidence on the interest-based banks’ 
pro-cyclical behaviour. Their studies show that the interest-based banks increase their 
leverage and reduce it when the asset price starts to fall in the event of increasing asset 
price. Quagliariello (2008), in his meta-analysis study, shows that the interest-based 
bank distress is usually associated with the significant fall in gross domestic product 
growth, increase of real interest rates, slower growth of households and firms spending, 
extensive swings in the general price level, decrease in the asset prices, and depreciation 
in the real exchange rate.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that debtors’ loan repayment competency is stronger during 
economic upturns and weaker during downturn periods. Accordingly, during this phase, 
it is observable that the interest-based banks tend to overreact to the swing. During 
economic upswings, in order to increase or protect their market share, the interest-based 
banks reduce their loan prices. During this promising economic condition, the interest-
based banks take on greater risks as regards to the optimistic prospect of the economy 
and future trends due to the profit enthusiasm behaviour.  
 
It is observable that the interest-based banks are enthusiastic to enlarge their lending 
operation and ease the requirements for collaterals during this phase. Throughout the 
economic expansion, the collateral’s value increases significantly, this greatly led to the 
cyclical behaviour. The value of collateral may decline significantly from the event of 
economic contractions. This worsens the banks’ pro-cyclicality behaviour.  
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Another observable fact of the interest-based bank is that the bank tends to tighten the 
credit supply and increase the loan loss provisions during economic downturns. 
Bouvatier’s and Lepetit’s (2008), Bikker’s and Metzemakers’ (2005), and Laeven’s and 
Majnoni’s (2003) empirical evidence shows that the interest-based bank’s policy on the 
provisions for loan losses made to cover the expected future loan losses has amplified 
the credit fluctuations. Acting pro-cyclically and decreasing the loan loss provisions, 
consequently, the interest-based banks will worsen the problem of adverse selection. 
This behaviour will increase the probability of resource misallocation and amplifying 
fluctuations in economic activities. 
 
The cyclical character of the profitability enthusiasm is another key feature of the 
interest-based banks’ pro-cyclical behaviour, which is connected to their expectation on 
the future economic trends (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009 and Bikker and Hu, 
2002). On average, during cyclical upturns, the banks’ earnings grew and in the event of 
economic recessions, in general the banks’ profitability performances decline. Thus, the 
interest-based banks have a propensity to take on greater risks due to over-optimistic 
towards the upward trend of the economic condition and generally become over-
pessimistic when the economic condition reverses.  
 
This credit policy approach will reinforce the economic fluctuation in the upturn and 
downturn cyclical, thus, generates stronger pro-cyclical character. This loose policy of 
assessing the credit standards becomes the trend by all banks as a whole this will build 
up and strengthen the pro-cyclically character of the banks’ lending activities.  
 
2.3.2 Hypotheses on Interest-Based Bank Pro-Cyclicality Behaviour 
A number of hypotheses on the interest-based bank pro-cyclicality can be extracted 
from the literature. Theoretically, Gertler (1988) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993 and 
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1994), supported by Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
emphasise on the interest-based bank debt and the role of market imperfections. They 
used the bank debt and the role of market imperfections framework to estimate credit 
market equilibriums to test for the credit channel hypothesis and the relevance to a 
credit crunch incident.  
 
Bernanke’s and Lown’s (1991) analysis of the United States credit crunch episodes, by 
controlling the stages of the business cycle and previous five recession occurrences 
from the 1960s, documents the decline in the supply of credit for the 1990-91 recession. 
They show that the causes for the interest-based bank to cut the loan supply of the 1990s 
are related to the combined effect of shortage of financial capital and decline in the 
quality of borrowers’ financial health. In their analysis, they compared the contraction 
in credit during 1990-91 recessions to those in the previous recessions and they 
concluded that there had been a credit crunch.  
 
Through their survey, the total loans at domestically chartered commercial banks grew 
at an average of 7.1 percent during the previous five recessions, compared to the period 
during the 1990-91 recessions when it grew only by 1.7 percent. This reduction in 
lending activity according to Bernanke and Lown (1991), attributed to the supply and 
demand factors. The supply of credit had reduced because of a decline in the interest-
based bank capital caused by severe loan losses during the recession. Concurrently, the 
borrowers’ balance sheets had been weaker than normal, thus, the borrowers became 
less creditworthy than usual. As a result, market loan demand started to decline. 
 
Earlier, Guttentag and Herring (1984) emphasised on the ‘disaster myopia’ syndrome 
that made the interest-based banks tend to underestimate the probability of shocks over 
time. The interest-based bank might underestimate the risk exposure and ease the credit 
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standard during economic expansion and might increase the magnitude of losses when 
the economy contracted. They emphasised on the creditor behaviour in formulating, and 
acting on the shock probabilities rather than the business cycle as the mechanism 
through which the vulnerability of the system might increase. They also argued that an 
abrupt increase in the extent of credit rationing was the central feature of a financial 
crisis. They showed how risk premiums were set in competitive markets in response to 
subjective probabilities of credit shocks. They also demonstrated how the moral hazard 
could lead to the credit rationing and the imposition of minimum capital requirements. 
 
Rajan (1994) hypothesised that the interest-based banks’ management was obsessed 
with short-term concerns and perception of reputation and this is relevant to the ‘herd 
behaviour’ model. His paper argues that rational interest-based bank managers with 
short horizons will set credit policies that influence and be influenced by other interest-
based and demand side conditions. Evidence of the interest-based banking crisis in New 
England in the early 1990s was consistent with the assumptions and predictions of his 
theory. This leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by the interest-
based bank credit policies. 
 
Asea and Blomberg (1998) provided another set of views. During strong economic 
condition added with low default rates, the interest-based bank had the inclination to 
enlarge their portfolios in business loans exceeding the prudent level. Their view held 
that the interest-based bank loans underlying quality might deteriorate during economic 
expansions. Excess levels of lending volume increased the problem of adverse selection 
of drawing in an unwarranted volume of bad loans. This positioned the bank of higher 
than expected default rates that subsequently brought about an unnecessary tightening 
of the interest-based bank lending. The economy then slowed down as credit tightened.  
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Van den Heuvel (2002), based on the hypothesis of an imperfect market for the bank 
equity mentioned that the bank capital channel contributed to the fluctuations of the 
bank profitability. He addressed the issue of the effect of bank capital and its regulation 
on the role of interest-based banks’ lending in transmitting the monetary policy. 
Following the bank capital channel view, the monetary policy will affect the interest-
based bank lending through its impact on the bank equity capital. Increases in interest 
rates will lower the bank equity even further, causing some interest-based banks cut 
lending to reduce the risk of capital inadequacy.  
 
Results from simulating the calibrated model, Van den Heuvel (2002) from the 
perspective of optimal monetary policy, suggested that the economic amplification size 
was large to moderate. Perhaps the dynamics of the effect and size were highly 
dependent on the distribution and initial level of capital among the interest-based banks. 
Van den Heuvel’s (2002) reasoning is that the capital requirement affects the interest-
based bank behaviour more when the interest-based bank equity is low.  
 
Another model explaining the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank is the 
‘unifying model’ by Bliss and Kaufman (2002). The model emphasises on two 
constraints to credit expansion and contractions, the capital requirement and reserved 
requirement. If either constraint is binding, earning assets could not grow further. 
During the period of economic recession and monetary expansion, capital constraint 
implication may become the binding constraints on the interest-based bank. Reserve 
requirements, which are under the central bank control, are the likely effective 
constraints on interest-based bank during periods of economic boom and restrictive 
monetary regime. 
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Berger and Udell (2003) through the ‘institutional memory hypothesis’ explained that 
the current loan officers ease of credit standards over time creates the pro-cyclicality of 
interest-based bank lending. Loan officers obtain the skills to identify poor loan risks of 
recession but as the recessionary economic environment recedes into the past, they 
gradually lose this skill. The previous loan bust is not remembered with loan officer 
turnovers. Deterioration in the capability of loan officers will result in an easing of 
credit standards. The loan officers’ attempt to lower the loan standard will deteriorate 
the loan quality and creating for high default rates when the economic condition 
reverses. Berger and Udell (2003) provided empirical analysis to support for the 
hypothesis. This view is consistent with the persistent weakness for the volume of 
business loans as the economy enters the recovery phase of an economic business cycle. 
 
Bank for International Settlement (2001b) on the other hand, describes the contribution 
factor of the pro-cyclical manners of the banking sector and the financial system is the 
improper banks risk management policy. The failure of treating the time-dimension of 
risks correctly by the money market participants causes the pro-cyclical behaviour. The 
money market participants in general fail to assess the progression of risk over time 
accurately. The financial institutions even fail to act based on the appropriate 
assessment even though they are able to determine the time-dimension of a certain risk 
correctly. Bank for International Settlement (2001b) also explains that the incentives 
affect the attitude of market participants and the regulatory environment as well 
contributes to the pro-cyclical behaviour.  
 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) supported by many researchers such as by Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) argued that the bank loan loss 
provision also played a part in contributing to the interest-based bank lending 
cyclicality. They empirically showed that many interest-based banks all over the world 
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delayed their provisioning for loan losses and bad loans until it was too late. When the 
economic condition reversed, it magnified the economic downturn impact on the 
interest-based banks’ returns and capital.  
 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Borio et al. (2000) study shows that banks 
provisioning for loan losses turned out to be substantially higher when the real gross 
domestic product growth was lower. This reflected the increase in risk of the credit 
portfolio when the economic condition was at a downswing trend that increased the risk 
of a credit crunch. This observable interest-based bank pro-cyclical behaviour of 
upswings or downswings of business cycle are the progression of interest-based banks’ 
provisioning for loan losses policy (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003).  
 
The banks’ ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans decreases in the economic 
upswing event with the increase in economic activities and consequently the costs of 
provisioning decreases. While during economic downturns, the ratio and costs increase 
quickly and significantly. Therefore, erosion of the interest-based bank earnings 
immediately accompanies the turning point in business cycles with an abrupt decline in 
banks’ inclination to take on risk. Then, this is followed by a decrease of credit supply. 
Then, banks’ began restructuring on their lending portfolios to increase security as well 
as an adjustment of banks’ risk pricing by increasing the interest rates.  
 
Summarising all the hypotheses explaining the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-
based bank lending is related to the misevaluation and misestimating of the credit risk 
and liquidity risk over the business cycle phases.  
 
The hypotheses model of the pro-cyclicality behaviour of interest-based bank lending 
activity is summarised in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: Interest-Based Bank Lending Pro-cyclical Behaviour Model 
Researcher/s Model Bank Pro-cycle Variables 
Guttentag 
and 
Herring 
(1984)  
Disaster Myopia 
Syndrome. 
Underestimate the 
probability of shocks 
and the risk exposure. 
Economic Expansion: Ease the credit 
standard. 
Economic Contraction: Increase the 
magnitude of losses 
Loan 
Supply 
Bernanke 
and Lown 
(1991) 
Credit Channel 
Hypothesis.  
Combined effect of 
shortage of financial 
capital and declining 
in the quality of 
borrowers’ financial 
health. 
Economic Contraction: Borrowers’ 
balance sheets weaken; Loan demand 
weaker, borrowers less creditworthy 
than usual.  
Decline in bank capital caused by 
severe loan losses during recession; 
Supply of credit reduced 
Loan 
Supply 
and Loan 
Demand 
Rajan 
(1994) 
Herd Behaviour 
Model. 
Manager’s with short 
horizons  
Bank’s Manager short horizons set 
credit policies that influence and 
being influenced by other banks and 
demand side conditions. 
Loan 
Supply 
and Loan 
Demand 
Asea and 
Blomberg 
(1998) 
Underlying Quality 
of Bank Loans. 
Business loan 
supplied beyond a 
prudent level. 
 
Economic Expansion: Excess lending 
activity creates adverse selection 
problem inordinate volume of bad 
loans. 
Economic Contraction: Sets higher-
than-expected default rates when the 
economy slows. 
Loan 
Quality 
Van den 
Heuvel 
(2002)  
Bank Capital 
Channel Hypothesis. 
The imperfect market 
for bank equity.  
Bank capital and its regulation affect 
the role of bank lending. Increase in 
interest rates lower bank equity, 
causing some banks to cut lending to 
reduce the risk of capital inadequacy. 
Bank 
capital 
and 
profit-
ability 
Bliss and 
Kaufman 
(2002) 
Unifying Model. 
Capital requirement 
and reserved 
requirement 
constraints on credit 
expansion and 
contractions.  
 
Either constraint is binding earning 
assets cannot grow further. 
Economic Expansion: Reserve are 
the likely effective constraints on 
banks. 
Economic Contraction: Capital 
constraint implications may become 
the binding constraints on banks.  
Bank 
Reserve 
and 
Capital 
Berger and 
Udell 
(2003) 
Institutional Memory 
Hypothesis.  
The ability of loan 
officers deteriorate 
over the bank’s 
lending cycle 
resulted in an easing 
of credit standard. 
Economic Recession: 
Loan officers gradually lose the skill 
to recognize poor loan risks as the 
recessionary economic environment 
recedes into the past.  
Loan officers’ turnover, previous 
loan bust is not remembered. They 
begin lowering standards, and loan 
quality deteriorates, setting the stage 
for high default rates at some future 
date.  
Loan 
Risk 
Quality 
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Table 2.1: Interest-Based Bank Lending Pro-cyclical Behaviour Model (continued) 
Researcher/s Model Bank Pro-cycle Variables 
Laeven 
and 
Majnoni 
(2003) 
Loan losses 
provisioning policy 
Loan loss provisions to total loans 
ratio and costs of provisioning. 
Economic Expansion: decline 
Economic Contraction: increases 
quickly and significantly 
Provision 
for Loan 
Losses  
 
Table 2.2: Islamic Bank Financing Behaviour Model 
Islamic 
Scholars 
View 
Based on 
Quran and 
Hadith – 
Divine 
guidance 
Shariah 
compliant 
instruments  
 
Application of interest-based instrument that 
resemble the characteristics of usury.  
Not free from exploitation and excesses brings 
unfairness and unjustness to parties involved 
financial transaction.  
Involvement of speculative trading, ambiguous 
financial transaction and financial risk trading  
Unethical investments and consumption spending 
loans make the operations within immoral value 
structure.  
Non-asset backing in financial transaction.  
Financing 
supply 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Evidence on The Interest-Based Bank’s Cyclicality Behaviour 
From various forms of financial institutions, banks are the most important source of 
external fund provider especially to small and medium firms to finance businesses, 
particularly, in small open economies. The reliance on bank credit is inescapable as the 
proportions of small typically bank-dependent firms are higher in small open economies 
compared to larger economies. Studies furthermore show that banks are also the source 
of liquidity for large firms during times of economic slumps (Trautwein 2000, and 
Saidenberg and Strahan 1999).  
 
With a huge amount of loans delivered through banks and large fractions of credits 
supplied to the firms, hence, the banking system may well have significant impact on 
the economic development. If banks are so essential in the economy, thus, financial 
deregulation and innovations are not likely to improve bank-dependent firms to borrow 
from the capital markets in this near future. 
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In achieving the stability in the economic environment, financial intermediaries’ 
steadiness, the banking institutions in particular, are one of the most significant gears. 
Through banking activities, the monetary impulses have direct and immediate reactions 
to correct the disturbances in economic activities. Specifically a well functioning 
banking system is supposed to help smooth the economic fluctuations or the business 
cycle and enhance the progress of economic growth. This is vital because studies have 
clearly shown that countries with lower macroeconomic volatility tend to grow faster 
(Ramey and Ramey 1995, Fatás and Mihov 2005, Aghion et al. 2006, and Elbers et al. 
2007). 
 
In most developed countries, it is a common phenomenon to observe steady financial 
growth as an access to real growth of output. Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1967), Goldsmith 
(1969), McKinnon (1973), among others have provided considerable evidence of 
supporting this argument. Early examples of literature on the relationships between 
financial intermediation and economic growth include Cameron (1967), Patrick (1966), 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). Goldsmith (1969) and 
McKinnon (1973) believed that the financial market is the central of the economic 
activity.  
 
From the monetary economic perspective, the nature of banking activities and bank’s 
position of one of the most influential financial intermediaries makes it relevant as a 
channel in transmitting the monetary policy operations. This is well recognised for the 
banking sector than in most of the other sectors of the economy. Perhaps it is one of the 
most important nerve-centres of modern economic monetary transmission mechanisms. 
They provide the demand deposit services, which are the largest part of money supply 
components and they are the major provider of credits in the system.  
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However, empirical studies such as by Adrian and Hyun (2008), Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008), Kroszner et al. (2007), Quagliariello (2007) and Nan and Hung (2007) have 
shown that there is evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank 
lending activities and this will not encourage the economy to grow. For instants, the 
Asian and Russian financial crises impact on the United States is a reduction in the 
lending supply in early 1999 due to the tightening of lending criteria (Lown’s et al., 
2000). The same pattern was observed in the period of 1973–1975 as well as in the early 
1990s, when banks reported a tightening of credit standards. Hence, the interest-based 
bank lending operation has an intrinsic tendency to worsen the economic activity 
fluctuations rather than smoothing them out. To some extent, it may even exacerbate the 
swing resulting in credit crunch episodes.  
 
Concerns on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank lending activities 
began to appear at the end of 1980s and early 1990s. This is revealed in studies such as 
by Guttentag and Herring (1984), Bernanke and Lown (1991), Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992), Kashyap and Stein (1993 and 1994) and Asea and Blomberg (1998). However, 
Guttentag’s and Herring’s (1984) works are more theoretical in view.  
 
There are two categories of literature relating to the interest-based bank operations 
relationship to the business cycle. The first category of study is on the cyclicality 
behaviour of the interest-based bank lending towards the business cycle. This study 
examines the tendency towards the interest-based bank’s operations to follow suit the 
upswing and downswing of the business cycle. Another category of study looks at the 
correlation between the business cycle and interest-based bank distress. This study 
analysed the interest-based banking crisis and the failure of interest-based banks of the 
business cycle occurrences. 
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Studies in 1990s were more concerned on the excessive pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
interest-based banks that empirically had proven to make worse the cyclical behaviour 
of the macroeconomic and sometimes hampered the recoveries from recessions. Among 
the studies are by Bernanke and Lown (1991), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Rajan 
(1994), and Asea and Blomberg (1998).  
 
The earlier literature provides partial explanations of the stylised facts about the 
interest-based bank lending operations with business cycle events. Empirical works 
such as by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap and Stein (1993 and 1994) 
through the IS-LM model framework estimates the interest-based credit market 
equilibriums and test the credit channel hypothesis and its relevancy to the credit crunch 
episode. This earlier study neglected the behaviour of interest-based bank’s lending 
during the expansion and contraction of the economy. At the end of 1990s and as the 
new century took place, the empirical literature on the pro-cyclicality behaviour of the 
interest-based bank lending became more apparent.  
 
In the 2000s, the analysis was more on the determinants that contributed to the pro-
cyclical behaviour in the interest-based bank lending activities. Researches related to the 
pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank hypothesised two related causes. One 
premise focused on the behavioural finance that analysed the interest-based bank 
management on risk associated with the bank policy on loan loss provisioning and 
reserve as the economy grew (De Lis et al, 2000; Bliss and Kaufman, 2002; Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003 and Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). The other hypothesis looked at the 
implementation of capital standards (Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Berger and Udell, 
1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Hancock and Wilcox, 1998; Wagster, 1999; 
Goodhart, 2005; and Jokipii and Milne, 2006). 
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Most of the empirical research in the 2000s shows that the banks’ provisioning for loan 
losses practices and credit rating policy contributed to the pro-cyclicality behaviour of 
the interest-based bank lending operations (among them are studies by Bouvatier and 
Lepetit, 2008; Quagliariello, 2007 and Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Furthermore, in 
the current financial crisis, Bank for International Settlement (BIS, 2008) stated that the 
main factors which had contributed to the event could easily be narrowed down to two 
reasons, that is, the excessive lending of money to high risk customers and the trading 
of that debt as a commodity.  
 
Another determinant that is found to be contributing to the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
interest-based bank is the profit driven enthusiasm (among them are Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009 and Bikker and Hu, 2002). One more contributing factor is the 
capital regulations such as the international bank regulation (Basel I and II) and 
accounting rules (IAS 39) (among them are Gruss and Sgherri, 2009 and Rochet, 2008).  
 
Jordan and Jain (2009) stated that banks driven by shareholder interest and the desire for 
profit maximisation started to indulge in excessive and imprudent lending activities. 
Over the long period of low interest rate regimes, lenders were extending loans to 
borrowers that borrowed more than they could afford. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (2008), the excessive and imprudent credit growth over a long 
period is the causes for the current global financial crisis. Mizen (2008) takes account of 
the fact that the lower interest rate has lured the borrowers to borrow more than they 
could handle and financial institutions devised new products and grant excessively risky 
loans in search of high profits. Lax lending standards during that period also contributed 
to the excessive and imprudent lending activities. 
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Another significant factor contributing to the current global financial crisis is the ability 
of interest-based banks to transfer the risk to the third parties by selling their loan 
portfolios. When the interest-based banks are able to transfer the risk through 
securitisation, collateralisation debt obligations, and other risk-transfer mechanisms, 
they are incentivised to assume excessive risks in pursuit of greater profit (Hakenes and 
Schnabel, 2010; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008).  
 
Bernanke (2010), Chapra (2008), and Mishkin (1997) on the other hand, pointed out the 
syndrome of ‘too big to fail’, also contributed to the problem. They believe that the 
central bank will bail the bank of in order to contain a systemic risk of the economy. For 
this reason, many commentators firmly believed that banks ended up taking greater 
risks than they would have otherwise sustained independently.  
 
Another reason brought up by Roubini (2008) is that banks are less careful about 
investing depositors’ money with the existing of the deposit insurance. Given deposits 
are either deliberately guaranteed by deposit insurance schemes or implicitly guaranteed 
by the central bank as the lender of last resort, the depositors were oblivious to the 
excessive risk taking appetite for the banks. 
 
Other latest studies confirming the existence of pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-
based bank lending behaviour to the business cycle among others is conducted by 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Adrian and Hyun (2008), Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008), Quagliariello M (2007), Nan and Hung (2007). Albertazzi and Gambacorta 
(2009) empirically analysed the link between business cycle fluctuations and the 
interest-based banking sector profitability for 10 industrialised countries over the period 
of 1981 to 2003. The data set includes yearly figures of the balance sheet and the 
income statements of the aggregated national banking industries. Their study shows that 
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pro-cyclicality of the interest-based bank profits are derived from the effect that the 
economic cycle exerts on net interest income via the lending activity and loan loss 
provisions via the credit portfolio quality. The empirical finding shows that the interest-
based bank profitability is also an important predictor of financial crises. 
 
Adrian and Hyun (2008) also empirically proved the existence of pro-cyclical behaviour 
of the interest-based financial intermediaries. They regress the Taylor Rule model onto 
1991(Q3) to 2007 (Q1) quarterly data of the United States bank holding company Repo, 
financial paper, federal funds and the consumer price index and they found that the 
interest-based banks increased their leverage during the asset price booms and reduced 
it during economic busts.  
 
The interest-based bank cyclicality behaviour is also observable from the bank loan loss 
provisions behaviour. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) conducted the study with panel data 
of 186 European banks from 15 countries for the period of 1992 until 2004. In their 
study, they examined if the bank provisioning system and capital adequacy constraint 
induced and amplified the bank credit fluctuation. Three main variables used in their 
study were the loan loss provisions, the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and 
total capital ratio. The variables utilised represent the risk of a bank’s portfolio. Various 
interest-based bank items were regressed to a dynamic adjustment of provisions for loan 
losses and they found that poorly capitalised interest-based banks were constrained to 
expand credit. They also found that the loan loss provisions made to cover expected 
future loan losses that were the non-discretionary loan loss provisions had amplified the 
credit fluctuations.  
 
Earlier in Italy, Quagliariello (2007) conducted a similar study by applying the Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model for 200 interest-based banks quarterlies 
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financial data, macroeconomic data, and bank specific information for 1985 to 2002. 
The study shows that the interest-based banks tend to tighten the credit supply of some 
stages of economic downturns. The growth of loan loss provision and various financial 
ratios, gross domestic product, interest rates and the asset prices shows a pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based banks.  
 
In addition, Nan and Hung (2007) through the three stage least square method on long 
term and short term borrowing data from 1991 to 2001  in Taiwan shows that the 
interest-based bank lending in Taiwan also act pro-cyclically, worsening the problem of 
adverse selection, increasing the probability of resource misallocation and amplifying 
fluctuations in economic activity. The variables included in their study are the amount 
of loans, interest rate spread, liquid assets, sales, total assets, and type of loans. 
 
The failure of the interest-based bank financial risk management through soft 
provisioning policy was empirically evidenced by Bikker’s and Metzemakers’ (2005), 
and Laeven’s and Majnoni’s (2003) works. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), by pooling 
the data of the individual interest-based banks’ balance sheet items (such as the loan 
growth, earnings, loan to total assets ratio, and capital to total assets ratio) examined the 
pro-cyclicality behaviour created by the loan loss provisioning. They used banks yearly 
observations from 29 OECD countries from 1991 to 2001 and country specific 
macroeconomic indicators for these countries (including gross domestic product growth 
and unemployment rate).  
 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) study shows that when the growth of gross domestic 
product is slower, the provisioning for loan losses turns out being considerably higher 
reflecting increased riskiness of the credit portfolio during business cycles turns 
downwards and increases the risk of a credit crunch. This effect is mitigated somewhat 
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as provisions rise in time when earnings is higher suggesting income smoothing and 
loan growth is higher indicating increased riskiness.  
 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) regressed on the interest-based bank’s loan loss provision 
to the earnings, loan growth, and gross domestic product growth with a total of 1419 
banks and 8176 bank yearly observations from 1988 to 1999, from 45 countries. They 
empirically showed that many interest-based banks delayed their provisioning for bad 
loans until it was too late. When the economic conditions reversed, this magnified the 
business cycle impact on the interest-based banks’ income and capital.  
 
Borio’s et al. (2000) study on 10 developed OECD countries from 1980 to 1999 also 
revealed a strong negative correlation between the interest-based banks’ provisioning to 
the business cycles. Their study shows that the provisions to shield for future losses by 
the interest-based banks in general only begin to increase after the economic growth rate 
has fallen significantly. Those phases of economic upturns are followed by a significant 
increase in the ratio of private sector credit to the gross domestic product. On the 
contrary, this indicator generally falls with the downswing of economic activities. Their 
study also shows that the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based banks’ 
provisioning for credit risk is also stronger than the changes in credits granted.  
 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), by considering a vast range of explanatory variables, 
analysed 75 emerging markets in the period of 1975 to 1997. The results verify that the 
financial distress is because of the unsustainable boom in the domestic credit. 
Macroeconomic policies leading to rapid lending growth and financial overheating 
generally set the stage for future problems. They also show that domestic interest rate 
liberalisation often accompanies the excessive lending activities.  
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Examining the lending cycle in Australia for the period of 1986 to 1993, Tallman and 
Bharucha (2000) described from their observation that a strong decrease in lending is 
because of a strong increase of lending activities then followed by an undesirable 
economic downturn. Substantial increase in loan losses, rising margins and a significant 
rearrangement of portfolios were also observable. The interest-based banks facing with 
problem assets larger than the average, restrained their lending more than the aggregate 
lending average. They even reduced their risk-weighted assets growth rates.  
 
De Lis et al. (2000) analysed the cyclical behaviour of the Spain interest-based bank 
credit and provisions for loan losses. By using the panel data method, they conducted 
the study on the commercial and savings banks from 1985-1997. In addition to the 
supply-side factors, they described the pro-cyclical lending behaviour with the cyclical 
changes in demand. They uphold that the credit demand is also determined by the real 
interest rates. The three variables are strongly cyclical in Spain. During economic 
uptrend, borrowers normally spend on products that engage a higher financing 
obligation. From the consumer side, this includes the consumer durables and residential 
property investments. For the corporate side, this includes business related investments. 
At the same time, borrowing for financial investments as well exhibits very strong 
cyclical movements.  
 
Asea and Blomberg (1998) conducted a study on United States interest-based bank 
lending criteria related to the unemployment rate cyclical changes. Their finding shows 
that during economic downswings, banks entail higher risk premiums and higher 
collateral. In the event of economic upswings, the average size of loans increases as 
well. According to them, when the bad loans are jointly delivered to the good loans 
during expansionary economic condition, deficiencies may as well exist and not just 
during economic contraction.  
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Throughout this period of economic upswings, customers with high default risks also 
have the access to financing. Altering the criteria of banks lending standards of tightness 
to laxity during this optimistic economic period pressure the expansion and 
performances of the real economy and add to the excessive risk-taking. This behaviour 
finally heated the economic condition before reversing the cycle. On the reverse side, 
the bad loans will eventually crowd out the good ones during an economic slump with 
an increasing counter-selection.  
 
Most of the studies show that the pro-cyclicality behaviour of interest-based banks has 
much to do with the realisation of risks driven. Throughout the expansionary phase of 
the business cycle, the interest-based banks are excessively optimistic and when the 
economy reverses become excessively pessimistic. Bank for International Settlement 
(BIS, 2001) supported this assertion.  Their study explains that the money market 
participants fail to treat the time-dimension of risks appropriately is the primary causes 
of the pro-cyclical lending behaviour of the financial system to the business cycle event 
in the economy. The main reason for this is that they generally incorrectly assess the 
evolution of risk over time.  
 
Bernanke (2009) in his speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition in Chicago, Illinois mentioned that risk management is 
paramount for a safe and sound banking system. Effective liquidity risk management is 
an important internal determinant of bank stability because it can be a source of bank 
failures. 
 
2.3.4 Interest-Based Bank Credit Supply and The Business Cycle 
To comprehend the lending behaviour impact on the economic condition, it is vital to 
understand how the credit market works. Most of the literature on banks’ lending pro-
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cyclicality behaviour based their work on Bernanke and Blinder (1988) works who 
introduced the credit market equilibrium through the IS-LM model. Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) initially analyse the association between the credit market and monetary 
policy.  
 
Literatures explaining the works of credit markets usually look at the credit view. The 
credit view puts a special emphasis on the role of financial intermediaries and the 
banking sector in particular in the economic activity aggregately. Many empirical works 
applied this model in estimating the credit market equilibriums and test the credit 
channel hypothesis and its relevancy to the credit crunch episode (such as by Bernanke 
and Lown, 1991; Kasyap and Stein, 1994; Peek and Rosengreen, 1995; Hancock and 
Wilcox, 1998).  
 
Bernanke (1983) attempted the pioneering effort in empirical study on the credit 
channel. Bernanke explains the credit view relevancy by fitting output equations with 
United States monetary variables and by adding proxies for the financial crisis in his 
work. Consequently the model suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) extended the 
traditional IS-LM model to incorporate the effect of bank loan or credit on the economic 
activity fluctuation or the business cycle happening.  
 
From the credit crunch literature, the empirical evidence suggested that one of the main 
factors of the reduction on loan demand had a significant consequence of the real 
economy production activities (Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1994; and 
Furfine, 2001). Bernanke and Blinder (1988) contends that the existence of direct credit 
channel of monetary policy to bank lending makes it possible to carry out monetary 
policy without large changes in the interest rate. It assumes that firms could finance 
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their investment of bank loans and bonds as well. The banks’ asset portfolio now 
consists of loans besides reserve and bonds in simple terms. 
 
Following this view, the direct effects of monetary policy on the interest rates amplified 
by the endogenous changes in the external finance premium that is the difference in cost 
of funds raised externally through the issuing of equity or debt and funds that is 
generated internally by retaining the earnings. The size of the external finance premium 
reflects imperfections in the credit market that drives a wedge, between the expected 
return received by lenders and the costs faced by potential borrowers.  
 
A change in the monetary policy that changes the open-market interest rates will be 
likely rises or lowers the external finance premium in the same direction. Because of the 
additional effect of policy on the external finance premium, the monetary policy effects 
on the broadly defined cost of borrowing and consequently on the real spending and real 
activity is magnified (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).  
 
This view explains what has been termed as the ‘liquidity puzzle’ – a situation where 
monetary drainage fails to raise interest rates. In this context, a prediction based solely 
on the traditional money view channel will underestimate the policy impact on the real 
variables. The direction of the bank’s lending does not influence the level of liquidity 
and inflation in the system alone but also productivity, resource allocation and the social 
economic order envisioned by the government.  
 
Central bank can manage bank’s loan supply either by raising the reserve requirements 
or through conducting an open market operation. The ultimate effect will not only 
reduce the total volume of the commercial bank loanable funds but also the proportion 
of the commercial banks earning assets to their total assets. An open market sale of the 
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treasury bills for instance, will reduce the commercial banks reserve as purchaser’s 
issues checks against their accounts in commercial banks. Hence, open market sales will 
drain liquidity from the economy. 
 
A distinctive feature of bank’s lending channel is the ability of a tight monetary policy 
to reduce the supply of loans beyond what ordinarily predicted by a rising interest rate. 
A rising interest rate resulting from a tight monetary policy will reduce private 
investment. As a result, a reduction in bank loans supply mostly to the small and 
medium scale entrepreneurs who rationed out of the credit market because of higher 
cost of capital. 
 
There are two descriptions of the credit channel in the literature, the bank lending 
channel and the balance sheet channel. The bank lending channel central attention is on 
the possible effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans by financial intermediaries. 
The balance sheet channel, on the other hand, looks on the possible response from the 
monetary policy on borrowers’ income statements, balance sheets, liquid assets, cash 
flows, and net worth. Those variables are the indicators of borrower’s creditworthiness. 
Weaken in any of those variables disrupt firms’ likelihood to obtain loans.  
 
The foundation of the bank lending channel is based on the nature of banks in 
mobilising deposits and utilising it in term loans and its ability to solve asymmetric 
information problem. For bank lending channel to exist, a reduction in reserve 
requirements by the monetary authority must increase the bank’s lending volume. Banks 
must not cut off their loan supply of a shock to reserve for simply rearranging their 
portfolio of other assets and liabilities. Bank’s lending channel requires that some firm 
without costless replaces losses of bank credit with other types of finance, but rather 
must curtail their investment spending (Mishkin, 2010). 
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The balance sheet channel explores the supply of funds of the overall fund markets. The 
channel arises from the presence of asymmetric information problems in credit markets. 
A tight monetary policy directly increases lower net worth of business firms and the 
more severe the adverse selection and moral hazard problems are in lending to these 
firms. Lower net worth means that lenders in effect have less collateral for their loans 
and therefore losses from adverse selection are higher. A decline in the net worth raises 
the adverse selection problem, thus, leads to the decreased of lending to finance 
investment spending.  
 
The lower net worth of business firms increases the moral hazard problem it means that 
owners have a lower equity stake in their firms, giving them more incentive to engage in 
risky investment projects. Taking on riskier investment projects makes it more likely 
that lenders will not be paid back. A decrease in firms net worth leads to a decrease in 
lending and hence in investment spending (Mishkin, 1997). 
 
The analyses on the credit channel discussed by previous researchers provide only 
partial explanations of the stylised facts about the pro-cyclicality of the interest-based 
bank behaviour. Earlier research neglected banks’ behaviour during the expansion and 
contraction of the business cycle. Later study such as by Albertazzi and Gambacorta 
(2009), Gruss and Sgherri (2009), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), Rochet (2008), 
Quagliariello (2007), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Bikker and Hu (2002) have 
provided a more comprehensive study on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-
based bank lending. 
 
2.3.5 Capital-Based Regulation and Bank Cyclicality Behaviour 
Following the 1988 Capital Accord introduction, a wide theoretical and empirical 
literature thoroughly analysed the cyclical effects of bank capital regulation. A Lot of 
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empirical research shows that the introduction to capital-based regulation like Basel 
regulatory framework likely will create a pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based 
bank’s operations (Saurina and Trucharte 2007, Brambilla and Piluso 2007, VanHoose 
2007).  
 
The argument and concern raised by the researchers on the new regulation was that 
higher capital ratios might lead to a reduced in credit supply during the periods of 
economic downswing. A typical line of researcher’s argument is that the default risk of 
firms in the real sector increases if a shock decreases productivity or increases the risk 
in the real economy. Assuming that the regulatory constraint on the interest-based 
banking sector was binding, the credit volume will decrease. Without additional 
financial resources, firms have to reduce their invested funds and consequently their 
production volume. Therefore, the common view is that regulations of the interest-based 
banks amplify a downturn (upturn) in the real economy and causes pro-cyclical effects 
in comparison to a non-regulated banking industry. 
 
A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that the declines in the bank loans in 
the period around 1990 are explained by the declines in the interest-based bank capital, 
loan delinquency, and local economic conditions (among them are Berger and Udell, 
1994; Hancock and Wilcox, 1994 and 1998 and Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Hancock 
and Wilcox (1998) presented estimates of how much the interest-based bank loans and 
real activity of businesses of all sizes declined when the bank capital and loans declined 
and other bank portfolio and aggregate economic conditions deteriorated in the United 
States.  
 
Using the state year data of 1989 to 1992, Hancock and Wilcox (1998) estimated the 
effects of those factors on employment, payrolls, and the number of firms by firm size, 
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as well as on gross state product. In response to the decline in their own bank capital, 
small banks shrank their loan portfolios considerably more than the large banks. Large 
banks tended to increase loans more when small banks were under increased capital 
pressure than vice versa. Other than that, the capital declines and loan declines of small 
banks reduced the real economic activity more than the large banks.  
 
Hence, based on the literature, a number of hypotheses provide with empirical evidence 
show that the implementation of tougher capital standards had some implications on the 
interest-based bank pro-cyclicality behaviour.  The hypotheses included the risk-based 
or leverage-based and explicit or implicit (Berger and Udell, 1994; Hancock and 
Wilcox, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Wagster, 1999; Furfine, 2001). Increase in 
supervisory toughness, such as worse CAMELS ratings; higher classified assets; and 
more formal actions for a given portfolio; also contributed to the behaviour (for 
example, study by Peek and Rosengren, 1995; and Furfine, 2001). Bank retrenchment or 
reduced risk taking due to portfolio risks, losses, impaired capital, changed risk 
tolerance, and so on (for example, study by Hancock and Wilcox, 1994 and 1998; 
Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Wagster, 1999; and Furfine, 2001).  
 
2.3.6 Real Estate Market and The Bank Lending Cyclicality Behaviour 
Another extensively studied area by researchers is the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
interest-based bank lending in the real estate market. Real estate loans, commercial and 
industrial loans represent the riskier loans relative to consumer loans. Berger and Udell 
(1994) argue that the commercial and industrial loans as well as the real estate loans are 
the higher risk loans since they are in the riskiest component of the regulatory bank 
capital category. The consumer loans are relatively less risky because of low variations 
in return.  
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McCarthy’s and Peach’s (2004) study on the real estate sectors shows that relatively 
long construction lags of real estate hinder the match of demand and supply for real 
estate. Due to these particularities, real estate prices are prone to deviate from their 
fundamental values, which imply the potential for turmoil in financial systems. 
Evidence from Hoggarth and Pain (2002) documents that growth in the interest-based 
bank loans for real estate and construction sectors in the United Kingdom increases 
disproportionately in the boom period of the economy in the period December 1987 to 
December 1989, lending to these sectors to grow by 55% and 40% respectively, 
compared to around 25% for other sectors.  
 
Hilbers’s et al. (2001) study evaluates the real estate bubbles contribution to the 
financial distress by estimating a probit and logit model on 11 Asia and Latin American 
countries with data gathered from 1970 to 1999. The variables included in the study are 
money supply (M2) multipliers, real interest rate, and real residential property price 
index. The interest-based banks, during the periods of increasing property prices, also 
tend to provide loan more to the real estate projects, given the collateral market value 
rises and the risk of lender decreases.  
 
This bank lending behaviour makes the bank defenceless to the macroeconomic shocks. 
Economic condition overturns will decrease the interest-based banks real estate assets 
and collateral value, thus, affecting the interest-based bank soundness. In their survey 
on a number of studies that theorise on the mechanics of such bubbles, shows that the 
behaviours are primarily driven by combinations of constrains of the real estate supply 
of the short run, lenders’ limited ability to assess project risks, and herding behaviour of 
investors.  
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Mei and Saunders (1997) documented that the interest-based bank lending behaviour in 
the United States to the real estate sector follows a pro-cyclical or a “trend-chasing” 
pattern. Returns to investments in the real estate sector are mean reverting. The interest-
based banks appear to lend more to this sector when its performance has risen above the 
trend. 
 
2.4 Literatures on Islamic Bank Financing Cyclical Behaviour 
To our knowledge, there is no existing empirical work with the intention of focusing on 
the specific question considered in this study. Empirical study of the cyclicality 
behaviour of the Islamic bank operation has never been attempted yet. Whilst various 
factors contributed to the lack of empirical study of this area, its basic causes can be 
summed up to its generally new industry and standardised systematic data recording, 
which is yet to be achieved. 
 
Without any empirical verification, the Islamic banking proponents like Siddiqi (1981 
and 1983), Khan (1984), Khan (1986), and Chapra (1992, 1996 and 2008b) confidently 
proposed that with the shariah based instrument the Islamic banking operations will be 
able to stabilise the economic atmosphere. With the existing of shariah compliant 
instruments, theoretically, the proponents of Islamic banking system believe that the 
Islamic bank institutions will be more resilient, stable, and ultimately be able to stabilise 
the economic atmosphere. They also believe the Islamic bank financing operations will 
behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle episode (Siddiqi, 1981; Ziauddin et al., 
1983; Khan, 1985, Khan, 1986; Khan and Mirakhor, 1988; Chapra, 1985 and 1996; 
Bashir, 1996; and others). Much of the views is yet theoretically in concepts and 
descriptive in nature with very little support of empirical evidence.  
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Compare to those of Islamic bank’s operations, empirical literatures concentrating on 
the relationship between the interest-based banks and macroeconomic indicators are 
more evident, even in Malaysia, which is currently considered as the hub of Islamic 
finance. However, this study able to depict some of the relevant concepts from related 
literature dealing with the Islamic bank operations relationship to some of the 
macroeconomic variables, which are also the business cycle indicators. Hence, this 
section reviews some of the related literature on the relationship between the banks 
financing behaviour to the incidence of macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Empirical analyses of the Islamic bank industry were arisen in 1990’s. Early empirical 
studies on the Islamic banking industry were mostly on the financial management 
performances (example studies by Wong, 1995; Rosly, 1999; Samad; 1999; Aggarwal 
and Yousef 2000; Yusoff et.al. 2001; and Bakar, 2001). By assessing the Islamic bank 
performances, they usually compare the Islamic bank financial returns to those of 
interest-based banks. They also examine the Islamic bank capability in mobilising and 
efficiently allocating the resources to generate comparable returns to their shareholder 
and depositors. The early intention was not only to produce comparable returns, but also 
to phase out the interest-based payments and receivables for the benefit of the 
stakeholders. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the empirical evidence of the cyclicality behaviour of 
Islamic bank financing operations is missing from the scene despite the strong believes 
by the proponents of Islamic financial system on the capability of the Islamic bank of 
stabilising the economic environment.  The closest empirical studies that provide 
symptoms of the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank are by Bakar (2001 and 
2006), Ismail and Sulaiman (2006), and Shahimi et al. (2006).  
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Macroeconomic condition is essential in determining the Islamic bank operations, for 
instance, the Asian financial crises of 1997 had significantly affected the volume of 
Islamic banks financing in Malaysia. Financing-deposit ratio declined from 104.1 per 
cent as at the ends of 1997 to 64.9 per cent as at the ends of 1998. The total Islamic 
banks financing declined by 1.4 per cent or RM149 million in the first half of 1998 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1998). Malaysia economy improved rapidly in 1999 and the 
total Islamic bank financing expanded RM3.1 billion or 28 per cent and RM7.2 billion 
or 52.2 per cent in the year 2000. Moreover, financing-deposits ratios of the Islamic 
bank grew from 55.3 per cent in 1999 to 58.2 per cent at the end 2000 (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1999 and 2000). 
 
Connect to the Malaysian financial crisis, empirical study by Bakar (2001 and 2006) in 
Malaysia through the ratio analysis method observed that the Islamic bank investment 
margin was fluctuating stronger than its rival that is the interest-based banks during an 
upswing and downswing of the interest rate. The interest rate is one of the leading 
indicators for the occurrence of business cycle episodes. The finding show that the 
Islamic bank returns to its investment is more sensitive to the interest rate volatility 
compared to its counterpart that is the interest-based banks.  
 
Ismail and Sulaiman (2006), on the other hand, analysed the link between 
macroeconomic variables to the recovery rates and default rates for the Islamic bank. By 
using an unbalanced panel data set for 15 Islamic banks of Malaysia over the period 
from 1994 to 2004, their study shows that real gross domestic product is negatively 
related to the financing recovery rates. Other than that, the money supply M3 has a 
positive sign and there is a negative correlation coefficient between default rates and 
financing recovery. This shows that the default rate is low when the economic activities 
are expanding and the opposite will happen when the economy is contracting.  
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Study conducted by Shahimi et al. (2006) was more to risk management. They 
examined the relationship between the net income margins and the financing and loan 
loss provision of the Malaysia Islamic banks. Their study shows that the net income 
margin is positively affected by the financing and loan loss provision. The higher the 
provision made by the bank the more secured the margins of the external shock.  
 
Kassim and Majid in 2010 conduct a study on the 1997 and 2007 financial crises 
financial shocks affect on the Malaysia Islamic banks. The study finds mixed evidence 
of the macroeconomic shocks impact on the Islamic banks. The descriptive statistic 
indicates that the Islamic banks are relatively resilient to the financial shocks, however, 
based on a more robust econometric analysis the results reveal otherwise. The results 
based on impulse response function shows the Islamic financing responded significantly 
to the macroeconomic shocks in non-crisis and 2007 crisis periods. The vector auto-
regression results suggest that Islamic banks are vulnerable to financial shocks. This is 
contrary to the belief that the Islamic bank is sheltered from the financial shocks due to 
its interest-free nature. 
 
Numerous studies have been done on Islamic bank profitability performances, which 
include some of the macroeconomic variables such as the national income, money 
supply, inflation rate, and interest rate. For instance, Bashir (2003) evaluated over the 
years of 1993 to 1998 Islamic bank profits data of eight Middle Eastern countries. The 
finding shows strong positive impact on the macroeconomic variables involved. Haron 
and Azmi (2004) on the other hand, statistically proved direct relationships of inflation 
rate and indirect relationship of real interest rate on ROA of five major Islamic banks 
over a period of 1984-2002. 
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Whilst studies by Bacha (2004), Choong and Ming (2006), and Kader and Leong (2009) 
on the other hand shows that the Malaysia Islamic bank operation is still influenced by 
the operation of its counterpart that is the interest-based bank. The close association of 
the Islamic bank operations and the interest-based bank operations makes it not entirely 
interest-free, but closely pegged and move fairly closed to the interest rate.  
 
Study by Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Bakar (2001, 2006), Choong and Ming (2006), 
Rosly and Bakar (2003), Sanusi and Ismail (2005), and Khan and Bhatti (2008) shows 
that the financing activities by the Islamic bank are mostly in the form of debt-like 
instrument in nature and not the profit and risk sharing. The profit and risk sharing 
instrument is almost absent from the financing services provided and debt-like 
instrument is found to be dominantly used by most of the Islamic bank. The amount of 
profit and loss sharing instruments currently applied by the Islamic bank financing 
operations is less than 5 percent. 
  
Bakar (2001 and 2006), and Rosly and Bakar (2003) studies suggested that with high 
application of debt-like and fixed rate financing instrument, there is a possibility that the 
Islamic bank will be trapped in a negative fund gap strategy. Whereby in the event of 
rising interest rates, the Islamic banks will not able to increase the profit rate and will 
gain more during a falling interest rate.  
 
Empirical analyses on the Malaysian Islamic bank industry shows that there is 
possibilities that through debt-like instruments practiced by the Islamic bank of 
Malaysia will behave pro-cyclical to the business cycle. Somehow, Bakar (2001 and 
2006), Ismail and Sulaiman (2006), and Shahimi’s et al. (2006) studies did not look at 
the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank operations to the business cycle. Therefore, 
their finding could not be used to draw conclusions in business cycle effects. Moreover, 
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their studies looked at the behaviour of Malaysia Islamic bank industry only and 
therefore could not be generalised for the Islamic bank operations behaviour as a whole. 
 
2.4.1 Research Gap 
Previous studies on the Islamic banking industry usually can be groups of three broad 
subjects comprising the areas of financial management efficiency, criteria and profile of 
Islamic bank patronage, and the theoretical concept. Among the three areas, earliest 
attempts focused mostly on the conceptual issues underlying the interest-free banking, 
for examples in Malaysia among others are studies by Ismail (1983), Ariff (1988) and 
Nawawi (1995). From the management side, studies mainly focused on the financial 
management efficiency especially the profitability performances. Among others are by 
Bakar (2006), Shahimi et al. (2005), Sanusi and Ismail (2005) and Rosly and Bakar 
(2003) that looks at the profitability performance of Malaysian Islamic banking 
industry.  
 
From the literature survey, it is evident that empirical analyses on the Islamic bank 
behaviour to the business cycle are not present in the scene. The idea of Islamic bank 
capability to smoothen the business cycle swing is theoretical and conceptual in nature, 
and currently without any empirical evidence. Therefore, this particular study try to fill 
up the vacuum by providing empirical evidence to prove the superiority over the Islamic 
banking industry compared to its rival that is the interest-based banks.  
 
With its existence of more than thirty years, the Islamic banking industry recorded a 
remarkable growth and with better acceptance among the global market players. 
Therefore, it is timely to evaluate the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank financing to 
the economic activity fluctuations or the business cycle phenomenon. With the marginal 
amount of profit and risk sharing instrument in used by the Islamic bank, therefore, the 
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capability of the Islamic bank of smoothing the business cycle viewed by the scholars is 
questionable. Add with its operations that are not totally free from the interest rate 
movement makes the Islamic bank financing might behave pro-cyclical to the business 
cycle happening. 
 
2.5 Conclusions From The Literature Survey  
Following through the literature survey on banks’ lending cyclicality behaviour to the 
business cycle suggests that all of this past empirical research had concentrated on the 
interest-based bank behaviour. Empirical analysis on the Islamic banking sector on the 
contrary provides very little empirical evidence. Despite of Muslim economists making 
enormous strides in the last three decades of understanding the relationship between the 
Islamic bank operations with the economic stability, most of the works are still mainly 
theoretical and conceptual presented.  
 
There continues to be a number of theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature in the 
Islamic banking industry. The reason that can be raised forward is most of the Islamic 
financial institution’s operation only made way of the financial market in the 1980s and 
1990s. Following to that limitation, this brings to another constraint on the form of data 
adequacy. Therefore, early scholars descriptively explained the ability of Islamic 
financial system to stabilise the macroeconomic condition with simulation models and 
this contributed to the absence of empirical evidence.  
 
Another reason that has contributed to this very little empirical study of the Islamic 
bank operations is that the worldwide domination of prevailing mainstreams interest-
based banking system practiced including those in the Muslim majority countries. With 
less than forty years of the financial market inception and with inadequate data, 
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therefore, only a small number of empirical studies on the Islamic financial system are 
inevitable.  
 
Nevertheless, there are also few good empirical papers that can be traced to certain 
Islamic countries like Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, and Malaysia. However, the previous 
studies did not look into the cyclical behaviour of the Islamic bank but more to the 
management side and the Islamic bank operation efficiency and its relationship to the 
monetary instruments such as study by Elhiraika (2004), Kiaee (2007), and Kia and 
Darrat (2007). Therefore, in general this study is an effort to fill the existing gap 
between the theoretical and descriptive concepts with the empirical evidence on the 
superiority of the Islamic financial system. 
 
With bank’s financing activities concentrating more on the debt-like instrument instead 
of the profit and risk sharing, there is a possibility that the Islamic bank operation will 
behave pro-cyclically to the business cycle. Evidence from Bakar (2006) investigation 
into Islamic bank investment margin, and Ismail and Sulaiman (2006) that analysed the 
link between recovery rates and default rates, thus, their findings need some 
consideration concerning the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing. 
 
The study anticipates that macroeconomic fluctuations will influence significantly the 
operation of Islamic banks, particularly, on the assets utilisation due to the debt-like 
instrument although in essence the fixed rate financing instruments are complying with 
the shariah. This expectation is based on Bakar (2001 and 2006), and Rosly and Bakar 
(2003) studies. On the other hand, the study also foresees that the Islamic bank 
operation will behave pro-cyclically if the Islamic bank contingency reserve, provision 
for loan losses, and capital failed to give a positive impact on the financing growth as 
instructed by the Quran in chapter Yusuf (12:46-49).  
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From the review of literatures on the interest-based bank lending cyclicality behaviour, 
the excessive expansions and contractions of the interest-based bank lending activities 
have real economic implications. The empirical study identifies that the interest-based 
banking operational structure of its nature has contributed to the occurrence of pro-
cyclical behaviour.  
 
Past empirical studies also showed that the reasons for the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
interest-based bank are due to the exercise in those unfavourable financial instruments 
and investment activities from the shariah viewpoint. The most undesirable instrument 
will be the practices of interest-based instruments that being a pre-determined cost of 
production is not a sound and a steady financial system. Furthermore, other forms of 
financial transaction practices of the interest-based bank that is also against the Islamic 
values are the existing of trading activities involving speculative activities, ambiguous 
and uncertain financial transaction, and trading of financial risk instruments.  
 
Such practices of financial and commercial transactions by the interest-based banks 
believed to be the main contributing factors to the economic instability. The interest-
based financial and commercial transaction that is not tied to any ethical and moral 
standard guidelines, investment, and financial transaction that is unlimited to only the 
genuine assets makes the impact of its operation of the economy more difficult to 
predict. The financial crises in the global financial system existing on the past decades 
signal the incompetence of this interest-based financial system in managing the 
economic agents’ behaviour.  
 
There are two scenarios that generally observed by researchers, practitioners, and 
regulators on the supply of credit by the interest-based bank over the business cycle. 
The first scenario, the interest-based bank lending activity normally increases 
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significantly from the expansions of business cycles. During the business cycle 
downturns, it reduces considerably and sometimes can be worse enough such as the 
credit crunch event. The second scenario is that observed to measure of the interest-
based loan performance problems appear to follow a distinct pattern of the business 
cycle. Past due, nonaccrual and higher loan loss provisions start to appear at the end of 
the expansion and rise dramatically during the downturn. This suggests that the interest-
based banks may take significantly more risks of the expansion, but the risk only 
revealed later because it takes time for the loan performance problems to appear.  
 
Many theories focus on the increase and decrease of lending by the interest-based bank. 
The theories explain these changes in lending are generally more than proportional to 
the changes in economic activity, suggesting that changes in the interest-based bank 
loan supply tend to stress the business cycle. Islamic scholars argued that the main 
reason for the pro-cyclicality behaviour is the practices of various financial transactions 
that go against the shariah conditions in the interest-based banking system. This 
changing behaviour of the economic unit in the event of business cycles can be 
visualised through the bank’s balance sheet movement, the deposits, and credit items. 
 
According to Khan’s (1986) when there is a downswing in an interest-based economy, 
the depositors’ existing claims remain a liability for the interest-based banking 
institution, hence, forces the interest-based bank into debt management. That is, the 
creation of new and more costly debt against the interest-based banks in the form of 
new deposits and borrowings from other sources in order to retire existing debt to the 
depositors. This action reinforces the process of the downswing and hampers the pace of 
recovery in the economy.  
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In addition to the practice of interest-based instruments behind their operations, the 
speculative activities and trades involving ambiguous criterion, is also the contributing 
factors to the pro-cyclical behaviour of the lending activities. As against this, the 
Islamic bank has the advantage due to the principle of profit and risk sharing. The 
Islamic bank obligations to depositors will automatically be adjusted to downswing and 
recovery phases.  
 
Wrapping up the literature survey, with the empirical evidence on the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of the interest-based type of bank, Islamic economists suggested that the 
Islamic financial system with special focus on the Islamic bank operations able to 
weather the turbulence, dynamic, complexity, unpredictable economic condition 
fluctuation, and financial crisis better.  
 
In running its financial transaction operations, it is an obligation of the Islamic banks to 
follow the guidance of the Quran and sunnah (the saying or hadith and conduct of the 
prophet). Failing to do so, will no doubt make the Islamic bank operations behave as 
what their counterpart behaves. Failing to adhere to the above Allah’s (swt) instruction 
in managing the contingency reserve and provision for loan losses will invite instability 
to the banking institutions’, particularly in this unpredictable economic surroundings. 
 
Besides complying with the shariah major financing principles, this study brings 
forward another proposition that the financial institutions need to follow in order for 
them to behave counter-cyclically to changing economic environment. The financial 
institutions need to adhere to Allah (swt) instruction related to the management of 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses as mentioned in Quran (chapter 
Yusuf, 12: 46-49). 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODERN BANKING AND THE ISLAMIC BANKING BACKGROUND 
 
3.0 Banking Industries and Economic Growth 
Banks are crucial in promoting greater economic growth of the financial market 
effectiveness by channelling funds more efficiently from people who do not have a 
productive use for them for those who do. Activities in banking markets also have direct 
effects on the households’ personal wealth and consumptions, the behaviour of 
businesses, and the performance of the overall economy. Of late, researchers and 
policymakers have also acknowledged that a critical role of banks is to manage and 
control various forms of risks in the financial market. These functions give banks a 
central position of saving and investment allocation. 
 
Indeed, a well functioning banking industry is a key factor of producing higher 
economic growth. This relationship has widely been accepted by the economists, 
bankers, financiers, and policymakers. From monetary economics theoretical points of 
view, bank’s operations should able to stabilise the economic environment. The nature 
of banking activities and bank’s position of one of the most influential financial 
intermediaries makes it relevant as an agent in achieving the stability in the economic 
environment. 
 
It is well believed that the monetary impulses will have a direct and immediate reaction 
to correct the disturbances in the economic atmosphere through the banking lending 
activities. Specifically, a well functioning banking operating system is supposed to help 
smoothen the economic activities and fluctuations or the business cycle occurrence, and 
able to enhance the progress of economic growth. Studies have clearly shown that 
countries with lower macroeconomic volatility tend to grow faster (Ramey and Ramey, 
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1995; Fatás and Mihov, 2005; Aghion et al., 2006; and Elbers et al., 2007). Thus, in 
achieving the stability of the economic environment, financial intermediaries’ 
steadiness and the banking institutions in particular, is one of the most significant gears. 
Undesirable disturbances to the financial market structure and information delivery 
system, banks’ equity levels and capability in providing loans, and firms’ collateral will 
have an impact on firms’ access to loans and consequently to investment and output.  
 
With the increasing concerned on the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based bank 
lending to the business cycle, the pertinent question is that does the Islamic bank 
financing activities have the inclination towards a pro-cyclical behaviour too. Therefore, 
analysing the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour, understanding the work and 
the importance of the Islamic bank financing for efficient operations of the economy, 
and understand the role of Islamic bank financing in contributing to the economic 
development are essential.  
 
Islamic bank as a whole provides the same functions and activities as the modern 
interest-based bank that is as the financial intermediaries. The Islamic bank plays the 
role as the matchmaker for those who have excess of funds to those who are short of 
funds of the economy. It is important to the Islamic bank, as it is in the interest-based 
bank to play this financial intermediary role and to support a sustainable, healthy, and 
growing economy. The operations of Islamic bank include practically all aspects of 
business, commerce, and investment but without infringement of the Islamic shariah or 
ruling principles. The Islamic principles must be the foundation of all Islamic bank 
operations. All of its financial and commercial transaction actions and activities must 
stay within the limits of the shariah. 
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The financing portfolio is the major sources of income for the Islamic bank business 
activities. With the shariah compliant instruments, added with high ethical and moral 
(akhlaq) value underpinning the Islamic financial system and adhering to the instruction 
of Quran (Yusuf, 12:46-49), the Islamic bank commercial financing and investment 
activities supposedly will not react excessively to the changes in the macroeconomic 
activities. Thus, it is likely that the operations of Islamic bank will be able to bring a 
more stable and resilient economic environment.  
 
In order to understand the operation of Islamic banking system it is worthwhile to 
comprehend the working of present day’s financial intermediary systems. The following 
chapter discusses the role of current financial intermediaries in facilitating the present 
economic activities. This is followed by the description of the Islamic bank background, 
the operational system, and how it fits in into the modern economic landscape. 
 
3.1 Banking Operations and Economic Activities 
Banks’ play a significant role in the economy by providing credit facilities to a large 
fraction of firms, thus, the amount of credit channelled through the banking system may 
well have significant macroeconomic effects. For a small open economies in particular, 
the numbers of small and medium scale firms and naturally bank reliant firms are high, 
thus, the reliance on bank credit is essential. Small and medium scale firms may have 
difficulties in acquiring funds from the non-banking sources. Existence of scale 
economies in the financial market makes the small and medium scale firms in particular 
more reliant on bank lending or financing. At least for the near future, the small and 
medium enterprises are likely to remain bank reliant. 
 
Study also shows that even during times of economic recession, banks are also the main 
source of liquidity for the large firms (Trautwein, 2000 and Saidenberg and Strahan, 
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1999). Adverse shocks to the banks’ equity levels and capacity to provide loans may all 
have impact on firms’ access to credit, consequently to investment and output. Thus, 
financial deregulation and innovations are improbably will help improve bank 
dependent firms’ ability to borrow from the capital markets and are likely to remain 
bank reliant at least for the near future.  
 
There are three players involved in the operation of a bank. They are the bank institution 
themselves, depositors, and the borrowers. The depositor places his fund in the bank and 
the bank will provide credit services to those who are short of funds called the 
borrowers. In the interest-based type of banking systems, the fund owner will receive 
interest from the bank as a reward for parting with his capital for a given time. The 
borrowers on the other hand, are charged with the loan rate by the interest-based bank of 
the amount borrowed.  
 
The interest-based bank as the financial intermediary will receive the interest spread. 
Interest spread is the difference between loan rates and interest paid to the depositors. 
Loan rate is the additional amount paid by the borrowers, which are over and above the 
principal amount borrowed. The loan rate depends on the size of the principal and the 
length of time the borrowers take to repay the whole amount they borrowed. Loan 
portfolios are one of the major forms of business activities for the interest-based bank. 
Hence, it is vital for the bank to monitor the market interest rate movement so that the 
interest spread margin of the interest-based banks is determined competitively. 
 
Majority of Islamic jurists view the collection and payment of interest has a 
resemblance to the characteristic of riba (usury), and for that reason, Islam prohibits the 
practice. In view of the fact that injustice laid at the root of interest-based instruments, 
thus, receiving and paying of interest is not permissible. Shariah strictly prohibited the 
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receiving and paying of interest, regardless of the loan purpose and regardless of the 
rate of interest charged.  
 
With the prohibition on interest-based instruments, as an alternative, Muslim scholars 
proposed the sharing of profit and risk for financial and commercial transaction 
activities between the fund suppliers, fund demanders, and the financial institutions 
(Qureshi, 1946; Ziauddin, 1984; Khan, 1984; Khan and Mirakhor, 1986 and others). For 
this alternative, the lender, borrower, and intermediary’s relationship have transformed 
into a partnership through the sharing of profit and risk in an investment. As for the 
consumption financings, these are done according to trade-based (al-bay) financing that 
is by a mark-up price or the hire purchase formula. The Islamic bank simply buys the 
product and sells it back to the customer at a profit rate and payments are made in 
instalments.  
 
Based on the proposed interest-free instruments, the scholars put forward that the 
financing operation of the Islamic bank will drive to fairness and justice for each 
contracting party. The profit and risk sharing instruments will create the awareness of 
the unity concept through partnership and cooperation among members of the society. 
More importantly, they believe by adhering to the shariah requirement the operations of 
financial and commercial transactions will able to stabilise the economy better than the 
interest-based financial system. 
 
The Islamic bank presently performs a variety of functions in addition to the deposits 
and financing services. For the last two decades, the Islamic banking industry has been 
doing well in formulating creative, flexible and shariah compliant financing instruments 
that have enabled them to compete with the interest-based bank. Historically, the 
Islamic bank has provided payment processing services and money changing. The 
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functions have gained its recognition of the international level owing to the greater 
integration of financial services.  
 
Presently, the Islamic banks primary function is the transformation of assets in terms of 
their maturity, quality, and denomination. In attempting to maximise the shareholders' 
investment value, the Islamic bank institutions are as well exposed to risks. Such 
interaction of risks can lead to a systemic crisis. Therefore, from the policy standpoint, 
Islamic bank management should also consider developing a portfolio management plan 
or strategy that will balance the risks and returns.  
 
3.2 Islamic Banking Background 
Banking industry is a crucial sector in supporting the development and growth of an 
economy locally as well as globally. The fundamental function of banking institutions 
comprises the mobilisation of funds of those who have an excess to those who are in 
need of funds of deploying them as credits for a variety of purposes. The existence of 
banks is to connect the lenders and borrowers mutually, and help allocate credits. Bank 
credit facilities are a special service from the standpoint of the bank or the borrower 
with no perfect substitute. The monetary policy will directly influence the banks’ 
lending operations.  
 
Islamic bank of a complete financial institution run the same activities as the interest-
based bank. The operations of Islamic bank include practically all aspects of business, 
commerce, and investment as provided by the interest-based bank institution, but 
without infringement of the shariah or the Islamic rules and regulations principle. The 
original meaning of shariah is “the way to the source of life”. Now it is referring to the 
legal system in keeping with the code of behaviour called for by the Holy Quran 
(Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010). The economic objectives of shariah among others are 
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to protect the wealth of people and morally upright society all the way through ensuring 
fairness, justice, and equitable distribution of wealth. Shariah will ensure the financial 
and commercial transaction and the exchange and transfer of wealth will take place in 
an orderly manner. 
 
Presently, the Islamic banking industry is still in its emerging stage. However, it is a fast 
growing industry with an increasing number of acceptances among the non-Muslims on 
the Islamic financial system and its instruments. The Islamic financial industry is 
growing at the rate of fifteen percent every year (Islamic Financial Services Board 
website). The fast spread and growing of the Islamic financial institutions for the past 
thirty years have elevated high attention, discussions and debates among the 
academicians, regulators, financial discipline practitioners, and policy makers.  
 
The setting up of the Islamic Financial Services Board in 2002 is one of the efforts in 
developing effective and prudent standards to supervise the Islamic bank operations and 
development. The Islamic Financial Services Board has issued a standard document on 
risk management guidelines in order to monitor the Islamic financial industry’s stability 
and resiliency. The risk management guidelines are in the form of fifteen principles 
general requirements in the six major areas of risk management. The areas are namely 
the credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, equity investment risk, rate of return risk or 
displaced commercial risk, and operational risk including shariah non-compliance risk. 
 
An increasing number of theoretical and empirical researches in the Islamic finance and 
Islamic banking system are now underway. There are three phases of existing research 
on the Islamic banking industry since their establishment of this modern world. 
Research in the first phase that is in the late 1970s and early1980s can be regarded as 
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theoretical and descriptive in nature with focus on the conceptual issues underlining the 
interest-free financing (among the researchers are Chapra, 1982 and Karsen 1982).  
 
In the second phase, the proponents of Islamic financial system examine the theoretical 
framework of the institutions and analyse their behaviour by using more rigorously 
analytical modelling techniques. Among them are Khan (1986), Haque and Mirakhor 
(1986), Bashir and Darrat (1992). Hitherto, the short of comprehensive Islamic finance 
and banking data hindered the progress of empirical analysis on the Islamic finance and 
banking experience of the last three decades.  
 
According to Bashir (1999), many factors contributed to the lack of information about 
Islamic banks. Firstly, most of the Islamic bank financing contracts are private and 
therefore, unavailable to researchers. Secondly, in most of the countries where the 
Islamic banks operate, financial markets are not well developed. Thirdly, there is no 
private agency specialising in gathering and selling information about Islamic banks. 
Finally, regulators do not hold periodic disclosure of sufficient information about the 
Islamic banks.  
 
The third phase of Islamic financial system research began some fifteen years ago with 
the application of more robust statistical technique analysis in evaluating the Islamic 
banking industry. The earliest pathway to the valuable empirical study on the Islamic 
financial among them was the works of Darrat (2002) where he did empirical analyses 
on the Islamic bank efficiency in managing the monetary systems. 
 
3.2.1 Historical Background of Islamic Banking 
In the past, the introductions of interest-based banking systems in the Muslim countries 
were after the fall of Muslim government especially in the early 19th century during the 
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colonial period. The main interest-based banks of the home country of the colonial 
power established the local branches in the capital of the subject countries. The purpose 
of introducing the bank branches of home country locally was to cater for mainly the 
colonials’ economic purposes and the colonial trade requirements in particular.  
 
With the passage of time and other political and socio-economic forces, it became 
difficult to engage in trade and other activities without the banking institutions. As a 
result, saw the establishment of the local interest-based banks of the same lines of 
foreign interest-based banks. The interest-based bank was very well established and 
deep-rooted in the Muslim countries financial system since the end of the 19th century. 
This has resulted in the small shares of the Islamic banking industry in the market scene 
of every Islamic country. Based on this reason, the interest-based banks become well 
experienced in the banking industry compared to the Islamic bank. 
 
It appears that, the history of Islamic financial institution is however traceable to the 
time of the prophet Muhammad (saw) with the existence of Bait-al-Mal or the ‘House 
of the Treasury’. It dealt with both business transactions and charity. During the glitter 
stage of the Islamic empires, the Bait-al-Mal plays an important role as the ‘central 
national finance house’, with its branches all over the Islamic state. Shariah principles 
were the basis of their operations that adopt the social justice, introducing laws, and 
instruments that help in the maintenance and dispensation of justice and equality.  
 
The period of 8th to 14th centuries saw the emerging of a systematic economic system in 
the Islamic empire that became the major references to the modern interest-based 
economic system then. Some of the Muslims authors, such as Labib (1969), even refers 
to it as the emerging of the ‘Islamic Capitalism’. The early form of merchant capitalism 
emerged during that period. In the 13th century of the medieval Europe, the Europeans 
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adopted and enhanced the systematic economic system practiced by the Muslim empire 
(Banaji, 2003). Global economic prosperity was the result of that systematic economic 
system practiced by the Muslim empire.  
 
The sprout of much multidiscipline knowledge follows the development in Islamic 
civilisation during that period. High growth of business activities invites the creation of 
many financial instruments. Throughout the Abbasid Caliphs (750 AD – 960 AD), 
Muslims had banks, preliminary court bankers, and even the use of letter of credits and 
other sorts of financial instruments (Labib, 1969). According to Banaji (2003), the 
concepts of profit, capital and the accumulation of capital are found in the Arabic 
sources. Thus, the Islamic empire has made a powerful contribution to the growth of 
economic knowledge and capitalism especially in the Mediterranean. The Islamic 
system had been able to maintain a stable and sustainable economic environment for 
hundreds of years without any reports of major economic environment disturbances. 
 
Following the erosion of Muslim government political control, the Islamic banking 
system was mainly the subject of theoretical discussions. The efforts to introduce the 
Islamic banking system were only private and individual initiatives in some countries 
and by laws in others. Gafoor (1996) recorded that the earliest references to the 
theoretical discussions of modern Islamic banking systems can be found in Anwar 
Qureshi, Naiem Siddiqi and Mahmud Ahmad in the 1940s. Sayyed Abul A’la Mawdudi 
and Muhammad Hamidullah did a more elaborate exposition of interest-free financial 
system in the 1950s. With the increase in awareness and the desire to see Islam 
becoming a pillar and as a way of life, works specifically devoted to this subject began 
to appear in the 1960s and 70s. Young Muslim economists like Abdullah al-Araby, 
Nejatullah Siddiqi, Baqir al-Sadr and Ahmad al-Najjar were the main contributors 
(Gafoor, 1996). 
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The practical effort of modern Islamic banking systems finally began in 1963 in Egypt 
with the establishment of an interest-free bank of an experimental basis. It was launched 
by Ahmad al Najjar in the rural Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr, however, it was closed in 
1967 (Bakar, 2001). The pioneering effort, led by Ahmad al-Najjar himself, took the 
form of a savings bank based on profit and risk sharing.  
 
At the same time in 1959, an economist from the University of Malaya made an effort 
in Malaysia. The honorary Ungku Aziz bin Ungku Abdul Hamid in his working paper, 
‘Programme for the Improvement of the Economy of Haj Pilgrims’, wrote a proposal 
for the establishment of a financial institution based on the interest-free economic 
activities to solve the financial problems faced by Malaysian pilgrims. Creatively he 
brought the original idea, which finally saw the establishment of Muslims Pilgrims 
Savings Fund Corporation in November 1963.  
 
Muslims Pilgrims Savings Fund Corporation then evolved into the Pilgrims 
Management and Fund Board in August 1969. The board was set up to coordinating and 
promoting all aspects of activities connected with Muslims going on pilgrimage as well 
as to mobilise the savings of its depositors (Bakar, 2001). It provides financial services 
to Muslims through the concept of halal (allowable or permissible) savings and 
investment.  
 
Following the successful implementation of Pilgrims Management and Fund Board a 
continuous pressure made on the government to establish an Islamic bank in Malaysia. 
A more formal demand for the establishment of the Islamic bank was first made in 
1980. The “Bumiputera Economic Congress 1980” passed a resolution urging the 
government to allow Pilgrims Management and Fund Board to establish Islamic banks 
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in Malaysia in order to mobilise savings from the Muslims and invest them in a more 
productive manner (Bakar, 2001). 
 
On the global perspective, the early seventies saw the international institutional 
involvement. The Finance Ministers of the Islamic Countries conference held in Karachi 
in 1970, the Egyptian study in 1972, the Mecca First International Conference on 
Islamic Economics in 1976, and the 1977 International Economic Conference in 
London were the results of such involvement.  
 
In 1972, the Egyptian government revived the al Najjar’s experiment. The experiment 
began attracting the attention to bankers, thinkers, and economists in the Muslim 
countries who were concerned with economic and social progress of individuals, as well 
as nations, in accordance with the principles of the shariah. The bank was designed to 
promote savings, investment in development projects, and productive enterprise and at 
the same time as being interest-free. In 1972, the Egyptian government established the 
first ever-official Islamic bank, the Nasir Social Bank as an introduction to Islamic 
banking with a comprehensive scale (Nawawi, 1995). 
 
The first private interest-free bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank was eventually set up in 
1975. A group of Muslim businessperson set it up from several countries. In 1977, 
another two private interest-free banks were founded under the name of Faisal Islamic 
Bank in Egypt and in Sudan. Following the establishment of the Nasir Social Bank, the 
number of Islamic Banking had increased and spread not just among the Muslim 
countries but also outside the Muslim world, such as Great Britain, Switzerland, 
Cyprus, and the USA (Nawawi, 1995).  
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For the past thirty years, it is beyond doubt that the growth of Islamic banking industry 
is much links to the rising of oil revenues then. The Islamic bank business has largely 
developed of from the rising of world oil prices. More than 50 Islamic banks institutions 
have come into being in the first ten years after the establishment of the first private 
interest-free commercial bank of Dubai. Nearly all of them are in Muslim countries, 
though, there are some in Western Europe as well. The Islamic Banking System (now 
known as the Islamic Finance House) established in Luxembourg in 1978, represents 
the first attempt on Islamic banking with the Western world. There is also an Islamic 
Bank International of Denmark, in Copenhagen (founded in 1982), and the Australia 
Islamic Investment Company which has been set up in Melbourne, Australia (Bakar, 
2001). 
 
3.3 Islamic Economic System Framework 
The global financial crisis related to the instability of financial markets has highlighted 
the weakness for interest-based banking and finance on which the global financial 
system built for hundreds of years. The interest-based bank lending tendencies to 
behave pro-cyclically to the business cycle event have raised much concern on its 
ability to stabilise this dynamic and unpredictable economic environment uncertainty. 
The International Monetary Fund based on a number of their studies have recommended 
that the Islamic financial system might be in better positions to absorb the international 
financial shocks compared to the interest-based financial system. 
 
Thus, the intention of this particular study is to evaluate the cyclicality behaviour of the 
Islamic bank financing. To confirm this behaviour of Islamic bank financing towards 
the business cycle event, it is worthwhile to start with the foundation description of the 
Islamic economic framework. To begin with, it is necessary to elaborate the basis of 
Islamic teaching underpins its economic views and is applied in every organisation 
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including the business organisation especially the financial intermediaries that directly 
plays an important role in the development of an economy.  
 
Six philosophic pillars that become the foundation of the Islamic economic management 
are: 
1. The concept of Allah (swt) alone determines the sustenance and nourishment of 
His creation and will direct those who believe in Him towards success 
(rububiyyah)  
2. Men’s role as Allah’s (swt)  khalifah (vicegerent) on earth  
3. The growth and purification of men as a necessary prerequisite before men 
undertakes the responsibilities laid out to them (tazkiyyah) 
4. The concepts of trustworthiness (amanah) 
5. Men’s is accountable for their actions and deeds during the present world in the 
hereafter (masulliyat/hisab). 
6. The principles of brotherhood in the society (ukhwah). 
 
The above-mentioned pillars underpin every action and activity performed either by 
individuals or by organisations as the economic units. The divine guidance governing 
the economic activities is the Islamic laws and regulations or recognised as the shariah 
in the Arabic term. It stands for believing in Allah (swt) (aqidah and takwa) and the 
concept of moral and ethics (akhlaq). Its principles are the utilisation of property and 
wealth provided by Allah (swt) according to His order for human welfare and benefits.  
 
The discussion of economic issues under the Islamic system is under the discipline of 
‘fiqh muamalat’, which is governed by the shariah or the Islamic law. The main 
principle of Islamic economics is the full utilisation of the property and wealth provided 
by Allah (swt) according to His instruction. The objectives of the economic agents are 
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to achieve the prosperity and success in this world and in the hereafter (falah) rather 
than maximising one’s own self (nafs). 
 
The concept of fearness to Allah (tauhid) reflects the economic doctrine of Islam. The 
key to economic philosophy of Islam lies in man’s relationship to Allah (swt) the 
almighty, His people and His universe that is other human beings and the nature. The 
basic sources of the Islamic code of conduct are the holy Quran and the Sunnah (the 
saying or Hadith and the conducts of the Prophet Muhammad (saw)). Following the 
Quran and Sunnah is of paramount importance in Islam and nothing could replace this. 
It is a complete misguidance to take one's Islam out of these revelations-based sources.  
 
Islamic bank, other than it should be in conformity with the ethos of Islam. It should 
help to realise the socioeconomic goals that Islam emphasises. Some of the most 
important goals in an Islamic economic system as mention by Chapra (1983) are: 
1.  Economic well-being with full employment and optimum rate of economic 
growth. 
2.  Socioeconomic justice and equitable distribution of income and wealth.  
3. Stability of money value. To enable the medium of exchange to be a reliable unit 
of accounts, a just standard of deferred payments, and a stable store of value. 
 
Kahf (1978) lists four main objectives of the Islamic macroeconomics policy view that 
is the economic development, full employment, price stability, and redistribution of 
wealth and income. 
 
Therefore, in an Islamic economic system the role of any financial institution, banks in 
particular are to smooth the progress of the macroeconomic environment.  
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Most of the Muslims economists’ scholars have very well accepted the above-
mentioned macroeconomics goals. Despite the fact that there is an apparent similarity in 
the policy objectives as those of capitalism, there is a significant difference in emphasis 
arising from the divergence in the commitment to the spiritual values of the two 
systems, socioeconomic justice, and unity. Hence, the short run objectives of 
macroeconomics according to Islamic framework are to achieve: 
1. optimum rate of economic growth 
2. full employment 
3. price stability 
4. redistribution of wealth and income. 
 
The long run Islamic policy objective is to achieve the wellbeing and success in this 
world (particularly for the non-Muslim) and as well as the hereafter (the concept of al-
falah) for the Muslims. According to Ariff (1982), the choice and role of the policy 
tools of an Islamic economy would depend greatly on the policy objectives pursued. 
Four broad objectives seem to have gained wide recognition are (a) internal stability (b) 
distributive justice (c) external equilibrium and (d) economic growth. 
 
With the above-discussed foundation of the economic systems, the Islamic bank 
operations need to follow accordingly to the instruction of shariah in order to arrive at 
the ultimate objectives of the economy. Thus, the main principle is the full utilisation of 
the property and wealth according to Allah (swt) instruction. 
 
3.4 Islamic Financial System Framework 
In Islam, the foundation of all institutional development in a given society is the 
principles of shariah with the objectives to realise the socioeconomic goals of Islam. 
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The concept and operations of Islamic financial institutions should be consistent with 
the shariah principles, derived from the Quran and the Sunnah.  
 
Islam prohibits all such transactions that depend on chance and speculations (Quran, 
2:219; 5:90). The essence of disapproved business conduct comprises unjustified 
appropriation of others’ wealth and rights, regardless of the forms. (Quran, 2:188; 4:29; 
38:23 and 83:1-2). This is exactly what the Quran has strictly forbidden by calling it as 
zulm or injustice (Quran, 2:188; 4:29; 38:24). Allah (swt) also unambiguously declared 
nothing could be having without effort or labour (Quran, 4:32; 53:39). Islam emphasises 
the duty of every individual to work for his living and productive enterprise is looked 
upon as a means of serving God (2:195). 
 
In the case of Islamic banks, it plays a special role in the financial system. In principals, 
similar to the interest-based bank roles, the Islamic bank is well suited to solve the 
asymmetric information problems of the financing markets but without the infringement 
of the Islamic principle. The Islamic bank financing operations practices differ from the 
interest-based bank lending practices as it is based on the shariah or the Islamic law 
principles. The major principles are the ban on interest-based financial instruments in 
whatever forms for the reason it resembles the characteristics of usury or riba.  
 
Majority of Islamic jurists views the collection and payment of interest as practiced by 
the interest-based banking system has a resemblance to the characteristic of riba or 
usury, and for that reason it is prohibited in Islam. The Holy Quran and the hadith or the 
saying of the Prophet Muhammad (saw), had explicitly prohibited riba or usury (Quran: 
2:275-281; 3:130-132; 4:161; 30:39).  
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Thus, the prohibition on interest was not based on economic theory per se but on the 
shariah instruction that is the divine guide, which considers the charging of interest 
resemble the characteristics of riba (usury). It is an act of exploitation and injustice. 
From the Islamic economic views, income that receives from a riba-based instrument is 
a return to an unproductive effort of no labour activities. 
 
Therefore, the interest-based instruments viewed as something that will bring unfairness 
and injustice to the parties involved in financial transactions no matter whether the 
charged is low or high. Since unfairness and injustice lay at the root of interest-based 
instruments on all undesirable business conducts, therefore, Islam strictly prohibited the 
receiving and paying of interest, regardless of the rates at which interest is charged and 
regardless of the purpose for which such loans are made. In the case of loans, it is riba 
al-Nasiah. Riba al-Nasiah is the additional amount sought on loan and usually based on 
time. It is also known as riba al-Jahiliyyah and is the one expressly prohibited by the 
Quran. In some cases, the injustice may not be apparent and in order to nip the evil in 
the bud, Islam seeks to block all those channels that eventually lead to the injustice.  
 
Despite the fact that the principles of shariah governed the Islamic bank, it essentially 
performs the same economic functions as those in an interest-based banking system, 
that is, they act as financial intermediaries. The aimed of Islamic banking system are 
meeting the requirement of those who ask for capital for a specific investment. It 
provides the financing of working capital, industry, agriculture or any other lawful 
investments and services, but without charging interest in any form. The Islamic bank 
operations also avoid all forms of impermissible activities based on the shariah order. 
Other than it should be in conformity with the rules of Islam, it should also help to 
realise the socioeconomic goals that Islam emphasises. 
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3.4.1 Islamic Bank Framework 
Muslim jurists and scholars generally accepted the used and function of the modern 
banking system and modern form of money as one of the economic gears in today’s 
world. In Islam, money is merely as tools of potential capital and not capital by itself. A 
risk must be undertaken to justify a return, for this reason, money has to be transformed 
into a productive use.  
 
It is against the Islamic rationality to stock up on money (Quran; 9:34 and 35). Thus, 
money kept as saving and unused will be charged with zakat (alms). Zakat (alms) is an 
obligatory charity and is a levy on certain categories of wealth in Islam. It follows that 
savings must be put to good use. To transform money into productive use, it requires the 
services of someone else such as entrepreneurs. One who cannot go into business 
himself can supply funds bases of partnership or on a profit and risk sharing. Therefore, 
the money and Islamic banking sector somehow should stand for contributing to the 
achievement of major economic goals following the Islamic worldview. 
 
The practices of Islamic financial institutions proceeded with the basis that it must be 
derived based on the shariah principles. The major principles that apply to shariah 
compliant financing activities are: 
1. Ban on interest for the reason that it resembles the characteristics of riba or 
usury. In interest-based forms of finance, there is a distinction between 
acceptable interest and usurious interest. On the contrary, under the Islamic law, 
any level of interest is usurious and prohibited. As a replacement is the approval 
for equity-based financing (investment) with the concepts of sharing of profit 
and risk and the trade-based (al-bay) financing instrument for financial 
transaction. 
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2. Prohibition on any transaction involves speculative activities, ambiguous and 
uncertain activities, and the trading of financial risk. Ambiguity in contractual 
terms, conditions, and transactions is not allowed unless all of the terms and 
conditions of the risk are clearly understood by all parties involved in a financial 
transaction. 
 
3. Fulfilling the concept of fairness and justice – In Islam, parties that are involved 
in a financial transaction must share both the associated profits and risks in order 
to fulfil the concepts of fairness and justice.  
 
4. Ethical investments and consumption spending – Project and consumption 
financing must be within the moral value structure, more efficient, more 
cautious and selective in project selection. Investment and consumption that are 
prohibited by the Qur’an, such as alcohol, pornography, gambling and pork-
based products are disallowed. 
 
5. Asset-backing financial transactions – Each financial transaction must be tied to 
a “tangible and identifiable underlying asset.” Under shariah, money is not 
tangible and not considered or classified as an asset, thus, may not earn a return. 
 
In the case of interest-based banks, their operations are primarily based on the interest 
instrument. The interest-based banks pay interest on the deposits and charge interest on 
the loans. When interest is imposed on the loan and deposits, money by itself is 
independent of any labour, effort, or bearing of any risk and it increases over time. 
Since Allah (swt) unambiguously declared nothing could be having without effort or 
labour (Quran, 4:32), thus, the increase realised through exploitation of labour, goods, 
or property is against the Islamic principles.  
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Unjust appropriation of others’ wealth, by whatever means and methods, is forbidden 
from the Islamic view (Quran, 2:188 and 4:29). In view of the fact that injustice lies at 
the root of interest-based instruments of all undesirable business conduct, therefore, the 
payment and receipts of interest are strictly prohibited in Islam regardless of the purpose 
for such loans or deposits and regardless of the rates at which interest is charged or 
given.  
 
Interest, definitely involves unlawful consumption of others’ wealth. It is therefore, 
abhorrent and evil. The Holy Quran (Quran: 2:275-281; 3:130-132; 4:161; 30:39) and 
the hadith had explicitly prohibited usury. The need for transparency is above all and an 
important shariah consideration. Any form of concealment, fraud or attempt at 
misrepresentation violates the principles of justice and fairness in shariah as mentioned 
in the Quran, in among others, verse 135 in chapter An-Nisa’ (4) and verses 1 to 3 in 
chapter Al-Mutaffifin (83).  
 
Another major concept that governs the behaviour of Islamic bank is the concept of 
trustworthiness (amanah). Trustworthiness is a very significant concept in Islam. 
Trustworthiness, as prescribed in the Quran and sunnah denotes performing all 
obligations and responsibilities (Quran, 4: 58; and Hadith: “And there is no faith in him 
(somebody) who is not trustworthy”). Thus, banks of their role as financial institutions 
should always be transparent in their operation to fulfil the concepts of trustworthiness 
(amanah) to the depositors as the owner of funds and the fund provider. The Islamic 
banks not only safeguard and manage depositors’ money but they also play the role as 
the trusty to the fund owners and accountable for any of their action. 
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Another important fact of the Islamic bank operation is adhering to the instruction in the 
chapter Yusuf (12): verses 46 to 49 that is the guideline in managing its assets and 
liability management: 
“ O truthful Yusuf, explain to us, seven fat cows which seven lean ones 
devoured, and seven green ears, and seven other dry, that I might return to 
the people that they may know (46). He said, “For seven years you shall 
sow continuously, then what you reap leave 5 it on the ear, except a little 
whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter there shall come upon you seven hard 
years, in which you shall devour all that you have reserved for them, except 
a little you keep in store (48). Then there shall come after that a year in 
which the people shall have rain and in which they shall press (fruit & oil) 
(49). (Quran; Yusuf (12):46-49) 
 
Those verses of the Quran instructed every individual and organisation to increase the 
size of contingency reserve, provision for loan losses, and capital provision in the event 
of growing economic trend. It is significant for the economic units to increase the 
contingency reserve, provision for loan losses and capital during prosperous economic 
condition for precautionary measures. In the event of slower economic growth every 
individual and organisation are instructed to spend the contingency reserve, provision 
for loan losses, and capital. Increasing the spending during economic slowdowns will 
help to boost up the economic activities back to its growing track. 
 
The Islamic bank operation essentially performs the same functions as those of interest-
based banking systems as financial intermediaries even though the principles of shariah 
govern its operation. The Islamic banking system aim is to meet the requirement of 
those who ask for capital for specific investments. It provides the financing of working 
capital, industry, agriculture or any other lawful investments and services, but without 
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charging interest in any form. In Islamic bank operations, the imposition of interests in 
loans is not permissible under the prohibition of riba (usury). In the case of loans, it is 
riba al-Nasiah. Riba al-Nasiah is the additional amount sought on loan, usually on time 
bases (also known as riba al-Jahiliyyah, which is the type of riba that is expressly 
prohibited by the Quran). 
 
To confer deeper, in Islam, a financial institution is not just an institution acting as an 
intermediary in transferring funds of the ultimate lenders to the ultimate borrowers. Al-
Najjar (1983) defined the Islamic financial institutions not mere ‘houses of finance’, but 
rather developmental institutions ideologically based on Islamic principles. They are 
institutions which believe that their funds are part of Allah (swt) property, to whom all 
properties belong and humans as the trustees. Accordingly, dealing with those funds 
should be bound by the shariah principles. They believe that all the services should be 
based on moral and money has a social function, therefore, it should be used for the 
welfare of society. They also believe that the Islamic financial institution functions do 
not confine merely to the financial and economic affairs of society but are also 
concerned with social and educational affairs.  
 
From the above statements, the Islamic concept of financial institutions is not only 
concerned with financial or economic affairs alone but as a social and educational affair 
of the society as well. Thus, the Islamic injunctions on the economy and commerce are 
to secure the rights of the public and maintain the solidarity of society. It seeks to 
inculcate morality in business and specifically, the most important agenda is to make the 
law of Allah (swt) supreme in all types of business enterprise. 
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3.4.2 Islamic Bank Assets Management 
There are various forms of Islamic financial institutions today carrying out a spectrum 
of banking operations on a competitive basis. There are four main categories of Islamic 
banks, development, investment, commercial, and saving banks. Today, Islamic banks 
embrace all categories of bank operations. These include home and vehicle financing, 
trade financing, and syndication financing. Thus, operations of Islamic banking include 
practically all aspects of business, commerce, and investment as applied to modern 
interest-based banks, but without the infringement of the shariah principle. 
 
With the absence of interest-based instruments in the system, the Islamic bank 
operations must run on other alternatives. There are two alternatives brought forward by 
Ziauddin (1984) following the proposition of Qureshi (1946). The first option is that no 
return can be paid for any type of Islamic bank deposits and all financing and advances 
will be provided for on an interest-free basis. The second alternative is that the Islamic 
bank should be conducted for profit and loss sharing basis. Both of these alternatives are 
in tune with Islamic norms of justice and are capable of assisting the achievement of the 
socioeconomic objectives of an Islamic society.  
 
Other scholars including Khan (1984), Khan (1986), Khan and Mirakhor (1986) also 
proposed the Islamic banking model to use the same tools as the centrality of interest-
free system (Khan and Mirakhor, 1988). Gafoor (2001) adds that the element of risk 
should not be excluded from the financial transactions or it would no longer be one of 
business and trade, but of usury or riba. The depositors have to be mentally prepared to 
risk of money diminishing because of losses incurred by the bank of its efforts to 
generate income. He further argues that the profits would have accrued from one year to 
another according to the performance of the Islamic bank, not according to changes in 
interest rates. 
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The sources of funds of the Islamic bank are mainly from the transaction deposits and 
investment deposits. Transaction deposits can be regarded as equivalents of the demand 
deposits in an interest-based banking system. Investment deposits constitute the 
principle source of funds of the Islamic bank, they resemble very closely to 
shareholdings in a firm and there is no guarantee of their nominal value and would not 
pay a fixed return. 
 
In the Islamic bank, depositors are the shareholders. They are entitled to a share of 
profit or losses made by the Islamic bank. The Islamic banks act as the intermediary 
meeting both parties the fund providers and investors with the fund users and 
entrepreneurs for a contractual agreement. Between depositors and the Islamic bank is 
the proportion of profits and losses to be distributed. The share or distribution parameter 
has to be agreed on in advance of the transaction between the Islamic bank and the 
depositor and cannot be altered during the life of the contract, except by mutual consent. 
 
Islam permits the sharing of profit and risk financing in any investment project and 
trade-based financing for the fairness and justice of the parties involved by sharing the 
risk and return with certainty. On the contrary, for the interest-based lending operations, 
the loan is not dependent on the profit or risk outcome of a project, but usually a secured 
return to the bank. Debtors have to repay the borrowed capital plus the interest amount 
of the resulting yield of the capital.  
 
Two forms of profit and risk instruments, which are predominantly in use of the pre-
Islamic period; they are the mudharabah and musharakah that represent the equity-
based financing instrument. As for the trade-based financing, the most extensive used 
instruments are the murabahah and ijarah that is by a mark-up price and the hire 
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purchase formula. The fund provider simply buys the product and sells it back to the 
customer at a profit rate and payments are made in instalments. 
 
The early ideas and literature on the Islamic bank model mainly focused on the profit 
and loss sharing operations. The idea was initially brought up by Qureshi in 1946 (Ariff, 
1988) and admired by Ziauddin (1984) and Chapra (1985) and other contemporary 
scholars. Originally, the profit and loss instrument in trade has been applied during the 
life of Prophet Muhammad (saw). Prophet Muhammad (saw) used this instrument with 
Khadijah (ra) about fifteen years prior to the appointment of Muhammad (saw) as the 
prophet and the spread of Islam (Ariff, 1988).  
 
The concepts of contracts, partnership, capital (al-mal) and accumulation of capital, 
profit and other concepts related to trade were already discussed among the early 
Muslim scholars in the 8th to 9th centuries particularly the four Imams’.  They are Imam 
A'zam Abu Hanifa (May Allah be pleased with him), Imam Maalik bin Anas (May 
Allah be pleased with him), Imam Mohammed bin Idris Al Shaafa'ee (May Allah be 
pleased with him) and Imam Ahmed bin Hambal (May Allah be pleased with him).  
 
Qureshi suggested the partnerships between banks and businesspersons as a possible 
alternative and sharing losses if any (Ariff, 1988). Chapra (1985) furthers suggested the 
Islamic bank of being a commercial bank, might also take up the role of an investment 
intermediary. The nature of Islamic bank is that it is supposed to run more as universal 
banks with the role of depository institutions as a provision of liquidity and access to the 
payment system and as an investment intermediary. Aljarhi and Iqbal (2001) suggest 
that mudharabah deposits could be compounded in a public pool for investment, which 
is a permissible way for the bank to mix mudharabah deposits with its own funds. 
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Referring to the instruction in Quran verses (12:46-49), another important guideline on 
managing the banks’ assets and liability is on the contingency reserve, provision for 
loan losses and capital provision. The instruction is to increase the size of contingency 
reserve, provision for loan losses and capital provision in the event of encouraging 
economic growth and spend the excess contingency reserve, provision for loan losses 
and capital in the event of slower economic growth. 
 
Based on the discussion, relatively there are not many differences between the Islamic 
financial market framework and the interest-based financial market framework, except 
that for the concepts of divine relationships that exists on the Islamic bank operational 
beliefs.  Although there is not much different to its framework of both financial systems 
but there is in fact a significant difference in emphasis arising from the divergence in 
the commitment to the spiritual values, socioeconomic justice and unity among human 
beings. 
 
3.5 Islamic Bank Modes of Financing 
To examine the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operations it is 
meaningful to understand entirely and in detail on how the Islamic bank modes of 
financing works. The Islamic financial institution function is not much different from its 
counterpart that is the interest-based bank except for that concept of divine relationships 
that exists on the Islamic beliefs.  Although the function is not much different but there 
is in fact a significant difference in emphasis, arising from the divergence in the 
commitment of the two systems to the spiritual values, socioeconomic justice and unity 
of human beings. 
 
In replacing the interest-based instruments, Islamic scholars have approved the 
application of the equity-based (investment) and trade-based (al-bay) financing. With 
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the application of the equity-based and trade-based financing instruments, the 
operations are free from all sorts of exploitation and excesses. The application of equity-
based with profit and risk sharing investment and trade-based with fixed rate financing 
instruments will bring fairness and justice to the parties involved in any financial 
transaction.  
 
Besides the interests instrument, shariah also prohibits all transactions involving 
speculative financial transactions, ambiguous and uncertain financial transactions and 
the transactions on financial risk. This makes the Islamic bank more cautious, very 
selective and more efficient in investment selection and financing activities. Ethical 
investments and consumption spending financing make the operations of the Islamic 
bank within the moral value structure. The Islamic bank financing and financial 
transaction must also be tied to a ‘tangible and identifiable underlying asset’. In other 
words, all Islamic financial transactions are asset-backing forms of transactions, which 
make them transparent. 
 
3.5.1 Equity-Based Financing 
In the application of the equity-based (investment) mode of financing, Iqbal et al. 
(1998) theoretically distinguishes two alternative modes of mudharabah financing 
which can be performed by the Islamic bank. Mudharabah is a form of capital trusts 
financing. It is a contract for parties of a partial equity partnership. The provision of 
capital is from either individual or institutions. The investors who are the individuals or 
the Islamic bank will provide the second party that is the entrepreneur or project owner 
with financial resources to fund an investment activity or a project. Sharing of profits is 
according to the pre-agreed ratio of the parties involved in the investment activity or 
project. If there are losses, the fund provider bears all the financial losses and for the 
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entrepreneur is the opportunity cost of their efforts that is more of the operating losses 
such as time, labour, and so forth.  
 
The first model explained by Iqbal et al.  (1998) is the two-tier mudharabah model that 
promotes the profit and risk sharing on both the liabilities and the assets side of the 
Islamic bank. The main business of the Islamic bank is to obtain funds from the public 
based on mudharabah and to supply funds to businesspersons on the same basis. In this 
model, the Islamic bank will take up the role as an investment intermediary. 
Diagrammatically the relationship between the investor (individual or Islamic bank) and 
the entrepreneur is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
 
The flows of funds depicted in Figure 3.1 show mudharabah as a mode of financing 
through which the Islamic bank acting as the owner of the capital provides capital 
finance for a specific venture by the entrepreneur. Profit from the venture is distributed 
over an agreed formula for parties but in the incidence of losses, it remains to the 
liability of the capital providers. The share or distribution parameter has to be agreed on 
in advance of the transaction between the Islamic bank and the entrepreneur and cannot 
be altered during the life of the contract, except by mutual consent. According to Iqbal 
et al (1998), a number of positive effects on the efficiency, equity and stability of the 
Islamic banking system are expected from the application of this model. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
        
Figure 3.1: Mudharabah Financing Model 1 
 
Entrepreneur Islamic 
Bank 
Capital financing for an agreed time and ratio 
Profit and risk shared according to the agreed ratio 
 120 
 
The second mudharabah financing models mentioned by Iqbal et al. (1998) is one tier 
mudharabah with multiple investment tools. The flows of funds depicted in Figure 3.2 
show the Islamic bank plays the role of the Islamic financial intermediary 
(representative) meeting the owner of the capital (depositor) that provides capital 
finance for a particular project invested by the entrepreneur. The distribution of profit 
from the investment is according to the pre-agreed formula for the parties. In the 
incidence of losses, again it remains to the liability of the capital providers. As agreed in 
advance of the transaction between the Islamic bank and the depositor, it cannot be 
amended during the life of the contract, except by mutual consent.  
 
 Loss shared according to the agreed ratio 
 
Figure 3.2: Mudharabah Financing Model 2 
 
However, due to the practical and operational problems, this model has evolved and as 
an alternative, the modes of financing are based on either partnerships or the principle 
of deferred trading of goods and services. 
 
The other form of equity-based financing instruments is the musharakah financing. It is 
a partnership agreement. In this agreement, generally two or more parties set up a joint 
enterprise and contribute to the capital, labour, and management. This instrument is a 
joint venture operation between the fund provider and a producer for a certain operation. 
Capital financing for an 
agreed time and ratio   
Capital financing for an 
agreed time and ratio   
Profit shared according 
to the agreed ratio   
Islamic Bank 
(Intermediary)  Entrepreneur Depositor 
Profit shared according 
to the agreed ratio   
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They shared the profits and risks from the operations together among the parties based 
on a pre-agreed ratio.  
 
The Islamic bank can possibly perform as the fund provider to finance all shariah 
compliant projects and enterprises through either equity investment or direct 
participation. Lewis and Algaoud (2001) suggest that musharakah contracts can be 
established in one of two ways. The first way is a permanent contract, which ensures for 
its parties, that is the investor, Islamic bank, and the entrepreneur an equitable share in 
the annual profit and loss on pre-agreed terms. This kind of permanent contract holds 
constant for a limited or unlimited period according to the original agreement.  
 
The second type of musharakah is a diminishing contract. There is consensus among the 
Islamic scholars of its validity of shariah. This musharakah contract is more preferable 
by the project participants, it allows the Islamic bank to reduce its share of equity each 
year and receive periodic profits based on the reducing equity balance. In this form, the 
equity share of the customer in the capital of the enterprise increases over time until the 
entrepreneur becomes the sole owner of the enterprise. Musharakah that provides equal 
benefits for all parties has many advantages. Figure 3.3 below shows the working of 
musharakah financing: 
                                    
Capital sharing with an agreed time and ratio 
 
     
 
 
 
        Profit and loss divided according to the agreed ratio 
 
Figure 3.3: Musharakah Financing Model 
 
Entrepreneur Bank 
Joint Venture 
Partnership 
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The practice of the Islamic financial institutions has led to the evolution of different 
types of permanent, temporary, as well as declining partnerships based on the principles 
of musharakah and mudharabah, with easily adaptable arrangements with respect to 
managerial responsibilities.  
 
According to Makiyan (2008) when the Islamic banks provide funds of the profit and 
loss sharing facilities particularly the mudharabah contract, there is no recognisable 
default on the part of the entrepreneur until profit and loss sharing contracts expire. A 
default of profit and loss sharing contracts means that failure to deliver the projected 
return from the investment. In this case, the sharing of low profit or loss between the 
parties is according to stipulated profit and loss sharing ratios.  
 
With mudharabah financing contracts, the Islamic banks have no legal means to control 
the entrepreneur who manages the business. The entrepreneur has complete freedom to 
run and control the enterprise according to his judgment. Banks are entitled only to 
share the profit and risk according to the contract ratio. On the contrary, with 
musharakah and direct investment contracts, banks have better opportunities to monitor 
the business because in these contract partners may have an influence on the enterprise 
and may use their voting rights. In the Islamic finance, profit and risk sharing modes 
cannot logically be made with collateral or other guarantees to reduce the credit risk. 
 
With the application of the profit and risk sharing as the financing instruments, it is 
believed that the instruments will deliver fairness and justice to the parties involved in 
any financial transaction. The Islamic bank selections of projects and investment are 
expected to be more cautious and very selective. Speculative trading, financial risk 
transaction, ambiguous and uncertain activities are prohibited and avoided. The Islamic 
financing operations are also free from all sorts of exploitation and excesses. The 
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Islamic financial transaction must also be tied to a ‘tangible, identifiable underlying 
asset’. Islamic financing is also within the moral value structure of ethical investments 
and consumption spending. Thus, transparency is more advantageous for the Islamic 
banks making them more efficient compared to the interest-based bank. 
 
3.5.2 Trade-Based Financing 
However, the equity-based financing that is supposed to be the main operational 
instrument, in practice the operations of Islamic bank currently did not adopt this early 
idea brought by the scholars. In fact, the Islamic bank opted more excessively to the 
trade-based financing instrument with fixed rate financing returns to the bank. The 
reason for the small amount of equity-based financing used by the Islamic bank 
according to Ahmed (2002) is due to the practical and operational problems.  
 
Khan (1996) points out that firms prefer fixed return modes as they can reinvest their 
surpluses to enhance growth. Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) argued that agency problems 
are the reasons behind the negligible amount of profit and risk sharing modes. Mirakhor 
(1987, in Ahmed 2002) mentions that it is related to the worries about bankruptcy and 
that it would keep the bank losses lower than total capital. To do so the Islamic banks 
invest in the short term mark-up instruments.  
 
Based on a survey by Khan and Ahmed (2001), the Islamic bank faced unique risks 
arising from the profit and risk sharing investment deposits. The bankers considered 
these unique risks to be more serious than the conventional risk faced by the Islamic 
financial institutions. The study also shows that the Islamic bankers judged the profit 
and risk sharing mode of financing and the product-deferred sale is more risky than the 
murabahah and ijarah instrument.  
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The Islamic banking did not adopt a full equity-based financing because of the need to 
keep and reveal detailed records. It is also difficult to expand a business financed 
through mudharabah, because of limited opportunities to reinvest retained earnings 
and/or raising additional funds. The entrepreneur also cannot become the sole owner of 
the project except through diminishing musharakah, which may take a long time (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005 and Farooq, 2007).  
 
Similarly, there are some practical reasons for the Islamic bank to prefer the fixed rate 
financing modes to the profit and risk sharing. This is related to the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in all agent-principal contracts such as mudharabah, there is 
a need for closer monitoring of the project. This project requires monitoring staffs and 
mechanisms, which at the end will increase the costs of these contracts. Moreover, on 
the liabilities side, the structure of the deposits of the Islamic banks is not sufficiently 
long term and therefore, they do not want to get involved in the long term projects. 
 
Another reason for the small amount of the profit and risk sharing in the market is that 
the profit and risk sharing contracts require a lot of information on the entrepreneurial 
abilities of the customer. This may not be easily available. Aggarwal’s and Yousef’s 
(2000) model shows the fixed rate financing instruments are a rational response from 
the Islamic banks to the contracting environments. Akacem and Gillian (2002) stated 
that the combination of both debt-alike financing with equity financing in banking 
operations was applied in the Japanese financial structure. Evidence has shown that the 
growth of Japan’s economy in the post-war period was greatly enhanced by the 
willingness of its bank to both lend money and assume equity stakes in the country’s 
manufacturing and industrial sector. 
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It is worthwhile to mention here that some of the proponents of Islamic bank scholars 
theoretically argued that this trade-based financing instrument resembles the 
characteristic of the debt-like instrument as practice by the interest-based bank. If the 
argument is more factual, than the Islamic bank financing activities may behave pro-
cyclically, as the interest-based bank loan behaves to the business cycle occurrence.  
 
The present study hypothetically disagrees with this baseless proposition for the reason 
of different characteristics underpinning the trade-based Islamic financing instrument 
compared to the conventional loan characteristic that based on the interest-based 
instrument. It is important to mention here that the argument with the impermissible of 
trade-based fixed rates financing instrument contracts for some of the scholars is 
unfounded to any verse in the Quran and the words of the prophet (saw). Even fixed 
financing rate financing through trade mark-up and leasing is not conflicting with the 
methodology of shariah for the reason that it is a trade-based in essence.  
 
Even though the works of the Islamic bank trade-based instruments looks similar the 
conventional loan characteristic but in essence, they are different as clearly stated in the 
Quran (2:275-276).  
“Those who devour interest will rise up on the Day of Judgment like the 
man whom Satan has driven to madness by his touch. This is because they 
claim that trading is like interest and how strange it is that Allah has 
permitted trading and forbidden interest. [No doubt, God has prohibited it]. 
Consequently, he who received this warning from the Almighty and desisted, 
then whatever he has taken in the past belongs to him. [No action shall be 
taken against him], and his fate is in the hands of Allah. And those who 
commit [the offence even after this warning] will be companions of the Fire 
and will abide therein forever (275). [On that Day] God will blot interest and 
 126 
 
increase charity, and [in reality], God does not like the ungrateful and the 
usurper of rights (276). 
 
The Quran clearly stated that there is a difference between the trade-based with the 
interest-based instrument.  
 
The Quran and hadith also did not specify exactly the instrument to be applied in the 
Islamic financial system. However, any financing instruments used and introduced in 
the Islamic transaction system need to be operated in accordance with the shariah 
principle. Therefore, the current practice in the Islamic bank operations with the 
combination of profit and risk sharing financing with the trade-based fixed rate 
financing is not in conflict with the methodology of shariah. 
 
Fixed Rate Financing Instruments 
The Islamic bank has developed various forms of fixed rate modes of financing such as 
murabahah (cost-plus-profit based financing), medium and long term murabahah 
(instalment sale), ijara (pre-paid or rent-deferred leasing), bai-muajjal (price deferred 
sale) and istisna’ or salam (object deferred sale or pre-paid sale). The Murabahah 
(mark-up) and ijara (lease purchase) instruments is the trade-based financing instrument 
most widely applied by the Islamic bank presently. 
 
The Murabahah and ijara instruments applied the mark-up principle in their operation 
and now they are the most popular fixed rate financing instruments used by Islamic 
banks.  Murabahah financing is a contract where the Islamic bank purchases an asset on 
behalf of a client and sells the asset to the client at a cost plus and declared profit. 
Payment is made in the future of a lump sum amount or in an instalment amount 
according to the agreed terms. The ownership of the assets resides in the Islamic bank 
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until all payments are completed. Figure 3.4 illustrated the transaction cycle of the 
Murabahah financing transaction.  
 
 Sale with deferred payment                                    
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Murabahah Financing Model 
 
Ijara financing instruments on the other hand are a leasing contract. The Islamic banks 
purchase the asset and allow the client to use the asset with an agreed fixed charge for a 
period. The ownership of the asset either remains with the Islamic bank or can be 
gradually transferred to the client. Figure 3.5 illustrates the ijara financing structure.  
 
Asset leased title may or  
 Cash sale    may not transfer 
 
        Lease or rentals                              
     
 
Figure 3.5: Ijara Financing Model 
 
Bai muajjal, istisna’ and bai bithaman ajil financing is a deferred payment contract. Bai 
muajjal is a trade deal in which the seller allows the buyer to pay the price of a 
commodity at a future date in lump sums or an instalment amount according to the 
agreed terms. The price fixed for the commodity in such a transaction can be the same 
as the spot price or higher or lower than the spot price.  
 
Istisna is a contract for acquisition of goods by specifications or order, where the price 
is paid in advance, but the goods are manufactured and delivered later. This 
manufacturing contract allows one party to obtain industrial goods with either an 
upfront cash payment and deferred delivery or deferred payment and delivery.  
Commodity 
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Commodity 
Seller 
Islamic Bank 
(Intermediary)  
Commodity 
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Islamic Bank 
(Intermediary)  
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Bai bithaman ajil financing contract also refers to the sale of goods on a deferred 
payment basis. Equipment or goods requested by the client are bought by the Islamic 
bank, which subsequently sells the goods to the client at an agreed price, which includes 
the Islamic bank's mark-up. The client may be allowed to settle payment of instalments 
within a pre-agreed period or in a lump sum. It is similar to a murabahah contract, but 
with payment on a deferred basis. 
 
The financing model described above gives a combination of both depository and 
investment intermediary roles for the Islamic bank. Ahmed (2002) explained that the 
ownership pattern of the Islamic bank resembles that of a commercial Islamic bank as 
the depositors do not own the Islamic bank and do not have voting rights. In an Islamic 
finance manner of speaking, this means while musharakah contract characterises the 
equity owners, deposits take the form of mudharabah contracts. An Islamic bank, 
however, has similarities with an investment intermediary as it shares the profit 
generated from its operation with those who hold savings or investment accounts. After 
paying the depositors a share of the profit, the residual net income is given out to the 
shareholders as dividends. 
 
From the above explanations of the Islamic financial instrument, it can be concluded 
that the Islamic financial services are not characterised by human made rules. Instead, 
the concept of the divine guidance of high ethical and moral (akhlaq) values underpin 
the financial system. A banking institutional development from the Islamic view is 
based on the principles of Islamic belief and its operations must be within the limits of 
shariah with the aims not just for profit motivations but includes the realisation of 
socioeconomic goals with fairness and justness.  
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The pillars of Islamic financial instruments are the prohibition against the payment and 
receipt of interest and its kind, which is fixed at a predetermined rate. Instead, profit and 
risk sharing arrangements, purchase and resale of goods and services, and the provision 
of services for fees forms the basis of contracts are said to comply with the Islamic 
laws. Other features of Islamic banks are that they are generally prohibited from 
financing production or trade that is against the shariah and from trading in financial 
risks.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Overview 
With the current global economic atmosphere of financial uncertainties, the sudden 
shock of economic activity disorder related to the financial market instability, and the 
failure of interest-based financial systems to stabilise the continuing global economic 
disorder has attracted the attention to the Islamic system. The attention happens 
especially when Muslim scholars proposed that the Islamic financial system in 
particular would be able to stabilise the economic atmosphere. With the shariah based 
instrument, the profit and risk sharing in particular, the Muslim scholars alleged that the 
Islamic banking system, would be able to weather the economic and financial crises 
better.  
 
Many of the views presented in the literature by the Islamic bank proponents are 
nevertheless still theoretical in nature and descriptive in concept with little empirical 
evidence. Among the prominent contemporary scholars that contribute their theoretical 
and conceptual views on the modern Islamic banking system are scholars such as 
Siddiqi (1981 and 1983), Ziauddin et al. (1983), Khan (1985), Khan and Mirakhor 
(1986 and 1988), and Chapra (1992).  
 
A part of theoretical and conceptual idea explaining the nature of Islamic banks, in-
depth empirical evidence is vital and not mere theoretical and conceptual description. 
Therefore, this study tries to provide some of the empirical evidence of the superiority 
in the Islamic banking system. Objectively, this particular study attempt to verify the 
cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operations towards the business 
cycle phenomena, which is yet to be explored.  
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To verify the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing to the business cycle 
event, it is essential to discuss on the theoretical and conceptual foundation 
underpinning the modern banking credit behaviour and the Islamic bank financing 
system. This chapter explores the theoretical and conceptual framework of Islamic bank 
financing, and the research design and analytical framework are then developed. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework of Bank Lending Behaviour to Business Cycle 
During the period of strong economic growth, it is beyond doubt the volume of banks’ 
lending increases and slower in the periods of weak economic growth. Clearly, during 
strong economic growth of the high growth of household’s consumption spending, the 
investment spending by the private sectors will increase too. Hypothetically, when the 
economy is growing within a stable general price level and low unemployment rate, the 
real income increases and the welfare of the country is better off.  
 
During this expansion period, corporate profits are very pro-cyclical, profits tend to 
increase from the economic ‘booms’ period. Workers and capital become more 
productive when the economy is experiencing a boom. Consumption spending then will 
start to behave pro-cycle with the increase in households’ income. Investments’ 
spending then tends to follow the pro-cyclical behaviour with more investments of the 
producers due to increases in aggregate expenditure. Thus, the volumes of banks’ 
lending as well begin to increase from this strong economic growth. 
  
This economic growth would continuously increase until the swing reaches the limit or 
boundary that would stop it due to the over consumption by the households and over 
investment by the firms. At the level the economy has ‘bubble-up’ and when it becomes 
‘overheated’, the economy will experience an economic downturn and enter a 
contraction. During a weak economic growth, the opposite reaction will take place. A 
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decrease in households consumption spending will be followed with a larger drop in 
private investment activities because of low demand. As a result, lending activities of 
banking institutions will be slower. Over pessimistic behaviour to the downturn of 
economic activities, worsen the business cycle scenario.  
 
The investment expenditure behaviour normally is more positively correlated than the 
consumption expenditure of the business cycle event, as fraction of investment 
expenditure on durable goods are larger than of consumption expenditure. Hence, this 
makes the working capital expenses pro-cyclical, as is the volume of interest-based 
bank loans to the business sector.  
 
4.1.1 Determinants of Bank’s Pro-cyclicality Behaviour  
The literature survey shows that the contributing factors of the pro-cyclicality behaviour 
of the interest-based banks’ lending activities are the price and the non-priced factors. A 
number of empirical studies have examined the role of the price and non-priced factors 
in the business cycle event. The proponent of the bank lending channel theory relates 
the pro-cyclical behaviour of the interest-based banks of the passing through of lending 
into the economy. 
 
The supply and demand of credit - The price factor 
The supply and demand of credit play a significant role in influencing the bank lending 
operations. The supply and demand of credit theoretically explain the pro-cyclicality of 
the interest-based bank lending activities. Horváth (2000) however, stated that it is 
rather difficult to see whether the business cycle phenomenon is attributable to changes 
in the supply or either demand of credit or the expansion or contraction of credit.  
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De Lis et al. (2000) analysis of Spanish banks shows that the cyclical changes in 
demand also contributed to the pro-cyclical lending behaviour together with the supply 
side aspects. During an economic cycle expansion, the expansionary force on demand is 
that borrowers in general spend more on products that require high financing. 
Household consumption includes durable goods and investments in residential property. 
On the corporate side, it includes business related investments. At the same time, 
borrowing is also for financial investments as well, which are not included in the 
components of gross domestic product, which exhibits very strong cyclical movements.  
 
Berger and Udell (1994) by using a data set of small firm examined the role of 
relationship lending that shows the aspects of supply and demand on lending cycles in 
the United States at the end of the 1980s. Using data from that National Survey of Small 
Business Finance, their finding shows that the supply side effect was insignificant in the 
United States. They find that borrowers with longer banking relationships pay a lower 
interest rate and are less likely to pledge collateral.  
 
Economists such as Blinder (1985), King (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and 
Kashyap and Stein (1993) conducted a more comprehensive empirical analysis on the 
supply side. They bring forward a number of models explaining the credit channel that 
directly related to the loans activities by the interest-based banks. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) argue that the instability of the econometric money demand functions in the 
early 1980’s and the importance of information asymmetry coupled with the crucial role 
of intermediaries in the financial market call for another look at the role of credit in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In the empirical work, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
find evidence to the effect that money demand shocks assumed greater importance in 
the early 1980’s.  
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The intuition behind the credit view is based on the following observation. In a world 
where the problem of information asymmetry is real, the size of a firm as well as the 
state of its net worth has a repercussion on its ability to obtain the bank loans. Under the 
circumstances, loans from the commercial banks will be special, especially for small 
and medium scale businesses that cannot issue securities in the open market. Because of 
this contraction in the bank reserve engineered by monetary policy, the amount of loan 
supply of the banks will decrease. Aggregate spending by banks dependent businesses 
will fall and so will output and employment. Blinder (1985) puts the idea of a simpler 
language 
 “...firms may have a desired or “notional” supply based on relative prices, 
expectations and other variables. But they may need credit to produce the 
goods. If the required credit is unavailable, they may be a “failure of 
effective supply” in which firms fail to produce as much as they can sell.” 
(Blinder, 1985: p. 2) 
 
It is clear that the money or the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet has fewer roles to 
play in this process. An important implication of this analysis is that any disruption in 
the operation of the interest-based banks will unleash damaging consequences on the 
real sector (Bernanke, 1983).  
 
In the traditional money view, the impact of changes in policy is limited to the required 
rate of return on new investment projects. Hence, only the changes in total investment 
are important. So it is reasonable to assume in aggregate terms that only the least 
profitable projects will not be funded (Cecchetti, 1995). Since the more socially 
desirable projects will continually fund, there is not much to worry about in terms of 
welfare loss.  
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On the other hand, the credit view, by highlighting the problems of imperfection in the 
capital and the dependency of businesses on the interest-based bank loans, 
acknowledged the possibility of the incidence of monetary policy falling more on small 
and medium scale businesses than on large firms. The cost could be enormous in case of 
contraction if such businesses dominate the economy. There is the concern that the 
incidence of the policy may not reflect the inherent creditworthiness of the projects in 
question. For policy purposes, it is important to know whether monetary policy has the 
above implications. 
 
Credit view framework 
Discussion on the supply and demand of credit or the price factor will not complete 
without considering the basic model of the credit view. A number of theoretical 
modelling of the credit view suggested in the literature. The model discussed here 
suggests by Bernanke and Blinder (1998). The model suggested by them is the 
extension of the traditional IS-LM model that incorporates the effect of bank loans or 
credit in the monetary transmission mechanism. Their model contains three distinct 
assets namely: money, bonds, and bank loans. The authors formalised the idea of credit 
view in the extended model, which assumes both borrowers and lenders choose between 
bonds and loans based on the respective interest rates on the two assets. In particular, 
the loan demand and supply function are specified as follows: 
  LD = ƒ {þ, i, y}   (1) 
  LS = λ {þ, i} D {1- λ}   (2) 
Where: 
LD and LS represent demand and supply of loan 
þ and i are the interest rate rates on loans and bonds and respectively, 
y represents the gross national product and picks up the transaction demand for money. 
D is deposits and  
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λ is reserved requirement ratio   
 
LD relates negatively to iL but positively to iB and Y. LS on the other hand depends 
positively on iL and negatively to iB. Equilibrium condition in the credit market gives us: 
  LD = LS     (3) 
ƒ {þ, i, y} = λ { þ, i } D {1- λ } (4) 
With the assumption that excess reserve held by banks follow the following function 
  Є {i} D {1- λ}    (5) 
Bernanke and Blinder specified the supply of deposits as Reserved (R) multiply by the 
money multiplier,  
m( i ) = [ Є { i } { 1- λ } + λ ]-1 (6) 
 
Since the demand for deposit depends on the interest rate, income and stock of wealth, 
the demand for deposit can be suppressed as D{i, y} and supply as m{i} R. Equilibrium 
condition in the market for deposit give us, 
  D {i, y} = m{i} R   (7) 
With the money market been same as the IS-LM, the authors specified the good market 
as:  
y = Y {i, þ}    (8) 
 
Combining the equations for goods market with the credits market, the authors arrived 
at the equation (9), which they term as the commodity and credit (CC) curve. 
  y = Y [ i, φ {i, y, R} ]   (9)  
 
It is important to note the CC curve like the conventional IS curve slope downward 
from left to right. The crucial point however is that, it moves by both shocks of the 
credit market and the monetary policy. The IS curve is moved by monetary policy only. 
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It is clear that Bernanke and Blinder’s model allow for the analysis of the effect of 
credit shocks on the real economy. 
 
In the empirical work, Bernanke and Blinder find evidence to the effect that money 
demand shocks assumed greater importance in the early 80’s. On this basis, the authors 
concluded that the time has arrived to give credit its due. 
 
Non-price factors 
Besides the price mechanism factor, researchers also examined other possible 
determinants of pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-based bank lending. Many 
studies have examined the connection between lending criteria that banks need from 
their corporate clients (for instance study by Lown et al. 2000). Previous study even 
evaluates the possibility of the capital-based regulation like Basel I and II regulatory 
framework and accounting rules like IAS 39 to create the pro-cyclically effects on the 
interest-based banking operations (as example, study by Saurina and Trucharte, 2007; 
Brambilla and Piluso, 2007; VanHoose, 2007 and Rochet,  2008). Bernanke and Lown 
(1991) hypothesise that reducing of loan demands are due to the implementation of 
tougher capital standards. 
 
A typical line of argument with researchers such as Saurina and Trucharte (2007), 
Brambilla and Piluso (2007), and VanHoose (2007) is that the default risk of firms in 
the real sector increases if the economic shock increases the risk of the real economy or 
decreases the productivity. Assuming that the regulatory constraint on the interest-based 
banking sector is binding, the credit volume will decrease. If firms have no additional 
financial resources, they have to reduce their invested funds and consequently their 
production volume reduces.  
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Lown et al. (2000) analyses of the characteristics of lending criteria of the interest-based 
banks shows when the lending criterion is tightening the lending volume drops and the 
economic performance weakens as well. Mostly this fact is observable in the inventory 
financing. The interest-based banks in general tighten the lending standards for short 
periods, while loosening takes a longer time. Hence, the decline in lending also started 
to pick up later, only after lending criteria have been relaxed. Therefore, the common 
view is that regulations of the interest-based banks amplify a downturn (upturn) in the 
real economy and causes pro-cyclical effects in comparison to a non-regulated interest-
based banking industry.  
 
De Lis et al (2000) study shows that the real interest rate is also a key determinant of 
Spain interest-based bank credit demand. Another factor affecting the Spain interest-
based bank credit demand is the change in relative prices. Intensifying competition 
among market participants may also trigger the interest-based bank lending booms. This 
trend is dangerous for banking sector stability, as the bank is at an informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the new entrants. Horváth (2000) in his writing points out that 
with the shrinking margins and new products resulting from competition attract new 
customers to the market. Since losses only known later, this strong asymmetry may 
prove to be lasting, hence, current assessments of loans may not necessarily give an 
accurate picture of borrowers’ actual creditworthiness. 
 
Over optimism behaviour, which is relevant to the behavioural finance and bounded 
rationality also contributed as factors explaining to the pro-cyclical behaviour as 
hypothesised by Guttentag and Herring (1984) through the ‘disaster myopia’, Rajan 
(1994) with the ‘herding behaviour’ and Berger and Udell (2003) in the ‘institutional 
memory hypothesis’. 
 
 139 
 
As for the conclusion of the banks’ pro-cyclical behaviour determinants, which the 
policymakers are concerned with is the possibility of an impairment that arises when the 
interest-based bank’s income statement weakened. Furthermore, the interest-based 
banks are unwilling to provide loans to private sectors during economic downturns and 
the opposite during economic upturns. This loan supply pro-cyclicality behaviour after 
some time will affect the aggregated investment and consumption spending and amplify 
the macroeconomic fluctuations. 
 
4.1.2 Islamic Bank Financing Supply and The Economic Stability 
Present day’s economic atmosphere instability is said to be related to the unsteadiness in 
the interest-based lending market. Until today, no prevailing conventional monetary or 
financial theory capable of explaining precisely the contributing factors and even far 
from solving the crisis. The current remedies suggested by the regulators and 
practitioners no more than ease the crisis temporarily and the effectiveness of the 
monetary stabilisation policy only hold for a short period. After a short while, the crisis 
reappears and evidence has shown that it may even become more severe. Empirical 
evidence has shown that the existing interest-based bank operation has pro-cyclicality 
behaviour to the business cycle event (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Bouvatier and 
Lepetit, 2008; Adrian and Hyun, 2008; Quagliariello, 2008 and 2007; Nan and Hung, 
2007; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; and Bikker and Hu, 2002). Rather than 
smoothing the economic fluctuations, the pro-cyclical behaviour even has the intrinsic 
tendency to worsen the scenario.   
  
The latest empirical finding on the interest-based bank pro-cyclical behaviour 
distinguished the following two causal channels from the business cycle. The 
conventional view argued that the operational risk increases during the economic 
downturn and decreases during upwards economic growth. It is these manners, which 
 140 
 
would cause the pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-based banks. As in a 
downswing of economic activities, the provisioning for loan losses swallows a larger 
part of profits just when more resources are needed as capital.  
 
Quran’s (12:46-49), hadith and Khaldun’s observation on the other hand provide an 
alternative view that states that the economic operational risks built up during the 
prosperous economic, particularly when the economic growth is relatively high. 
Associates to this high economic growth, they argued the operational risks are higher 
and the build-up of economic imbalances will increase the likelihood of economic 
contraction. 
 
Under this scenario, the Islamic financial system will provide long run stability to the 
economy according to Muslim scholars.  The Islamic financial system, as pointed out by 
the Islamic scholars, is the best remedy in solving the economic crisis related to the 
financial market instability. Scholars, for instance, Siddiqi (1981 and 1983), Ziauddin et 
al. (1983), Khan (1985), Khan and Mirakhor (1986 and 1988), and Chapra, (1992) 
consider the virtue in the Islamic financial system should be able to weather the 
economic and financial crisis better and stabilise the macroeconomic environment.  
 
Khan (1985) furthers suggest that long term financing through the Islamic bank is able 
to promote growth of the economy. They also propose that the Islamic finance ensures a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and stable monetary system. Muslim scholars 
claim that the Islamic bank is superior to the interest-based bank of the reasons for the 
morality of the homoislamicus surmounting moral hazards and adverse selection 
problems, the developmental character promoting growth and wealth redistribution and 
most importantly the inherent stability of Islamic banking in reducing economic 
fluctuations and reoccurring crisis (Karwowski 2009). 
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This is relevant to the current financial crisis that shows the Islamic banking industry 
able to grow steadily during the crisis period. According to Aziz (2010), the proponents 
of the Islamic finance system claimed that the economic fluctuations of the current 
financial crisis impacts on the Islamic bank are very limited. This steadiness and 
stability of the Islamic bank are believed to be contributed by the bank’s ethical and 
moral standard (akhlaq) and shariah principles. 
 
Following the Quran’s (12:46-49) instruction, a counter-cyclical of banks’ financing 
operational behaviour shows that the financing volume should increase with a 
diminishing rate of economic upturns. Alternatively, the financing activities should be 
growing at an increasing rate of economic downswing. At the same time the 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses should have a positive relationship to 
the banks’ financing supply which is proven not to be the case for the interest-based 
bank (Bouvatier and Lepetit 2008; Quagliariello, 2008; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005 
and others).  
 
In the event of an economic upturn, banks experience higher earnings and this 
stimulates the interest-based bank to increase loan supply in order to attain higher 
return. This ‘profit enthusiasm’ behaviour increases the risk of bank failure when the 
economy reverses. During economic slowdowns, tight lending policy makes the 
interest-based banks again to behave pro-cyclically to the business cycle, worsens the 
economic condition, and slows down the process of economic recoveries.  
 
Following the Borio et al. (2000) and Lowe’s (2002) counter-cyclical view that the 
provisions for loan losses should be positively correlated with the lending cycle, for 
banks should recognise the underlying risk and build up the loan loss reserve in good 
times to be drawn on in bad times. This counter-cyclical view of Borio et al. (2000) and 
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Lowe (2002) is in fact directly relevant to what was mentioned in the Quran (12:46-49) 
more than 1400 years ago.  
 
Islamic bank financing operations and the business cycle  
Theoretically, the business cycle phenomenon is related to the changes in the spending 
behaviour of the economic agents particularly the households and firms that influence 
the economic aggregate expenditure as a whole. Changes in the behaviour of economic 
agents are noticeable in the banks’ balance sheet movement. The private spending, 
which consists of consumption and investment expenditure, has a propensity to act pro-
cyclically to the real gross domestic product movement. When the real gross domestic 
product rises during the economic booms, workers and capital become more productive 
and corporate profits will increase due to the increase in household spending.  
 
This growth continues until it hits the limit and stops the economic growth, then starts 
experiencing the downturn when the economy ‘busts’. At this period, the household 
consumption will start to drop and persistent consumer pessimism will then lower the 
private investment for the reason that businesses reduce investment when consumers’ 
purchases of their products fall. When the economy weakens, it experiences an increase 
in unemployment rates due to the falling sales. The real gross domestic product will 
start to fall due to the decrease in production. Prolonged consumer pessimism will result 
in a lesser consumer spending and contribute to an even slower economic growth. 
 
To understand the working of the Islamic banking system in response to the changes in 
the economic activities, it is necessary to understand the philosophy and fundamental 
code and beliefs of the Islamic system. The philosophy and fundamental tenets of 
Islamic banking system are different from the interest-based banking system. Banking 
institutional development from the Islamic view must be based on the principles of 
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Islamic beliefs. Its operations must be within the limits of shariah with the aims not just 
for profits motivated, but includes the realising of socioeconomic goals with fairness 
and justice. On this ground, the concept and operations of Islamic financial institutions 
should be consistent with the shariah principles, derived from the Quran and sunnah. As 
far as the interest-based banking system is concerned, there are no such restrictions. 
 
Allah (swt) totally disapproved any financial transaction that comprises of unjustified 
appropriation of others’ wealth and rights (Quran, 2:188; 4:29). Allah (swt) also has 
unambiguously declared nothing can be had without any effort or labour (Quran 53:39). 
For that reason, the payment and receivable of interest in whatsoever form is totally 
forbidden. The collection and payment of interest has a resemblance to the characteristic 
of usury, and for that reason, it is prohibited. It is an unproductive effort of no any 
labour activities and it brings unfairness and injustice to the parties involved in a 
financial transaction. Transactions that depend on chance and speculations are also 
totally forbidden (Quran, 2:219; 5:90).  
 
The Islamic bank of the unique characteristics and shariah compliant instruments may 
work effectively better in moderating the business cycle occurrences compared to the 
interest-based banking system. Their argument is that besides the interest-free 
instruments, the Islamic bank operations are also not exploitative, and tied to the ethical 
and moral standard (akhlaq). With that unique trait of the Islamic financial and 
commercial transaction, it will allocate the resources more efficiently, effectively and 
transparently. As a result, it will not impede the real economy and hence, able to avoid 
from the ‘boom and bust’ in the economic environments or the business cycle episodes.  
 
Muslim scholar’s argument with the business cycle phenomenon and international 
monetary crises are largely attributable to the practices of non-permissible financial 
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transaction instruments and economic activities that are not according to the Islamic law 
or the shariah. They believed that the root of the pro-cyclical behaviour in the interest-
based banking operations is much to do with the exercise in interest-based instruments. 
They also argued that the interest instrument is not very effective as a monetary policy 
instrument (Ariff, 1982). Khan (1968) and Ahmad (1952) even mention that interest-
based instrument tends to prevent full employment.  
 
Adding to that, the financial and commercial transactions that are not aligned to the 
shariah requirement also contributes to the current financial crisis felt globally. The 
currently practiced financial and commercial transactions that are contrary to the 
shariah requirement include practices such as the trading of debt instruments, for 
example the Collateralised Debt Obligations and Mortgage Backed Securities.  
 
Another related reason is the interest-based bank lending activities on high-risk 
customers that are not permissible under the Islamic law or the shariah, as an example 
the subprime lending incidence. Under the Islamic law, all financial transactions must 
be backed onto real assets and debts are not considered as assets. Thus, the Islamic 
banks are a more transparent and efficient financial intermediary. In recent markets 
turbulent, related to the financial market instability, investors around the world begin to 
aware of the need for a transparent financial transaction and are critical for the smooth 
running of economic activities. 
 
Theoretically, as a more transparent financial intermediary, right through the equity 
financing ventures, the Islamic bank should be able to evaluate and monitor more 
efficiently on the asymmetry information issue to reduce the risk. Asymmetry 
information on the financial market involves the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Equity financing gives them access to information and enables them to guide 
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the course of their borrowers. Compatible interest in the performance of the financed 
projects will prevail over the bank that includes their stakeholders, particularly the 
depositors, their equity holders, and their investment partners. With the equity financing 
ventures, the reward is earned after undertaking through a commensurable risk that 
equally applies to the capital as well as labour effort. Hence, for this reason, Muslim 
scholars insist the Islamic financial system and in particular, the Islamic banking system 
has the solution to stabilise the economy.  
 
Another unique characteristic of the Islamic bank operation that will help to smooth 
down the economic activities environment is the compliance with the Quran’s 
instruction in verses 46 to 49, chapter Yusuf (12):  
“O truthful Yusuf, explain to us, seven fat cows which seven lean ones 
devoured, and seven green ears, and seven other dry, that I might return to 
the people that they may know” (46). He said, “For seven years you shall 
sow continuously, then what you reap leave 5 it on the ear, except a little 
whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter there shall come upon you seven hard 
years, in which you shall devour all that you have reserved for them, except a 
little you keep in store (48). Then there shall come after that a year in which 
the people shall have rain and in which they shall press (fruit & oil)” (49). 
 
The verses provide an important instruction on how the economic units suppose to 
manage their assets and liabilities during the upstream and downstream of economic 
activities in order to protect and stabilise the economic condition.  
 
In those verses (46 to 49: 12) of the Quran, in some ways it instructs every individual 
and organisation the needs to increase the size of contingency reserve and provision for 
loan losses in the event of growing economic trend. It is significant for the economic 
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units to increase the contingency reserve and provision for loan losses during 
prosperous economic condition for precautionary and safety measures. In the event of 
slower economic growth, every individual and organisation is directly instructed to 
spend the contingency reserve and excess of provision for loan losses. Theoretically, by 
increasing the spending during economic slowdowns will help to boost up the economic 
activities back to its growing track. 
 
Islamic bank equity-based financing and the economic stability 
Hypothetically, the Islamic bank operations that based on the shariah principles make 
its financing practices relatively different from the interest-based lending activities in 
the event of the business cycle. Interest receivable is an unproductive effort of no labour 
activities. It brings unfairness and injustice to the parties involved in a financial 
transaction. Therefore, Islam prohibits the collection and payment of interest.  
 
Islamic scholars approved the application of equity-based financial transactions as an 
alternative, with the lender, intermediaries, and borrower relationships is transformed 
into a partnership through the profit and risk sharing investment financing. For the 
matter of facts, the early ideas and literature on the Islamic bank model was mainly 
focused on the profit and risk sharing operations. The application of profit and risk 
sharing financing in replacement of risk-free interest-based operation is the major 
principle of Islamic bank financing. 
 
Mudharabah and musyarakah are the two forms of profit and risk sharing investment 
and financing instruments practised by the Islamic bank currently. In olden time’s 
tradesmen in Mecca before Islam used this mudharabah financing form of profit and 
risk sharing. According to Gafoor (2006), Prophet Muhammad (saw) used this 
instrument with Syaiditina Khadijah (ra) that is the wife of Prophet Muhammad (saw) 
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for about fifteen years prior to the appointment of Muhammad (saw) as the prophet and 
the spread of Islam. The present day version of mudharabah and musyarakah financing 
was initially brought up by Qureshi in 1946 (Ariff, 1988), and admired by Ziauddin 
(1984) and Chapra (1985) and other contemporary scholars. Qureshi suggested that 
there would be partnerships between banks and businesspersons as a possible alternative 
and sharing of losses if any (Ariff, 1988).  
 
In the modern form of profit and risk sharing model, the relationship between borrower 
and lender is transformed into a partnership through the sharing of profit and risk. This 
is relevant to the shariah requirement where nothing can be had without effort or 
labour. Money is no more to act as capital per se. It is the effort of the owner to make it 
to become productive. With profit and risk sharing instrument, money is now being 
transformed to a productive use. Risk is undertaken to justify the return and the returns 
should not be fixed regardless of profits because of usury.  
 
Theoretically, with profit and risk sharing instrument, the fund provider has more 
attention on the soundness of the investment. For a fact, the return of investment is 
directly related to the project success. At the same time, the Islamic bank is also 
bounded to the concept of trustworthiness (amanah) to the depositors. Thus, the Islamic 
bank will drive up the entrepreneur in ensuring efficient management and the highest 
possible productivity and return of the projects. 
 
With the emphasis on productivity as compared to the creditworthiness, the Islamic 
bank will be more efficient in project selection and financing only projects that are more 
efficient. Furthermore, the selected project is within the ethical value system, more 
cautious and very selective. The Islamic bank will also avoid all trading that involves 
speculative activities, ambiguous and uncertain trade and all transactions of financial 
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risk. Each financial and commercial transaction is tied to a ‘tangible, identifiable 
underlying asset’. The most distinctive characteristic of the Islamic financial 
transactions will be the replacement of all interest related instruments to the profit and 
risk sharing instruments. With the special nature underpinning the Islamic bank 
operation, it is expected that it will able to smooth the fluctuation of economic activities 
or the business cycle. 
 
Transparency is more advantageous for the Islamic bank financing by applying profit 
and risk sharing instrument since that it is backed by the real assets and are in line with 
the shariah principles. The transparency of an Islamic bank will allow market forces to 
work in a better way to achieve economic efficiency and effectiveness. As opposed to 
this, the speculative pressure than the economic fundamentals affects the interest-based 
banks’ lending activities, which extend an untied credit and the pricing system more. 
Thus, this pushes it to a lesser degree of transparency as compared to the shariah based 
financing instruments.  
 
Mirakhor (2008) wrote that the Islamic finance (understood as achieving maximum risk 
sharing) diversifies risk and allow it to be shared widely. The implication that follows 
are the rate of return to real economic activities rather than the reverse determines a 
closer relationship between finance and real economic activities and the rate of return to 
finance. The full operation of the Islamic financial system will finally lead to financial 
stability, growth of income and employment, and as a result, the reduction in poverty. 
To obtain these results, preconditions must exist, including a developed financial 
system, rule of law, legal institutions that protect investors, creditors and property 
rights, good governance, policy discipline to ensure macroeconomic stability and trust 
in government and institutions. Implementing the network of rules and norms mandated 
by Islam will satisfy these preconditions.  
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Through the joint participation in the wealth creation activities and the sharing of risks 
and rewards by the borrower and lender by substituting equity for debt, hence, the 
Islamic economic principles have a potential solution that is able to promote 
entrepreneurship and creativity in the economic cycle. Moreover, the Islamic principles 
require equity participants actively to benchmark proposed projects against moral and 
ethical (akhlaq) standards in addition to financial parameters, leading to a wider 
community participation in the wealth creation process.  
 
According to Khan (1992), a profit and loss based banking system eliminate the 
possible discrepancy between liabilities and assets because the return to liabilities is 
directly related to the return on assets that are in turn based on real investment activity. 
This implies that the rate of return to the financial sector will be determined by the real 
sector. Some scholars also suggested the banking and financial market stability might 
also be achieved by applying a 100 percent reserved system that yields similar results to 
100 percent equity-based system. This means the more equity-based financing used in 
Islamic bank, the less the need in reserve. This explains the fact that investment deposits 
with Islamic banks attract a zero reserve requirement (Elhiraika, 2004).  
 
Profit and risk sharing financing behaviour and the economic upswing 
In the event of upswing economic activities with lower rates of non-performing loans, 
Islamic bank investment earnings are expected to show a positive trend. This motivates 
the Islamic bank to increase the volumes of its financing supply. At the same time, an 
important characteristic of the Islamic bank operations is to comply with Allah’s (swt) 
command of the upswing of business cycle events through verse 46 to 49 in chapter 
Yusuf (12) in the Quran. Allah’s (swt) instruction is to increase the contingency reserve 
and provision for loan losses during the upswing of economic conditions and decreased 
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the contingency reserve and provision for loan losses in the event of the economic 
condition downswing.  
 
The Islamic bank is supposed to increase its contingency reserve and provision for loan 
losses as instructed by the Quran (12:46-49) during an upswing of economic activities, 
because of increasing in various forms of business risk. An increase in the contingency 
reserve and provision for loan losses will lower the excess fund for financing activities. 
With the increase in its contingency reserve and provision for loan losses, it will reduce 
the bank’s financing growth due to the decrease in the amount of earning assets. The 
increase in contingency reserve and provision for loan losses will also lessen the 
speculative motivated financial and commercial financing operations. With the smaller 
amount of excess funds to be delivered into the fund market, as a result the growth of 
financing will be with a diminishing rate. 
 
As opposed to this, the interest-based banks that extend untied credit and pricing are 
influenced more by speculative pressures and profit driven enthusiasm than economic 
fundamental benefit. Thus, the interest-based bank increases the financing volume of an 
increasing rate.  
 
Empirical evidence shows the interest-based bank provision for the loan losses and 
reserve growth decreases when the economy expands. Decrease in the bank provision 
for the loan losses and reserve increases its earning assets and that makes the lending 
activities behaving pro-cyclically in the event of the upswing business cycle (Bouvatier 
and Lepetit 2008; Quagliariello, 2008; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005 and others).  
 
Islamic bank financing that is tied to the real asset and based on profit and risk sharing 
allows market forces to work in a better way and highly transparent to achieve the 
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financial market efficiency. Comparing this to the interest-based financial institutions, 
the Islamic bank of the profit and risk sharing instruments is more cautious and more 
selective in choosing a project. Speculation and financing on speculative financial 
transaction, ambiguous activities and financial risk are totally avoided as it is considered 
as haram (forbidden and a sin) activities. With that, the Islamic bank will allocate the 
resources more efficiently without any exploitation.  
 
Referring to the argument, the Islamic bank’s investment will not increase as large as 
the interest-based bank of an economic upswing. Even though with the earning and non-
performing loans showing an encouraging sign during this economic upswing event the 
Islamic bank will not easily extend the financing or loosen the requirements.  
 
Profit and risk sharing financing behaviour and the economic downswing 
In the event of economic downturns with fewer profitable investment projects exist, 
normally the interest-based banks tighten their underwriting standards. The Islamic 
banks on the other hand, will not overreact to these swings. The provision of profit and 
risk sharing financing of the Islamic bank will not fall significantly although the 
investment risk is higher and with the increasing number of non-performing loans when 
the economy contracts.  
 
The Islamic bank will reduce the contingency reserve and provision for loan losses to 
increase the excess funds for financing as instructed by the Quran (12:46-49) which is to 
spend when the economy contracts. The excess fund of the contingency reserve and 
provision for loan losses during high economic growth will be utilised during this 
period to finance any productive projects. With the decrease in the contingency reserve 
and bank provision for the loan losses during an economic downturn period, the Islamic 
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bank of more excess funds of financing will be able to push the financing volume 
upwards with an increasing rate.  
 
During slower economic growth, the Islamic bank will not hold excessive cash reserve 
due to the zakat (obligatory charity and levy on certain categories of wealth in Islam) 
responsibility for cash reserve. Over here, zakat instrument plays the role as an 
automatic investment mechanical trigger for the economic agents during the economic 
downturn. Zakat also plays the role of redistribution mechanisms on income and wealth 
for fairness and justice to the society. Cash reserve holding therefore will be at a 
minimum safety level. The excess cash reserve needs to be invested with a return at 
least equal to the zakat rate. The cash reserve assets will deplete due to the zakat 
obligation if it is not invested.  
 
Profit and risk sharing is the foundation for the equity-based financing. Thus profits are 
shared between the two parties according to some pre-agreed ratios, if there are losses, 
the investor bears all the financial losses (mudharabah agreement) or shared 
(musyarakah agreement) with the entrepreneur. Therefore, due to the sharing of risk, the 
entrepreneur will not be reluctant to invest with the fund providers during the 
downswing of economic activities.  
 
The financing activities of Islamic bank also emphasise on productivity as compared to 
creditworthiness. The Islamic bank project financing is within the ethical value system, 
more cautious, selective and more efficient project selection. Islamic bank will also 
avoid all trading involving speculation activities, financial risk, and ambiguous and 
uncertain financial and commercial trade. With those special characteristics of the profit 
and risk sharing financing instrument underpinning the Islamic bank, as expected will 
be able to smooth the downswing in the economic activity. 
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Islamic bank trade-based financing and the business cycle 
Another form of Islamic bank financing is the trade-based financing, which the Islamic 
bank institutions today extensively used. Currently the trade-based financing applied by 
the Islamic bank financing operation is in the form of fixed rate contract with interest-
free financial transactions. It is widely used in the commercial type of financing 
transactions. The trade-based financing gives a fixed return to the Islamic bank. 
 
Practically, the trade-based financing prevails of the financing operations of the Islamic 
bank dominantly. The trade-based financing instruments, which are at this time widely 
used by the Islamic bank, are the murabahah (mark-up) and ijara (lease purchase) 
instruments. Murabahah financing is a contract in which the Islamic bank purchases an 
asset on behalf of a client and sells the asset to the client at a cost-plus the declared 
profit. On the other hand, the ijara financing instrument is a leasing contract. In this 
ijara financing instrument, the Islamic bank purchases the asset and allows the client to 
use the asset with fixed charges. The ownership of the asset either remains with the 
Islamic bank or gradually transferred to the client. It is worthwhile to mention here that 
the use of these two most popular trade-based financing instruments by the Islamic bank 
is in line with the shariah criterion. 
 
Fixed rate financing instruments behaviour and the business cycle 
In essence the nature of the Islamic bank fixed rate financing instruments are also 
complying with the shariah directive that is to avoid all kinds of transactions involving 
prohibited operations in whatever forms, particularly the interest-based instruments. The 
financing operation must avoid all speculative transactions, ambiguous and uncertain 
activities, and transactions of financial risk. The financial transactions have to be backed 
on a real asset transaction. With ethical investments and consumption financing 
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operations and non-exploitative actions, will bring fairness and justice in the Islamic 
bank operations.  
 
With the above characteristics underpinning the operation of the Islamic fixed rate of 
return instruments, also makes it different from the interest-based instrument. The 
general idea of the unique principles is to ensure certainty and stability to avoid 
exploitation and excessive speculation in all financial and commercial transactions. 
 
During an economic upswing, the Islamic banks will not easily extend the trade-based 
financing or loosen the trade-based financing requirements. Increase in the contingency 
reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing during this period as obeying to 
Allah’s (swt) instruction in chapter Yusuf (Quran, 12:46-49) will reduce the Islamic 
bank earning assets that will directly reduce the bank capability in offering the fixed rate 
financing. With this argument, the Islamic bank trade-based financing supply will 
increase with a decreasing rate.  
 
During the period of economic expansion, the chances of over extensions of trade-based 
financings are still balanced because the paying capacity of clients is stable. During this 
period, the value of the collateral assets is also at a rising note. The obligation to back 
all financial and commercial transactions with a tangible, identifiable, and underlying 
asset means that the financial and commercial transaction in theory is also backed by 
collateral.  
 
In the event of an economic upswing, the Islamic bank of high moral and ethical 
(akhlaq) characteristics will at all time be cautious and selective in providing the trade-
based financing. The Islamic bank will definitely avoid all types of trading involving 
speculative activities, financial risk transactions, ambiguous and uncertain activities as 
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following the shariah orders. With asset-backed financial transactions, ethical 
investments and ethical consumption financing operations, the Islamic bank will be able 
to allocate the resources efficiently and effectively without any exploitation.  
 
On the other hand, when the economy is hit with a slow growth, as for the counter-
cyclical behaviour the Islamic banks are still protected when they use the trade-based 
financing. Since the trade-based financing is agreed at the closing of the transaction 
between the bank and the client, therefore, it cannot be altered during the life of the 
contract. With the fixed due date or schedule of dates, banks can neither recall for early 
payments nor offer discounts to induce the clients. Therefore, the likelihood of a ‘run on 
debtors’ by the banks of expectation of a coming recession is low.  
 
In the event of slower economic growth, again the zakat instrument will play its role as 
an automatic spending mechanical trigger to the economic agents. The Islamic bank will 
also not hold too much cash reserve due to the zakat obligation. Holding of cash reserve 
therefore will be at a minimum safety level. The excess cash reserve needs to be 
delivered to the fund market for financing purposes of a return at least equal to the zakat 
rate. If not, then the cash reserve assets will deplete due to the zakat obligation.  
 
Theoretical framework of Islamic bank financing counter-cyclical behaviour  
Summing up the theoretical argument of the Islamic bank financing counter-cyclical 
behaviour, changes in the economic environment conditions will positively affect the 
quality of the Islamic bank portfolios. With its unique characteristics guided by the 
religiosity behaviour, hypothetically it is believed that the Islamic bank will assure its 
financing activities will not overreact to the economic swings. At any time, Islamic 
bank is likely able to mellow down its financing cyclicality behaviour by adjusting the 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses. 
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Scholars believe by eliminating the risk-free asset form of return with the shariah based 
instruments and the sharing of profit and risk in particular will have a significant 
positive impact on the investment financing, commercial financing, financial 
development, and the overall economic performances.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the theoretical framework of the counter-cyclical behaviour of the 
Islamic bank financing to the business cycle phenomena and how it will able to stabilise 
the economic environment. 
 
Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework of The Islamic Bank Financing Counter-cyclical 
Behaviour  
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Contingency reserve and the business cycle 
Liquidity risk is a threat that banks encountered in their business operations. Thus, to 
avoid insolvency, banks often hold assets that can easily convert into cash. Hence, from 
a management policy standpoint, the bank portfolio management then considered and 
developed the bank contingency reserve. It is a liquidity plan or a strategy that balances 
the liquidity risks and return.  
 
The bank contingency reserve is the minimum amount of funds or other liquid financial 
resources that each bank must hold for safety reason. It refers to the required amount of 
liquid resources allocated to and above the previously designated estimated amount for 
safety reason. For the Islamic bank, the contingency reserve includes the retained 
earnings, profit equalisation reserve, and investment risk reserve.  
 
In bank’s financial statements, record of the contingency reserve item is in the equity 
capital side of a bank’s balance sheet or report of condition. It is a pool of funds that 
will cover the costs of any risk events that do happen. The contingency reserve is set 
aside to cover anticipated future liabilities or reductions in the bank asset values and 
held as protection against unforeseen losses. It reduces the risk of overruns to an 
acceptable level of an organisation. Contingency reserve is required when a bank 
believes the value of its assets has likely decreased or it has incurred liabilities due to 
risk taking operations. 
 
Banks have to consider the risks associated with possible unforeseen events and the risk 
directly related to the investment or project financing when establishing a contingency 
reserve. The contingency reserve has to adequately cover the risk and implement any 
contingency plan meant to ensure the success of an investment or project financing. The 
higher the contingency reserve, the safer the depository institution is held to be but with 
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an opportunity cost of profit forgo. It represents the immediate liquidity needs, but does 
not provide bank liquidity for the long term. 
 
The reason for the bank contingency reserve is to improve the safety and soundness of 
depository institutions. This argument is also relevant to Allah’s instruction in the verse 
47 to 48 in chapter Yusuf (12). 
He said: “For seven years you shall sow continuously, then what you reap 
leave 5 it on the ear, except a little whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter 
there shall come upon you seven hard years, in which you shall devour all 
that you have reserved for them, except a little you keep in store (48). 
(Yusuf: 47-48). 
 
Provision for bad and doubtful financing and the business cycle 
For banks to account for future losses on loan defaults, banks create the provision for 
bad and doubtful financing. It is a non-cash expense, which banks assume that a certain 
percentage of financing (loans in the case of interest-based bank) will default or become 
slow paying. Provision for bad and doubtful financings anticipated the amount of 
financings remaining at the year end after the bad financings have been written off, 
which are likely to finish up as bad financings.  
 
Provision for bad and doubtful financing is the buffer to preserve the banks’ continued 
solvency by shielding them against respectively expected financing losses. The 
management of bad and doubtful financings is very important for a business entity 
because it has an impact on the profit if it is not in good health. Theoretically, provisions 
for bad and doubtful financing allocations are supposed to increase with the level of 
riskiness of the financing or loan a given bank makes. This guarantees a bank's solvency 
and capitalisation when the defaults occur.  
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Hypothetically, a counter-cyclical view states that the credit risk is built up in a boom 
and materialises in a downturn (Borio et al., 2000; Lowe, 2002). The favourable 
conditions of an economic expansion could lead to an excessive increase in credit 
financing or lending and a less critical assessment of creditworthiness. The counter-
cyclical view associates this with higher risks and the build-up of financial imbalances 
that increase the likelihood of economic contraction.  
 
According to the counter-cyclical bank lending view, provision for bad and doubtful 
debts should be positively correlated with the lending cycle, for banks should 
distinguish the underlying risk and build up loan loss reserve in good times to be drawn 
on in bad times (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). This argument is relevant to Allah’s 
(swt) instruction in the Quran (Chapter Yusuf; 12:46-49)  
 
From the empirical evidence of the Islamic bank, during an economic upswing with 
rising incomes, the likelihood of financing or loan defaults of households and firms 
reduce (Ismail and Sulaiman, (2006). In the case of interest-based banks the loan default 
also shows the same behaviour (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Bouvatier and 
Lepetit, 2008; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005 and Laeven and Majoni, 2003). Whereas 
during an economic downswing the financing or loan defaults of households and firms 
behave the opposite way.  
 
The interest-based banks reflected this loan default of households and firms feature by 
lowering the provision for bad and doubtful debts during an economic boom and 
increasing them during a downturn. Empirical evidence of banks’ provision for bad and 
doubtful debts clearly shows a pattern of correlation with those variables related to the 
risk they are meant to cover. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008), and Laeven and Majoni (2003) empirical evidence shows that the interest-based 
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bank provision for bad and doubtful debts and gross domestic products are negatively 
correlated. Therefore, based on the evidence it shows that the interest-based banks 
provisioning on the expected loan losses largely contributes to the interest-based bank 
lending pro-cyclical behaviour to the business cycle. Other researchers such as Bikker 
and Hu (2002), and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) also empirically prove this cyclical 
behaviour.  
 
On the other hand, for the Islamic bank, theoretically if it adheres to Allah’s (swt) 
instruction as provided in the Quran (Chapter Yusuf (12):46-49), it will behave the 
opposite way compared to the interest-based bank loan activities. By adhering to the 
shariah requirement, this makes the Islamic bank financing operations behave counter-
cyclically to the economic cycle. However, the empirical evidence is yet to support this 
argument. 
 
4.1.3 Islamic Bank Management on Contingency Reserve and Provision For Bad 
And Doubtful Financing  
The relevant issue of the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour is that whether the Islamic 
banks practically tend to use the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful 
financing to smooth their operations. Does an Islamic bank allocate more contingency 
reserve and the provision for bad and doubtful financing when financing activities and 
earnings increase or will the bank reduce the contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing during the economic downturn in order to increase the financing 
activities?  
 
This study hypothesises if the Islamic bank management on the contingency reserve and 
provision for bad and doubtful financing failed to follow Allah’s (swt) direction as 
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stated in chapter Yusuf (12:46-49, Quran), then the possibility of Islamic bank financing 
operations to behave pro-cyclical to the business cycle is there. 
 
A high growth rate of real gross domestic product and faster growing rate of the 
financing activities is the indicator of growing economy. The Islamic bank should make 
a sufficient amount of contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing 
when the economy is growing. Failing to do so, when the economic conditions reverse, 
the non-performing loan and loan losses will start to emerge, banks’ profitability 
decreases and credit supply tends to decrease. Under this condition it will force the bank 
to increase its contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing, tighten 
the lending operations, consequently, amplifying the effects of the recession. On the 
other hand, neglecting to spend on economic downturns will worsen the economic 
environment and finally at the end will affect the bank’s performance.  
 
Following the Quran’s instruction in chapter Yusuf (12:46-49), the contingency reserve 
and provision for bad and doubtful financing should increase during the event of 
economic upswing and the opposite when the economy is at downswing for banks to 
behave counter-cyclically. With the increase in the contingency reserve and provision 
for bad and doubtful financing during an economic upswing, this will directly decrease 
the excess funds that can be offered in the financial market. This is activated by the 
decrease in the banks’ earning asset and will directly weaken the growth rate of 
financing operations and subsequently make it behave counter-cyclically.  
 
In the event of economic downswing, the reversal behaviour will take place to mellow 
down the business cycle swing. The excess of contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing during an economic upswing will be utilised by providing it 
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more to financing activities. With the role of zakat as the automatic investment 
motivator, the holding of liquid assets will be at the minimum safety level.  
 
The working of Islamic financial intermediaries in stabilising the economic environment 
is conceptualised in Figure 4.2 given below. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Islamic Financing and Economic Stability 
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the economic environment. Above all the argument, by eliminating the interest-based 
asset form of return and replacing it with the equity-based that is through the profit and 
risk sharing instruments and the trade-based financing instruments it will bring 
significant consequences on the behaviour of investment, financing operations, financial 
development, and the overall economic condition. Then the Islamic bank investment 
and financing policy will be able to smooth the economic fluctuation, both in terms of 
the upswings and downswings cycle.  
 
The potential for Islamic bank of minimising the business cycle swings actually depends 
on the bank management of the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful 
financing and the ratio between equity-based financing to the trade-based financing. 
Obeying Allah’s (swt) instruction mentioned in chapter Yusuf (Quran 12:46-49) plays 
an important role in shaping the activities of the Islamic bank of the business cycle 
events. The higher provision for equity-based financing will ensure a more effective 
counter-cyclical behaviour of the Islamic bank institution. Thus, avoiding the ‘boom’ 
and ‘bust’ in the economic environment or the business cycles episodes and at the same 
time does not impede the real economic growth.  
 
Operational model of Islamic bank financing 
Currently there are two modes of financing applied by the Islamic bank institution. They 
are the equity-based financing that based on profit and risk sharing and the trade-based 
financing with a fixed financing rate that gives a fixed return to the bank.  
 
Two alternative instruments that currently represent the equity-based financing are the 
mudharabah and musharakah. These two forms of profit and risk sharing financial 
instruments were predominantly in use since the pre-Islamic period. Mudharabah is a 
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capital trusts financing forms. It is a partial equity partnership contract between parties. 
The provision of capital is from either individual or the institutions.  
 
Musharakah financing on the other hand is a partnership agreement with two or more 
parties establishes a joint commercial enterprise. It is a joint venture operation between 
fund providers and producers for certain operations. For the trade-based financing 
instrument, which is at this time widely used by the Islamic banks, are the murabahah 
(mark-up) and ijara (lease purchase) instruments. 
 
With the replacement of interest-based instruments with the equity-based financing 
(profit and risk sharing) and the trade-based financing (fixed financing rate) 
instruments, the Islamic bank assets management policy needs to determine the 
optimum combination of the excess reserve for financing provision and for liquidity and 
safety requirements. The portfolio assets held by the Islamic bank that is the equity-
based financing, trade-based financing and securities have different levels of return, 
liquidity, and risk. To determine the combined ratio of the profit and risk sharing 
instruments with the fixed income instrument, it deals with the assets and liability 
management policy of the Islamic bank to suit with its goals to achieve. 
 
The operational model of Islamic bank discussed in this study follows the model of 
Ahmed (2002).  In theory, Ahmed (2002) discusses the combination of both of the 
financing methods that is the fixed income financing (FI) and the equity-based financing 
applied by the Islamic bank. In his model, he assumed that the Islamic bank has equity 
(E) and offers demand deposits (Dd) and saving deposits (Ds). Therefore, the total 
deposits are:  
D = Dd + Ds  
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On the asset (A) side, considering that in theory it consists of the reserved requirement, 
fixed income financing (FI) and the profit sharing financing (PS). Therefore,  
 A = R + FI + PS  
Considering only two kinds of financing by the Islamic bank, the balance sheet of the 
Islamic bank indicates that total assets (A) are equal to the deposits and equity (D + E): 
 A = D + E 
 D + E = R + FI + PS 
On the liability side, depositors of the Islamic bank will get a share of profit. The 
expected return (re) and risk (σr) of deposits are closely linked to the Islamic bank 
assets, as given by the function below: 
  re =  f (r) f ’ > 0; and  
 σr = f (σ) g’ > 0; 
With r and σ are the rates of return and standard deviation of assets of the Islamic bank. 
Given that the minimum rate of return that is acceptable to the depositor is rm, then a 
tolerance level (ℰm) of this depositor is given by the difference between the expected 
and minimum return on deposits that is re - rm = ℰm.  
 
Ceteris paribus, a fall in real value of deposits by more than the tolerance level will lead 
to a withdrawal of depositor’s funds to other alternative. The depositor will withdraw 
his fund if the actual return (ra) is low enough [(re – ra) > ℰm]. Ahmed (2002) calls this 
as asset-preservation withdrawals. This is the withdrawal risks faced by the Islamic 
banks. The tolerance level is different from one depositor to another. 
 
The interaction of assets and liability side is illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. The return 
and risk feature of the portfolio of the Islamic bank will depend on the relative shares 
ratio of the fixed income financing and the profit and risk sharing financing given by 𝛾𝛾f. 
The shares of profit and risk sharing financing is therefore given as (1 - 𝛾𝛾f ). Holding 
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more of the profit and risk sharing financing assets will increase the risk (σ) of Islamic 
bank’s assets portfolios.  
 
The relationship between the share of fixed income financing assets and the risk of the 
Islamic bank’s portfolio is given by 𝛾𝛾f (σ). An increase in the share of fixed income 
financing assets will decrease the share of profit and risk sharing financing assets (a 
larger 𝛾𝛾f), and lower the overall risk (σ) of the portfolio. Note that risk of the portfolio 
does not equal to zero when 𝛾𝛾f = 1, as there are other risks associated to the fixed 
income financing asset, (𝛾𝛾f = 1; σ > 0). As the risk of bank’s portfolio (σ) increases the 
withdrawal of the asset share (w) also increases. This is shown by the upward sloping w 
(σ) curve.  
 
The regulatory authorities exogenously give cash ratio (𝛾𝛾c) and the share of fixed 
income financing (𝛾𝛾f) and profit sharing financing assets (𝛾𝛾p) are determined 
endogenously in the model. The Islamic bank strategy at any time is to keep the 
withdrawal share (w) lower than the cash reserve (𝛾𝛾c). As the figure shows, for a given 
cash ratio (𝛾𝛾c), the maximum risk that the Islamic bank can undertake (and avoid a run) 
is σw. The 𝛾𝛾c curve determines the composition of fixed income and profit sharing 
financing assets that would yield a risk of σw. The Islamic bank has to choose a 
minimum share of the fixed income financing (𝛾𝛾f) to be at the safe side. The larger the 
share of fixed income financing assets the smaller the share of profit sharing financing 
assets (𝛾𝛾p) as:  𝛾𝛾p = 1 - 𝛾𝛾c - 𝛾𝛾f . 
 
Acting as investment intermediaries, the role of the Islamic bank is reflected on their 
offering investment accounts that offer higher expected rates of return to higher risk. 
Relatively, less risk-averse behaviour implies that the tolerance factor (ℰm) for these 
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deposits would be higher. That will reduce the withdrawal risk or asset-preservation 
withdrawals from investment deposits. Furthermore, these deposits are less liquid as there 
is a cost of withdrawal of funds. This, along with the higher tolerance factor would mean 
that the w (σ) curve would be steeper for funds in investment account. This is shown in 
Figure 4.3 by the rotation of the w (σ) curve from w0 (σ) to w1 (σ), increasing the 
acceptable risk that the Islamic bank can undertake on the asset side of 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤0  to  𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤1  .  
 
As the figure shows, we move from point b to d on the 𝛾𝛾f (σ) line. This movement 
indicates that the Islamic bank can lower its share of fixed income financing assets from 
𝛾𝛾f1 to 𝛾𝛾f2 and increase the share of profit and risk sharing financing assets in their 
portfolio. The model shows the Islamic bank financing activities are a combination of 
profit and risk sharing financing and fixed income financing assets in the portfolio.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤1  
                                            b 
                                                   a 
 
w0        𝛾𝛾c            𝛾𝛾f2             𝛾𝛾f1     1          w, 𝛾𝛾 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Ahmed Model’s on Ratio of Fixed Rate Financing and Profit Sharing 
Financing (Adapted from Ahmed (2002)) 
 
The Ahmed (2002) model analysis shows when an Islamic bank act as an investment 
intermediary attracting depositors who are willing to take more risks, the Islamic bank is 
risk (σ) w1 (σ) 
𝛾𝛾f (σ) 
𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤
0   
w0 (σ) 
d   c 
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in a position to increase the share of assets financed by profit and risk sharing financing 
modes. 
 
The use of profit and risk sharing principle to reward depositors on the liability side has 
important implications regarding the stability and management of the Islamic banks. 
Ahmed (2002) discusses how the depositors will react to a lower rate of return relatively 
to other financial institutions in the economy. If the Islamic bank return is low in an 
overall downturn of the economy, then this will be reflected in lower returns for all the 
Islamic banks. Whereas lower returns to the asset side, will be transferred to the 
depositors. This will not be the case of the interest-based banks.  
 
Linking the return on liabilities to return on assets brings stability and can avoid bank 
runs (Gangopadhyay and Singh 2002). Khan (1986) proves this in a study for the 
Islamic bank (Ahmed 2002). A downturn causing a decline in the value of assets is 
cushioned by the corresponding decrease in the liabilities, protecting the net-worth of 
the Islamic bank. When depositors see that the overall rate of return in the economy has 
gone down, the probability of withdrawals will be very small. However, if the lower 
rate of return is restricted to a particular Islamic bank then the reaction to the depositors 
will be different. An isolated lower rate of return to the Islamic bank will be taken as a 
signal of mismanagement and will cause asset-preservation withdrawals. Thus, the use 
of profit and risk sharing modes has disciplinary effects on the Islamic banks as 
depositors punish inefficiency and mismanagement.  
 
Ahmed (2002) continues to suggest by combining the fixed rate income financing and 
profit and risk sharing financing modes to finance project brings the Islamic bank closer 
to a universal banking system. By holding the shares, the Islamic bank will have a say in 
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the management of the firm. Santos (1999) supports a mix of debt and equity holdings 
in a firm can reduce the moral hazard problem (Ahmed 2002). 
 
From Ahmed’s (2002) model, it is expected that the level of risk would be higher and 
the tolerance factor will increase from an economic downturn. With higher tolerance 
factors, the w (σ) curve will be steeper. The maximum risk (σw) that the Islamic bank 
can undertake will be higher. The portion of funds of an investment account given by 𝛾𝛾p 
will be larger (𝛾𝛾p = 1 - 𝛾𝛾c - 𝛾𝛾f). With higher investment risk, the Islamic bank 
contingency reserve and provision for expected loan losses will follow suit and give a 
counter-cyclical behaviour.  
 
The Japanese financial structure applied this combination of both the debt-like financing 
and equity-based financing in banking operations. Evidence shows that the growth of 
the Japanese economy in the post-war period was greatly enhanced by the willingness 
of banks to lend money and assume equity stakes in the country’s manufacturing and 
industrial sector (Akacem and Gillian 2002).  
 
However, the aim of this paper is not to establish the ideal level of Islamic bank 
financing asset holdings, but rather to help distinguish empirically the cyclicality 
behaviour of the Islamic banks’ financing activities of the business cycle event. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Framework of Islamic Bank Financing Behaviour 
To get a better understanding of the relationship between the Islamic banks’ financing 
activities and the business cycle event, some of the important concepts of the business 
cycle and Islamic bank asset management related to the cyclicality behaviour of the 
banking sector are described in this section.  
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4.2.1 Business Cycle Concepts and Indicators 
Business cycle is the fluctuations of the economic production activities or the economic 
growth of a given period. The alternating period of the upswing and downswing of 
economic growth is also known as the ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’ of the economic 
production activities. The real gross domestic product growth rate is often used to 
measure for the economic fluctuations. In the event of economic expansion, the 
economy reaches its prosperity with growing real gross domestic product rates and low 
rate of unemployment.  
 
Following the standard aggregate expenditure function, gross domestic product is 
referred as the total spending by all the economic units, which can be expressed as: 
  Gross Domestic Product = private consumption + private investment + public spending  
+ net export 
 
If the economy has reached the full employment condition, an increase in aggregate 
expenditure will have no impact on the real gross domestic product but only pushing up 
the general price level. The increase in aggregate expenditure then inflates the nominal 
gross domestic product and the economy starts to ‘bubble up’. With the increase in real 
income and households’ consumption, the producers’ investment will increase and 
lenders tend to relax their borrowing standards when the economy is strong and 
economic activity is high with low default rate.  
 
This economic growth continuously increases until the swing hits a limit or boundary 
that would stop it because of the overinvestment of the firms. At a level the economy 
has ‘bubbled-up’ and when it becomes ‘overheated’, the economy will experience an 
economic downturn and enter a contraction. When the economy weakens, followed by a 
pessimistic behaviour among the economic agents economic conditions will worsen. 
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The economy experiences an increase in unemployment rates because of the falling in 
sales. Consequently the country economic growth is hampered with this occasional 
disturbance and deteriorating welfare of the country’s people. 
 
Besides the real gross domestic products of the most significant business cycle 
indicators, other available indicators also show and measure the macroeconomic 
conditions. These indicators are classified as leading indicators, lagging indicators and 
coincident indicators.  
1. Leading Indicators – leading indicators are variables that change before the real gross 
domestic product changes.  
The forecasting gauge of the business cycle is usually in indices forms of leading 
indicators. Examples of leading indicators are money supply, interest rates, stock 
prices, consumer expectation, average working time per week, unemployment 
claims, new consumer goods order, delayed deliveries, and new orders for plants and 
equipment. 
2. Lagging Indicators – lagging indicators are variables that change after the real gross 
domestic product changes.  
As the real gross domestic product increases, the average time workers remain 
unemployed does not fall until some months after the beginning of the recovery. 
Examples of lagging indicators are the commercial and industrial loans, consumer 
price index, unemployment rates, and duration of unemployment, labour cost per 
unit, prime rates, and consumer credit to personal income.  
3. Coincident Indicators – coincident indicators are variables that change at the same 
time that the real gross domestic product changes.  
As the real gross domestic product rises, the economy expects employment, personal 
income, industrial production, and sales to rise. Examples of coincident indicators 
are the industrial production, manufacturing, and trade sales. 
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Figure 4.4 illustrate the business cycle indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Business Cycle Indicators 
 
4.2.2 Islamic Bank Assets Management and The Business Cycle 
It is important to the Islamic bank to act in accordance with the Quran’s instruction 
(Chapter Yusuf, 12:46-49). For banks to behave counter-cyclical, theoretically, the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing should be at an 
increasing rate in the event of upswing economic activities and the opposite when the 
economic activities are at a downswing trend. Hence, an important aspect of the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing is its timing with 
respect to the incident of the business cycle. 
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During an economic upswing and rising incomes, it indicates improving conditions for 
firms and reduces the likelihood of loan defaults. The interest-based banks are expected 
to reflect this feature of their decisions on lowering the contingency reserve and 
provision for bad and doubtful financing during an economic boom for the reasons of 
profit driven enthusiasm. Whilst during recession with a downturn of economic 
activities and decreasing incomes the opposite behaviour of loan defaults will begin to 
exist. The interest-based banks tend to increase them during a downturn for over 
pessimism.  
 
For the Islamic bank, on the other hand, it is important to them to adhere to the Quran’s 
instruction (12:46-49), that is, by increasing them during an economic boom for 
institutional safety.  During economic downturns, the provision for contingency reserve 
and provision for bad and doubtful financing will be reduced for the reasons of societal 
benefits (maslahah ummah) by increasing the amount of financing to improve the 
economic condition. 
 
The Islamic banks should provide sufficient contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing when the economy is growing as shown by a high growth rate of 
real gross domestic product and high financing growth rate. Failing to do so, when the 
economic conditions reverse, the loan losses will begin to emerge, profitability 
decreases and credit supply tend to decrease. This will force the Islamic banks to 
increase their contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing thus 
amplifying the effects of the recession.  
 
Alternatively, the Islamic banks should spend the contingency reserve and provision for 
bad and doubtful financing during an economic downturn. During the economic 
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downturn, refuse to spend will worsen the economic environment and at the end will 
affect the Islamic banks’ performance in the long term.  
 
During an economic upswing, abiding by the Quran’s instruction (Chapter Yusuf, 
12:46-49), an increase in the provision for contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing will directly decrease banks’ earning assets. Decreases in bank’s 
earning assets will directly reduce the banks’ excess funds that can be offered to the 
financial market. This will directly weaken the growth rate of bank financing operations 
and subsequently making it to behave counter-cyclically.  
 
In the event of economic downswing, the reversal behaviour will take place to mellow 
down the business cycle swing. The excess of contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing during prosperous economic condition will be utilised in this 
period by delivering more credit opportunity into the financing market. By reducing the 
volume of contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing during an 
economic downswing, the banks’ earning assets will directly increase. Increases in 
bank’s earning assets will directly increase the banks’ excess funds that can be offered 
to the financial market. This will directly strengthen the growth rate of bank investment 
and financing operations and subsequently making it to behave counter-cyclically.  
 
Another unique characteristic in the Islamic bank financing operation is the existence of 
the zakat instruments. With the role of zakat as the automatic investment motivator 
mechanism, the holding of liquid assets will be at a minimum safety level. In order to 
avoid the depletion of the liquid assets value of the economic downswing because of the 
zakat obligation this will force the Islamic bank to look for new investment 
opportunities for returns at the least equals to the zakat rate. 
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The Islamic bank financing quality effect on its operations mentioned above could be 
observed and examine through the movement in the Islamic bank balance sheet. The 
bank’s balance sheet records the flows of funds of people who have an excess of funds 
to the borrowers that are short of funds. The Islamic bank management on its 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses is visualised and can be analysed from 
the movement in the banks’ balance sheet as shown in Figure 4.5 below. 
 
Figure 4.5: Islamic Bank Financing Framework 
 
4.2.3 Islamic Bank Assets Management and Bank’s Counter-cyclical Behaviour 
Regardless of types of banking systems practiced by the economy, it is irrefutable the 
bank’s financing or lending volume is increasing during the period of strong economic 
growth and decreasing during the periods of weak economic growth. Clearly, the 
investment spending by the private sectors will increase from high growing of 
household consumption spending during strong economic growth.  
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During weak economic growth the opposite reaction will occur, a drop in private 
investment activities will follow a decrease in households consumption spending. If the 
Islamic bank adheres to Allah’s (swt) instruction related to the buffer management 
during the upswing and downswing of economic activities as stated in the Quran 
(Chapter Yusuf (12):46-49) it will be able to behave counter-cyclically to the economic 
cycle. 
 
Diagrammatically Figure 4.6 below shows the process of counter-cyclical behaviour of 
the Islamic bank operation. 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Conceptual Framework of The Islamic Bank Financing Counter-cyclical 
Behaviour  
 
4.2.4 Conceptual Framework of Bank Cyclical Behaviour  
Conceptually, the business cycle phenomena will affect the behaviour of economic 
agents from both sides namely the depositors and borrowers. The changes in the 
behaviour are detectable by the changes in the banks’ balance sheet. Figure 4.7 below 
Increase in 
Contingency 
Reserve 
and  
Provision for 
loan losses 
growth 
Diminishing 
growth of 
Commercial   
and  
Industrial   
Financing 
Earning     
Assets 
Decrease 
Increasing 
growth of 
Commercial  
and  
Industrial  
Financing 
Decrease in  
Contingency 
Reserve, 
and  
Provision for 
loan losses 
growth 
 Earning     
Assets 
Increase 
Increasing 
Consumption 
Spending 
Counter-
cyclical 
Financing 
Behaviour 
Increasing 
Investment   
Spending 
Decreasing 
Consumption 
Spending 
Decreasing 
Investment   
Spending 
Expanding 
Economic  
Contracting 
Economic  
 177 
 
shows how the changing behaviour of the main economic agents is caused by the 
fluctuations in the macroeconomic activities. Changes in the banks’ balance sheet 
reflect the changes of all the economic agents’ behaviour. Those changes of behaviour 
will be visualised through the changes of both the banks’ assets and liabilities statement. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Business Cycle Influence on The Economic Units 
 
4.3 Research Design  
The following section of the chapter explained the research framework and analytical 
model. The model developed here will examine the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic 
bank financing and factors that contribute to that cyclicality behaviour. To determine 
the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing at the bank level the study begins 
with defining the variables at the basis supply function of financing. Then the study 
resolves the problem of endogenous variables and lastly the study identifies the Islamic 
bank financing cyclicality behaviour at the bank level.  
 
Firms 
Households 
Deposit
 
Banks 
Balance 
Sheet 
Financing
 
Households 
Firms 
BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
IMPACT 
MAJOR INDICATORS OF BANK’S CYCLICALITY BEHAVIOUR  
 
1. Macroeconomic Indicators 
Gross Domestic Product; Money supply; General Price Level and other indicators 
 
2.  Institutional Indicators  
Total Financing; Contingency Reserve; Provision for Loan Losses; Capital; Net 
Income and other indicators 
BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
IMPACT 
 178 
 
4.3.1 Research Framework on Islamic Bank Financing Cyclical Behaviour  
In measuring the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operation, the 
research framework, and econometric model apply to the financing supply is derived 
based on the bank credit channel view, which is the work by Bernanke & Blinder 
(1988). The analytical model applied for the study is a combination of models 
developed by Bikker and Hu (2002), Bliss and Kaufman (2002), Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003), and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). They observed the behaviour of the 
interest-based bank lending operations to the growth in business cycle indicators. This 
particular study on the other hand, measure the Islamic bank financing growth 
cyclicality behaviour of the business cycle indicators namely the real gross domestic 
product, general price level, money supply, contingency reserve, loan loss provision, 
capital based, and banks’ profit growth.  
 
Determinants of Islamic bank financing supply 
To understand the behaviour of Islamic bank financing it is necessary to explore the 
determinants of bank credit supply of the fund market. The supply function of Islamic 
bank financing is the basis of model development in the statistical analysis for this 
study. Factors influencing the supply of financing by an individual Islamic bank are not 
much different to the interest-based bank.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) provide a simple ISLM based theoretical model of the 
bank credit channel, where banks rely on deposits as the source of funds. For this study, 
the approach is a little difference in several points. In this study, we investigate Islamic 
bank financing growth fluctuations and not the amount of credit as brought forwards by 
Bernanke & Blinder (1988). The model also considers the Islamic bank financing 
growth fluctuations of the bank level and not the credit market equilibrium. Lastly, the 
study introduces two institutional buffer items, to be precise the Islamic bank 
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provisioning for contingency reserve and the provisioning for financing losses influence 
on banks financing operation.  
 
Based on banking theory and literature, there are various factors that statistically prove 
to be significant in influencing the capability of banks of delivering the credit facilities 
to the public. The determinants of bank credit supply can be categorised into two 
groups, the internal, and the external factor. The internal factors are the bank’s 
institutional related variables including the sources of funds and the regulatory and 
prudential measures items. The external factor is the macroeconomic variables. Thus, 
Islamic bank’s financing supply function is as follows: 
Bank Financing = f {banks specific variables and macroeconomic variables}  
 
Conceptually, three sets of factors that determine the supply of Islamic bank financing. 
The first set is the sources of funds. The other sets of factors that influence bank’s 
financing flows are the regulatory and prudential measures and the third set of factors is 
the macroeconomic variables.  
 
The sources of funds are the most important determinant. Based on the credit view 
channel, three main sources of the bank’s funds are the deposits, market funding, and 
equity. Consolidated balance sheets of the Islamic banks reveal that deposits constitute 
approximately 80 percent of total liabilities, while, capital contributes to around one 
percent of total liabilities. 
 
The second set of institutional variables is the prudential and regulatory measures to 
promote for banking sector safety and competition. Banks provision of contingency 
reserve and provision for loan losses are the prudential measures items. Banks 
regulatory items are the reserve requirement and capital requirements. The prudential 
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and regulatory measures are the constraint factors that trim down the capability of bank 
in delivering the financing opportunities.  
 
The monetary policy objectives largely determined the size of the Islamic bank 
regulatory reserve and capital requirements. The safety and prudential requirements on 
the other hand determined the Islamic bank decision on the volume of provision for 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses. Chapter Yusuf (12): verse 46 to 49 
(Quran), clearly stated the importance of bank’s contingency reserve and provision for 
loan losses.  
 
Contingency reserve is a liquidity plan or strategy that balances the risks and return. 
Contingency reserve is the amount of funds or liquid financial resources that each bank 
must hold for safety and soundness of the depository institutions. In bank’s financial 
statements, records of contingency reserve items are in the equity capital side of a 
bank’s balance sheet or report of condition. For the Islamic bank, the contingency 
reserve includes the retained earnings, profit equalisation reserve, and investment risk 
reserve. The higher the contingency reserve, the safer the depository institutions, 
however, the opportunity cost will be the profits forgo.  
 
The contingency reserve directly affects the potential for banks of supplying funds of 
the credit market. Increasing the contingency reserve will reduce the bank’s capability 
in expanding the banks financing and reductions in contingency reserve would allow the 
expansion of credit creation. To decelerate the economic expansion the bank should 
increase the contingency reserve rate to control the nation’s money supply of reducing 
bank’s capability in credit creations. To accelerate the economic contraction bank will 
decrease the contingency reserve to increase the amount of money circulating in the 
market. This argument is relevant to Allah’s instruction in the Quran (12:46-49).  
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From the Islamic view, Chapter Yusuf (12): verse 46 to 49 (Quran) clearly stated the 
importance of bank’s provision for a contingency reserve. The bank contingency reserve 
is supposed to have a contraction impact on the bank financing flow by impounding the 
bank excess fund of financing activities.  
 
Provision for loan losses is another institutional prudential measure that will also have a 
contraction effect on the financing volume. Banks have to do some specific provisions 
of their amount of nonperforming financing. The loan loss provision is a way by which 
various types of financial institutions like banks keep a certain sum regarded as the 
outstanding bad financing. The profit and loss statement recorded the loan loss 
provision.  
 
Loan loss provision occurs when all the measures to collect the financing have been 
resorted to but to remain outstanding. The provisioning is done in various ways of the 
bad financing. The financing becomes bad financing when there is no possibility of 
collecting the financing at all. Bad financing believed to be irrecoverable is then 
written-off, thus, become the loss assets of the business entity.  
 
Another important item that will promote banking sector safety and competition is the 
regulatory requirement. The regulatory requirement restricts the institution’s capability 
in delivering financing funds of the credit market. If monetary regulators reduce the 
regulatory requirement imposed on banks, they may take on more risk. Various different 
regulation instruments have been adopted for the banking sector safety and competition. 
The bank’s main regulatory items are the regulatory capital requirement and regulatory 
reserve requirements. Both of the items are included in the study as the control 
variables.  
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To enhance banks safety capital requirements is intended. Banks are prescribed to 
maintain a certain minimum amount of capital to risk-weighted assets ratios or 
minimum capital adequacy ratio according to their total risk exposure. Capital 
regulation is one of the key regulatory instruments, aimed at providing a buffer during 
adverse economic conditions, as well as a mechanism aimed at preventing excessive 
risk taking.  
 
The capital adequacy ratio will affect negatively on the ability of banks to supply new 
credits. During economic growth are at the downtrend, with increasing risk perception, 
capital requirements increase and consequently constrain the financing flow to respect 
the minimum capital ratio. A higher level of current capital adequacy ratios, above the 
minimum prescribed level, gives greater comfort for the banks of future contingency 
and thus is conducive to current credit expansion.  
 
Bank’s provision for bad and doubtful financing and capital requirements perform 
different tasks and functions. The regulatory requirements are also different. 
Traditionally, the provision for bad and doubtful financing serves to cover the expected 
losses. Provision for bad and doubtful financing has to meet a minimum requirement on 
average over a predefined period, which allows them to fluctuate over the cycle.  
 
To cover the unexpected losses, capital requirements are used. Capital requirements are 
regulated by a fixed minimum requirement. For capital requirements, it is expedients to 
consider a different time horizon than in the case of provision for bad and doubtful 
financing. Banks are encouraged to hold optimal capital requirements to asset ratios for 
safety and soundness of banks especially during economic distress.  
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The expected costs of financial distress increases as the capital ratio declines and the 
probability of insolvency rises. Such a buffer of capital protects against costly 
unexpected shocks to capital if the financial distress costs of low capital are substantial 
and the transaction costs of raising new capital quickly are very high. Banks may also 
hold a substantial buffer of additional capital as financial slack so that they can borrow 
additional funds quickly and cheaply in the event of unexpected profitable investment 
opportunities.  
 
Efficient capital management has important implication for bank’s effectiveness in 
protecting itself against the business cycle. Bank’s capital is supposed to be negatively 
related to the lending cycle. To cover the unexpected losses, banks should identify the 
underlying risk of good times that portrayed during economic bad times. Economists 
and policymakers view that during recession’s capital requirements need to be loosened 
and deliberately tighten them during expansions as a way to dampen credit and output 
swings (Kashyap and Stein, 2004 and Borio, 2003). This argument is also without a 
shred of doubt relevant to verse 46-49 (12) in the Quran. 
 
Current capital regulation, as put into practiced by the Basel I (1988) and II (2006), 
applies to all internationally active banks. The capital adequacy ratio is set to the banks’ 
risk weighted assets, and acts as an indicator of the bank’s ability to absorb losses. The 
capital regulation rules, as outlined by Basel I (1988) and II (2006) are a minimum 
capital amount to be implemented by the individual supervisory authorities with the aim 
of creating a level playing field for market operatives, as well as for ensuring a sound 
and stable financial environment (Jokipii and Milne, 2006). 
 
Capital may become the binding constraint on banks of periods of economic recessions 
and monetary expansion, as noted by Bliss and Kaufman (2002). Increasing the 
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contingency reserve in good time and therefore positively affects bank’s financing 
supply ability, whereas the capital management and signalling behaviours may have no 
clear impact on the cyclicality of bank financing. Thus, as monetary policy relies on 
banks deposits or bank credit to achieve its objectives, it may be easier for the central 
bank to restrain expansions than to stimulate recoveries.  
 
During economic distress, it is evidence that the interest-based banks keen to increase its 
capital ratio for safety reasons that will exacerbate the economic slump. During growing 
economy, interest-based banks reduce the capital ratio to increase the loan supply. 
Consequently, the ability of monetary policy to stabilise the economy is asymmetrical. 
 
Reserve requirement is another form of regulatory items in banking operation that will 
restrict the bank’s capability in delivering the financing funds of the credit market. The 
reserve requirement is a central bank regulation that sets the minimum reserve a bank 
must hold of customers’ deposits. Banks hold deposits to help deposit inflows and 
outflows caused by the bank’s clearing requirement such as check clearings, maturing 
time deposit and securities and other financial transaction.  
 
Traditionally, monetary authority used the reserve requirement to stabilise the economy. 
The reserve requirement affects the potential of the banking system to credit creation 
processes. Reductions in reserve requirement would allow the expansion of money 
supply and lower interest rates, vice versa. To decelerate economic expansion, the 
central bank will increase the reserve ratio to control the nation’s money supply by 
reducing bank capability in credit creation.  
 
At present, the reserve requirement is no longer binding for most of the banks of many 
countries. Many central banks all over the world has removed or alleviated their policy 
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on reserve requirement. Many economists advocate the elimination of reserve 
requirements especially in the United States and had already been implemented in 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Mishkin 2007).  
 
The economists’ argument is that the reserve requirement acts as a tax on banks because 
central banks usually do not pay interest on reserve. The bank earns nothing on the 
reserve holding and the opportunity costs of that is forgone interest if the bank held 
loans instead. The cost imposed on banks by the reserve requirement means that banks, 
in effect, have a higher cost of funds than intermediaries that are not subject to the 
reserve requirements, making them less competitive.  
 
According to Mishkin (2010), another disadvantage of the reserve requirement is that 
raises the reserve requirements can cause immediate liquidity problems where reserve 
requirement are binding. Continually fluctuating to reserve requirements would also 
create more uncertainty for banks, thus making their liquidity management more 
difficult.  
 
Central banks have thus been reducing the reserve requirements to make the banks more 
competitive and stronger (Mishkin, 2007). As a result, the removal of reserve 
requirements policy might have contributed to the relentless turbulence, complexity, and 
instability in the financial market for the past twenty years. Consequently, the removal 
of reserve requirements policy might also be one of the significant contributing factors 
of the pro-cyclicality behaviour of the interest-based bank.  
 
The arguments brought forward by the conventional economists are in fact the main 
reason for introducing the reserve requirement that is to manage the credit creation 
operation of a bank. Through the reserve requirement directive that will make the 
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banking institutions to be less profit enthusiastic and able to trim down the speculative 
activities during an economic upswing. It is also the essence of the verses of 46 to 49 in 
chapter Yusuf (12) in order to smooth the economic environment fluctuation and 
correcting the undesirable behaviour of the economic agents that contribute to the 
business cycle phenomenon.  
 
The next set of determinant on bank’s financing is the economic activities conditions 
given by the macroeconomic indicators. The main macroeconomic variables to measure 
the fluctuations in macroeconomic activities are the real gross domestic product, general 
price level, and money circulating in the market that reflects the macroeconomic 
condition of a country.  The real gross domestic product growth, general price level 
growth and growth in money supply represent the uncertainties in the economy and the 
variables are analysed to capture for the cyclical movements as well as uncertainty in 
the economy. The financing supply growth rate acted counter-cyclically should it 
negatively related to the growth rate of macroeconomic indicators.  
 
Based on the literature and the conceptual framework of the business cycle, the relevant 
macroeconomic variables indicating the events of bank cyclicality behaviour to business 
cycles are illustrated in Figure 4.8 below:  
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   Bank Cyclicality Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
             Influence on the business cycle happening 
Figure 4.8: Bank Financing and Business Cycle Indicators Framework 
 
Model development 
From literature surveys, studies on bank cyclicality behaviour mostly evaluate the bank 
provision for loan losses behaviour as its indicator (among them are Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 and 
Quagliariello, 2007). Alternatively, Jokipii and Milne (2006), Goodhart (2005), 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) evaluate capital requirement relationship to the 
incident of business cycle. There are also researchers such as Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta (2009) who include other income statement items such as banks’ earnings 
as an additional indicator in measuring the cyclicality behaviour of banking sector. 
 
Thus, in order to investigate the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour, it is 
necessary to gauge the capability features of banks’ contingency reserve, provision for 
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loan losses and capital requirement policy in controlling the Islamic banks’ financing 
activities. This aspect is very interesting in light of encouraging banks to build buffers 
when financing and earnings are high and draw them when the economy is in down 
trend to counter-cycle the business cycle. This scheme should have a smoothing effect 
to curb excessive bank financing during the upswing of the business cycle and to reduce 
credit crunches in the downswings. The buffers will include provision for contingency 
reserve and provisions for financing losses. 
 
4.4 Statistical Analysis 
This study employs the panel data analysis in measuring the Islamic bank financing 
cyclicality behaviour in the business cycle event. The main advantage of using panel 
data analysis is the ability of it to control for individual heterogeneity such as firms, 
states, or countries dissimilarity. Thus, panel data analysis allows us to control for any 
unobservable or immeasurable variables. This method of analysis also helps to control 
for the unobservable variables that do not change over time but change across entities, 
such as the national policies and international agreements (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2008; 
and Torres-Reyna lecture note).  
 
An important fact on bank’s operation is that the level of its operation in the preceding 
period influences the expected current year operation. It is common to bank’s operation 
within a causal period t to be dependent on their value of the causal period t-1. 
Therefore, the data analysis uses the growth values of variables to avoid the potential 
endogeneity problems that might arise from the time series data.  
 
The growth values able to capture the average speed of adjustments between current 
year volume and the previous year volume. For example, the current year financing 
policy is reflected on a year growth response to a year growth of the independent 
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variable performance based on the bank financial operation reported at the end of the 
year. Thus, the growth rate measures the annual percentage change of the variable 
between current years and the previous year volume, hence trim down the endogeneity 
problems (Bikker and Hu, 2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005). For the sake of merging the data across banks and through time, the growth value 
of variable able to avoid scaling difficulties. The growth value will also avoid for any 
potential misspecification due to the differences in the Islamic bank characteristics.  
 
The study also used the ratio of variable growth to earning assets growth to allow for the 
difference between individuals’ Islamic bank internal characteristics. The ratio method 
is a method that is commonly used in analysing financial performance including 
comparing between institutions and market performances. Previous studies that used the 
growth ratio approach with data from various countries are by Bikker and Hu (2002), 
Bliss and Kaufman (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005); Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and many more.  
 
However, previous researchers used total assets growth rate as the denominator to 
control the banks’ characteristic differences. In this particular study, the rationale for 
using the earning assets as the denominator because it is this item that actually generates 
the bank’s income. The earning assets (EA) included all assets that generate explicit 
financing income or lease receipts. It is typically measured by subtracting all non-
earning assets such as cash and short-term funds, statutory deposits with the central 
bank, fixed assets, and other assets from the total assets (TA).  
EA = TA – (cash and short-term funds + statutory deposits + fixed assets + other assets) 
 
This study analyses the Islamic bank financing cyclical behaviour through its 
relationship to the growth of real gross domestic product, general price level (CPI) and 
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money supply M2 and as the main business cycle indicators. Selection of Money supply 
M2 as one of the business cycle indicator is due to the closed relationship to the credit 
creation activities by the commercial banks. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
predictors for the contingency reserve and provisions for bad and doubtful financing 
will quantify the capability of Islamic bank to smooth the cyclicality behaviour during 
the uptrend and downtrend of the macroeconomic activities.  
 
With the special characteristics underpinning the Islamic bank operation and with the 
absence of empirical evidence on the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour, this study will 
be very essential. It is open to argument with the expected behaviour of Islamic bank to 
business cycle events and the likelihood of Islamic bank of smoothing the business 
cycle phenomenon. 
 
4.4.1 Analytical Framework on Islamic Bank Financing Counter-cyclical 
Behaviour 
The counter-cyclical behaviour of the Islamic bank financing in the event of economic 
fluctuations is revealed from the total financing growth rate relationship to the business 
cycle indicators. The Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour is indicated by the growth rate 
of financing related to the growth rate of real gross domestic product, bank contingency 
reserve, and provision for loan losses. When the growth rate of the total financing is 
negatively associated with the growth rate of real gross domestic product, it gives a 
counter-cyclical behaviour. Whereby when the real gross domestic product is growing 
the Islamic bank total financing is increasing but with a decreasing rate or it should 
increase at a diminishing rate with the increase in the economic growth. 
 
The negative relationship between the Islamic bank financing growth and the real gross 
domestic product growth is supposed to be caused by the increasing growth of the 
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provision for contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing during 
an economic upturn. With the increase in the contingency reserve and provision for bad 
and doubtful financing, it will reduce bank’s financing growth because of the decrease 
in the amount of earning assets. Thus, trim down the excess fund for financing 
activities.  
 
In a way, the increase in contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful 
financing will also lessen the speculative motivated financial and commercial financing 
operations. With the lesser amount of excess funds to be delivered into the fund market, 
as a result, the growth of financing will be with a diminishing rate. On the other hand, in 
the event of slow economic growth, the opposite behaviour of Islamic bank financing 
growth will happen with a decrease in the provision for bad and doubtful financing 
growth rate.  
 
Thus, the internal instrument used by the Islamic banking institutions to manage the 
financing volume so that it behaves counter-cyclical to the business cycle is the bank 
contingency reserve and provisions for loan losses. The contingency reserve and bank 
provisions for loan losses growth must positively relate to the financing growth. In the 
event of economic upswings, the contingency reserve and provisions for loan losses 
must increase to safeguard the increase in financing volume. 
 
The Islamic bank financing and the fixed rate financing growth rates should also 
diminish when the general price level growth is at an increasing rate. Alternatively, 
financing activities will increase when the general price level started to decrease. In the 
event of an upswing economic activity, the financing risk level also starts to increase 
with the increase in the general price level. Therefore, the financing growth should 
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increase with a decreasing rate for a counter-cyclical behaviour during economic 
upturns. 
 
With reference to the general price level and money supply growth, in the event of 
economic expansion, both of the macroeconomic indicators tend to increase because of 
the increase in the transaction activities in the economy. Therefore, Islamic bank 
financing growth should have a negative relationship to the growth in the general price 
level and money supply to make it able to smooth the business cycle.  
 
A counter-cyclical behaviour of bank financing shows the general price level and 
money supply must increase at a decreasing rate or slower growth. On the other hand, 
during the downturns of economic condition with sluggish aggregate market activities, 
the Islamic bank will increase the financing volume of an increasing rate or with a faster 
growth to enhance the economy. Thus, that makes the association will be negatively 
related.  
 
With the counter-cyclical determinants mentioned above, therefore, the study 
hypothesises that the Islamic bank operation will behave counter-cyclical to the 
business cycle if the following conditions met: 
1. Islamic bank total financing and fixed rate financing growth are negatively 
related to the real gross domestic product growth. 
2. Islamic bank total financing and fixed rate financing growth are positively 
related to the bank contingency reserve growth. 
3. Islamic bank total financing and fixed rate financing growth are positively 
related to the bank loan loss provision growth. 
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Hence, the conditions above look up at the misalignment of Islamic bank specific 
indicators to the financing growth of a business cycle.  
 
Modelling Specification and Estimation Model on Islamic Bank Financing Cyclical 
Behaviour  
The first and second objective of the thesis is to examine the relationship between 
Islamic bank total financing and fixed rate financing growth and the growth of business 
cycle indicators. To accomplish the objective, the following econometric model is 
estimated: 
i = 1, ..... , n (sample bank);  j = 1, ..... , n (sample country);  t = 1, ..... , T (time period)  
Where: 
(F/EA)ijt  is total financing or fixed rate financing growth to earning asset growth 
ratio for bank i in country j at time t 
GDP jt         is real gross domestic product growth in country j at time t 
CPI jt    is consumer price index growth in country j at time t 
M2 jt         is money supply M2 growth in country j at time t 
 (CR/EA)ijt  is contingency reserve growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in 
country j at time t 
(LLP/EA)ijt is loan loss provision growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in 
country j at time t  
(D/EA)ijt  is deposit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t 
 F                                                                    CR            LLP             D             CB 
  -----   = α0 + β1 GDPjt + β2 CPIjt + β3 M2jt  + β4   -----   + β5 ------   + β6  -----  + β7  -----   + 
EA  ijt                                                                    EA ijt          EA   ijt        EA ijt         EA ijt 
                      RR             NPF                P                 P 
             + β8  ----     + β9 ------       + β10 -----    + β11 -----         +  ℰijt                                (1) 
                      EA ijt                EA   ijt            EA ijt           EA  ijt-1     
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 (CB/EA)ijt  is capital based growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j 
at time t 
(RR/EA)ijt  is regulatory reserve growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in 
country j at time t 
 (NPF/EA)ijt  is nonperforming financing growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i 
in country j at time t 
(P/EA)ijt  is net profit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t 
(P/EA)ijt-1  is net profit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t-1 
 
The model estimates the Islamic bank financing behaviour to the fluctuation in the 
macroeconomic level includes the real gross domestic product, general price level 
growth (CPI) and money supply M2 as the main business cycle indicators. The 
contingency reserve and loan loss provision are the institutional characteristics that 
indicate the banks’ buffers policy. To control for the effects of individual bank 
characteristics, the study includes the capital based and regulatory reserved as the 
regulatory instruments. The analysis also controls for the non-performing financing 
growth, banks profit growth and deposits growth to isolate the effects of banks special 
characteristics.  
 
The above variables are the main variables used by previous researchers in investigating 
the bank cyclicality behaviour. Among them are Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), Adrian and Hyun (2008), Quagliariello (2008 and 2007), 
Nan and Hung (2007), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Bikker and Hu (2002). The 
difference between this study compares to previous studies are the use of earning assets 
growth instead of total assets as the denominator. 
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The financing figure used in the analysis is the net total financing and net fixed rate 
financing after deducting the gross financing with provision for bad and doubtful 
financings. The fixed rate financing instruments are the sum of financing from 
murabahah, ijarah, bay muajjal, istisna’ and bai bithaman ajil financing instruments. A 
counter-cyclical behaviour of Islamic bank financing during economic fluctuations is 
revealed by a negative relationship of financing volume to the real gross domestic 
product growth and a positive relationship to bank contingency reserve growth and 
provision for the loan losses growth. 
 
The cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank financing is given by the relationship of the 
real gross domestic product growth, general price level growth and money supply M2 
growth to the ratio of total financing growth to earning assets growth (TF/EA) and fixed 
rate financing growth to earning assets growth (FR/EA).  
 
The bank’s ratio of contingency reserve growth to earning assets growth (R/EA) and 
loan loss provision growth to earning assets growth (LLP/EA) play the role as an 
internal control device on the financing cyclicality behaviour. By imposing controls on 
the indicator variables, at least a short run cyclical behaviour (Juglar fixed investment 
cycle and Kitchin inventory cycle) of Islamic bank operations to the business cycle 
event can be visualised. 
 
Summary of counter-cyclical behaviour relationships of the Islamic bank financing 
operations are given in Table 4.1 below. 
 
 
 
 196 
 
 Table 4.1:  Islamic Bank Financing and Fixed Rate Financing Counter-cyclical 
Behaviour Analysis 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Expected Relationship 
   Total Financing and 
   Fixed Rate Financing      
   Growth 
----------------------------- 
 Earning Assets Growth 
 
= 
Gross Domestic Product growth negative 
Consumer Price Index growth  negative 
Money Supply M2 growth negative 
Contingency Reserve growth 
------------------------------------ 
      Earning Asset growth 
positive 
Loan Loss Provision growth 
----------------------------------- 
     Earning Asset growth 
positive 
    Deposits growth 
--------------------------- 
Earning Asset growth 
positive 
Capital Based growth 
--------------------------- 
Earning Asset growth 
negative 
Regulatory Reserve growth 
---------------------------------- 
   Earning Asset growth 
negative 
Nonperforming Financing growth 
------------------------------------------- 
         Earning Asset growth 
negative 
   Net Profit growth 
--------------------------- 
Earning Asset growth 
positive 
    Previous year Net Profit growth 
-------------------------------------------- 
Previous year Earning Asset growth 
positive 
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4.4.2 Analytical Framework on Islamic Bank Provisions for Bad And Doubtful 
Financing Behaviour 
To confirm the financing cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank the analysis proceeds by 
examining the provision for bad and doubtful financings growth of the Islamic bank as 
this shows their expectation on future bad financings growth. Provision for bad and 
doubtful financing is an expense set aside as an allowance for bad financing or loans.  
An important aspect of provision for bad and doubtful financing is its timing with 
respect to the business cycle and the related issue of pro-cyclicality. Provision for bad 
and doubtful financing has to meet a minimum requirement on average over a 
predefined period, which allows them to fluctuate over the cycle. Provision for bad and 
doubtful financing is more important during an economic expansion, with problem 
financing decrease, optimism is widespread and undervalue of financing risks by banks 
that ease the credit supply.  
 
The provisioning is done in various ways with respect to the bad and doubtful 
financings. The estimation is purely made with respect to the bad and doubtful 
financings based upon the past trends in the industry. Therefore, the provisioning for 
bad and doubtful financings is done with respect to estimation of future losses before 
they are confirmed. The ex-post provisioning system that based on backward-looking 
rules is an unsatisfactory institutional arrangement because it inadequately takes into 
account credit risks. The opposite effect could happen during the downswing of the 
business cycle and could reduce the bank’s ability to supply credits. Hence, the ex-post 
provisioning systems will amplify the credit cycle. 
 
Specific provisions are complemented by general provisions, which have to cope with 
expected losses, but banks do not implement rigorous and statistical methods to 
compute them, they depend on expansion of total financing and discretionary 
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behaviours of bank managers. Thus, this market requirement may differ for each bank. 
A bank making a small number of risky financing or loan will have a low provision for 
bad and doubtful financing compared to a bank with the intention of taking higher risks. 
 
The analysis will examine the Islamic bank provision for bad and doubtful financings 
growth to the changes in the economic environment shown by the main macroeconomic 
indicators growth and specific institutional variables. Hence, the function of the Islamic 
bank provision for bad and doubtful financing policy is given as: 
Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing = f {macroeconomic variables and  
         bank’s specific variables} 
 
The determinants of provision for bad and doubtful financing can be categorised into 
two groups the macroeconomic variables and bank’s specific variables. The 
macroeconomic indicators are the real gross domestic product growth, consumer price 
index growth and money supply M2 growth. The amount of financing, nonperforming 
financing and current year profit are the bank’s specific variables that determine the 
amount put aside as provision for bad and doubtful financing. The capital based and 
regulatory reserve is to control for the bank’s regulatory variables. 
 
Modelling Specification and Estimation Model on Islamic Bank Provision For Bad 
And Doubtful Financings Behaviour 
The proposed specification and analytical model used in analysing the Islamic bank 
provision for bad and doubtful financings behaviour is as equation 2. The model is 
given as: 
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i = 1, ..... , n (sample bank);  j = 1, ..... , n (sample country);  t = 1, ..... , T (time period) 
Where: 
(PBD/EA)ijt  is provision for bad and doubtful financing growth to earning asset growth 
ratio for bank i in country j at time t 
GDP jt         is real gross domestic product growth in country j at time t 
CPIjt    is consumer price index growth in country j at time t 
M2 jt         is money supply M2 growth in country j at time t 
(F/EA)ijt  is total financing growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country 
j at time t 
(NPF/EA)ijt  is nonperforming financing growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i 
in country j at time t 
(P/EA)ijt  is net profit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t 
(CB/EA)ijt  is capital based growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j 
at time t 
(RR/EA)ijt  is regulatory reserved growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in 
country j at time t 
 
The study hypothesises that the Islamic bank operation will behave counter-cyclically to 
the business cycle if the following conditions are met: 
1. Bank’s provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the bank’s total financing growth. 
 PBD                                                                          F               NPF               P 
  --------   = α0 + β1 GDPjt + β2 CPIjt + β3 M2 jt  + β4  -----    + β5  -------    + β6  -----   + 
  EA    ijt                                                                    EA  ijt           EA    ijt          EA  ijt 
                           CB                RR 
                  + β7  ------     + β8  ------     +  ℰijt                                                                (2) 
                           EA   ijt            EA  ijt     
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2. Bank’s provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the bank’s profit growth. 
3. Bank’s provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the real gross domestic product growth. 
 
Condition 1 captures the misalignment of the Islamic bank’s credit risk management, 
while condition 2 refers to the income smoothing hypothesis and profit enthusiasm 
hypothesis by the Islamic banks. Condition 3 captures the misalignment of the Islamic 
banks management to the business cycle indicator. 
 
Table 4.2 below gives the summary of Islamic bank provision for bad and doubtful 
financings management related to the bank’s counter-cyclical behaviour.  
 
Table 4.2: Islamic Bank Provision for Bad And Doubtful Financing Counter-cyclical 
Behaviour Analysis 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Expected Relationship 
Provision for bad and 
doubtful financing growth 
-------------------------------- 
  Earning Assets Growth 
= 
Gross Domestic Product growth positive 
Money Supply M2 growth  positive 
Consumer Price Index growth  positive 
 Total Financing Growth 
------------------------------- 
   Earning Asset growth 
positive 
Non-Performing Financing growth 
------------------------------------------ 
         Earning Asset growth 
positive 
     Net Profit growth 
---------------------------- 
 Earning Asset growth 
positive 
 Capital Based growth 
---------------------------- 
 Earning Asset growth 
positive 
 Regulatory Reserve growth 
----------------------------------- 
     Earning Asset growth 
negative 
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The counter-cyclical behaviour of Islamic bank provision for bad and doubtful 
financing growth to the business cycle event is given by a positive relationship of the 
provision for bad and doubtful financing growth to all the independent variables namely 
the macroeconomic indicators and bank’s specific items.  
 
4.4.3 Analytical Framework on Islamic Bank Contingency Reserve Behaviour 
Another major determinant of the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour is their 
policy on the contingency reserve. The essential of contingency reserve are clearly 
mentioned in the holy Quran (Chapter Yusuf; 12: 46-49). Hence, the following analysis 
looks at the Islamic bank contingency reserve management. The analysis is to determine 
whether the Islamic bank is following the instruction in verse 47-48, chapter Yusuf (12: 
Quran) on the contingency reserve management. 
 
Bank’s contingency reserve is the fraction of bank’s liquidity that the institution must 
hold. It refers to the required amount of liquid resources allocated to and above the 
previously designated estimated amount for safety and soundness of the depository 
institutions. The instruction in verse 47-48, chapter Yusuf (Quran) is to increase the 
contingency reserve during an upward trend of economic growth and to spend the 
contingency reserve when the economic condition reverses. For a banking institution, 
increase in the contingency reserve in the event of economic upswing will decrease the 
excess fund for the bank to deliver as financing. In the event of economic downturns, 
decreases in bank contingency reserve will increase the earning assets and this will 
increase the excess fund of the bank for financing activities.  
 
To examine whether the Islamic bank management of the contingency reserve is acting 
in accordance with the verse 47-48, chapter Yusuf (Quran), the estimation model is 
based on the following function: 
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Contingency Reserve = f {macroeconomic variables and banks specific variables}  
 
The macroeconomic indicators are the real gross domestic product growth, consumer 
price index growth and money supply M2 growth. The current year profit growth and 
non-performing financing growth are the institutional specific characteristics that 
determine the bank contingency reserve policy. The capital based and regulatory reserve 
is the bank’s regulatory variables. 
 
Modelling Specification and Estimation Model on Islamic Bank Contingency Reserve 
Management 
To determine whether Islamic bank contingency reserve management is following the 
Quran’s (12: 46-49) instruction the proposed specification and analytical model is as 
equation 3. 
i = 1, ..... , n (sample bank);  j = 1, ..... , n (sample country);  t = 1, ..... , T (time period) 
Where: 
(RES/EA)ijt  is banks’ contingency reserve growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank 
i in country j at time t 
GDP jt         is real gross domestic product growth in country j at time t 
M2 jt         is money supply M2 growth in country j at time t 
CPIjt    is consumer price index growth in country j at time t 
(P/EA)ijt  is net profit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t 
RES                                                                        P               D              NPF 
  --------   = α0 + β1 GDPjt + β2 CPIjt + β3 M2jt  + β4 -----   + β5  -----   + β6  -------            
  EA    ijt                                                                   EA  ijt          EA ijt           EA   ijt     
                             F              CB              RR 
                  +  β7  -----   + β8  ------   + β9  -----   +  ℰijt                                                      (3) 
                            EA  ijt            EA  ijt           EA  ijt     
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(D/EA)ijt  is deposit growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j at 
time t 
(NPF/EA)ijt  is non-performing financing growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i 
in country j at time t 
(F/EA)ijt  is total financing or fixed rate financing growth to earning asset growth 
ratio for bank i in country j at time t 
 (CB/EA)ijt  is capital based growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j 
at time t 
(RR/EA)ijt  is capital based growth to earning asset growth ratio for bank i in country j 
at time t 
 
The study hypothesises that the Islamic bank operation will behave as instructed in the 
Quran (12:46-49) if the following conditions are met: 
1. Banks’ contingency reserve growth is positively related to banks’ profit growth. 
2. Banks’ contingency reserve growth is positively related to real gross domestic 
product growth. 
 
Both of the conditions provide evidence on the Islamic bank contingency reserve 
management in complying with the Quran’s instruction (12:46-49). By complying with 
it, the Islamic bank earning assets will be managed and the fund for financing activities 
will be regulated so that it will behave counter-cyclical.  
 
The expected behaviour of contingency reserve growth related to the Islamic bank 
counter-cyclical behaviour is given in Table 4.3 below.  
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Table 4.3: Islamic Bank Contingency Reserve Management Analysis 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Expected Relationship 
Contingency Reserve Growth 
------------------------------------- 
     Earning Assets Growth 
= 
Gross Domestic Product growth  positive 
Money Supply M2 growth  positive 
Consumer Price Index growth  positive 
    Net Profit growth 
--------------------------- 
Earning Asset growth 
positive 
    Deposits growth 
--------------------------- 
Earning Asset growth 
positive 
 Non-Performing Financing growth 
--------------------------------------------
Previous year Earning Asset growth 
positive 
Total Financing growth 
------------------------------ 
  Earning Asset growth 
positive 
 Capital Based growth 
--------------------------- 
 Earning Asset growth 
positive 
 Regulatory Reserve growth 
---------------------------------- 
      Earning Asset growth 
negative 
 
 
4.5 Data Sources 
For this particular study, the data comes from 67 Islamic banks collected from 16 
countries (Appendix 1). They are from Malaysia (15 banks), UAE (3 banks), Saudi 
Arabia (8 banks), Bahrain (7 banks), Egypt (2 banks), Qatar (2 banks), Jordan (2 banks), 
Yemen (3 banks), Sudan (4 banks), Kuwait (1 bank), Turk (2 banks), South Africa (1 
bank), Pakistan (3 banks), Bangladesh (5 banks), Indonesia (2 banks), and Iran (7 
banks). The data time framed for the study is from the range of 1998 to 2009. The 
reason for short time span in the panel data analysis is due to the unavailability of data 
and not many Islamic banks initiate their operation before the year 2000. 
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In exploring the behaviour of Islamic bank financing to the business cycle happening, 
this study utilised the panel data set over a period of eleven years from 1998 to 2009. 
The individual bank financial data is obtained from the bank’s annual reports gathered 
from the bank’s website and Bankscope database. The macroeconomic data is gathered 
from various countries’ economic reports, central bank annual and monthly reports, and 
from the Datastream database. The data sample size collected for this study for each 
variable used in the analysis was initially 635 data in ratio form but was reduced within 
the range of 468 to 557 data after adjusting for the statistical validity requirement and 
needs. 
 
4.6 Statistical Analysis Procedures 
The estimation of the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour is by applying a 
panel data analysis. The reason for employing data from various Islamic banks across 
countries with time series data is to obtain a clear and comprehensive understanding of 
the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour of the business cycle happening.  
 
Following the standard panel data estimation, there are three alternative models of panel 
data analysis can be employed to estimate the Islamic bank financing behaviour that is 
the pooled least squares model, fixed effects model and random effects model. It is 
undeniable that each entity has its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the predictor variables (for this study it is related to the different banks and 
countries).  
 
The simple pooled least squares model assumes no firm or time-specific effects and if 
they are, then least squares estimators will be a compromise, not likely to be a good 
predictor of the cross-section units over a period. The redundant fixed effects tests are 
employed to test the null hypothesis of no fixed effects of the cross-sectional and time 
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series data. The results of redundant fixed effects tests will indicate whether the cross-
section fixed effects and period fixed effects are significant or otherwise. If the 
redundant fixed effects test gives a significant result of 5 per cent levels, thus, the fixed 
model is the appropriate for this panel data set instead of the simple pooled least squares 
regression model. 
 
The fixed effects model is able to explore the relationship between predictor and the 
outcome variables within the entity. Therefore, fixed effects models remove the effect of 
those time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables so that we can assess the 
predictors’ net effect.  
 
The rationale for random effects models on the other hand, is that the variation across 
entities is assumed random and uncorrelated with the independent variables included in 
the model. Green (2008) stated that the crucial distinction between fixed and random 
effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are 
correlated with the regresses in the model. If it is believed that differences across 
entities have some influence on the dependent variable then the random effects should 
be used. An advantage of random effects is that it includes time invariant variables. In 
the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed by the intercept.  
 
In order to avoid spurious finding, the analysis will go through a series of statistical 
testing procedure. The statistical analysis procedures undertaken in the analysis initially 
examined some important properties of the data. The testing includes data normality test 
and the stationary test. Firstly, the study tests of the skewness, kurtosis, mean, median 
and Jarque-Bera testing to verify whether the sample data are normally distributed. The 
results determined the degree of deviation of the variables value considered in the study 
from the standard deviation. If it exists, therefore, it is volatile. For a normal distributed 
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data, the skewness must equal to zero, the kurtosis value should be three and the mean 
should be the same as its median.  
 
A traditional approach for testing data normality is to look at the skewness and kurtosis 
of the variable of interest (Mardia, 1970; Bowman and Shenton, 1975; Bera and Anil, 
1980 and 1981). More precisely, when a random variable X is distributed as N (0, σ 2), 
we have:  
E[X3] = 0 and E[X4 – 3σ 4] = 0,  
with the first condition deals with skewness, while the second condition deals with 
kurtosis. 
 
The value of Jarque-Bera testing should not be significant or must have high probability 
value. In other word, a small probability value leads to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution. Sample data, which are normally distributed, should 
be an efficient estimator, unbiased and consistent.  
 
In view of the fact that the variables integrated into the analysis are a pool of time series 
and cross sectional data, certain relevant testing procedures on the data constructed are 
required to respect the grouping of the data properties. A time series data under classical 
linear regression models requires the data series under investigation to be stationary. 
The use of ordinary least squares (OLS) relies on the stochastic process being 
stationary. Often, use of ordinary least squares is to estimate the slope coefficients of the 
autoregressive model. If the mention assumption meets, then the ordinary least squares 
estimation is the appropriate estimator to be used.  
 
Violation of the assumption of data is normally distributed and when the stochastic 
process is non-stationary, then the use of OLS produces an invalid estimation. If the 
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stationary assumption is violated it leads to the problem of spurious regression (Granger 
and Newbold, 1974). The finding produce a high R2 value and high t-ratios yielding 
results with no economic meaning.  
 
To ensure the data are stationary in the study, the unit root test is conducted on the 
sample data. To make sure the appropriateness of the study, unit-root properties of the 
variables considered in the study should be met and to see whether adding lagged values 
of X can improve the explanation on Y. A spurious regression occurred if the variables 
in the analysis are non-stationary or the stationary level is different. Hence, testing for 
unit roots is the first step in the data analysis. This ensures that the t-statistic is 
applicable. Non-stationary data will give an invalid t-statistic result and spurious 
regression on the model among the variables. Granger and Newbold (1974) stated that 
trended and non-stationary data usually produce spurious or misleading results. 
 
Data are stationary if the mean and variance of the time series data are constant against 
time. If the mean and variance are increasing or dependence on time, it is non-
stationary. Assuming Yt is stochastic time series data, the mean, variance and covariant 
are as follows:  
Mean : E (Yt) = µ  
Variance : Var (Yt) = E (Yt - µ)² = σ²  
Covariant : γk = E [(Yt - µ)(Yt+k - µ)]  
 
Where γk is the covariant between Yt and Yt+k at lag k. If Yt is stationary, the mean, 
variance and covariance are equal at all level of lag k. Non-stationary Yt if the value of 
mean, variance and covariance change if time changes. If non-stationary data used in an 
analysis, the analysis will produce spurious correlations between variables, hence 
producing a spurious regression result. If the first difference produce a stationary data 
then the variable is integrated of order one and it is labelled as I(1). Differentiation 
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process continues until the data become stationary. Stationary data after a few times 
differentiation are symbolised as I(d), that is differentiated at d times. The hypothesised 
analysis is: 
H0: ρ = 1 (stationary) 
H1: ρ ≠ 1 (non-stationary) 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) statistical test is the calculated t-statistic value. The critical 
value is the Schwarz critical value. If the Schwarz critical value is greater than the 
calculated t-statistic, then the H1 hypothesis of the time series data is non-stationary. If 
the Schwarz critical value is smaller than the calculated t-statistic, the null hypothesis of 
the time series data is stationary. 
 
Various methods are applicable to test for data stationary. Levin, Lin and Chu (1993 and 
2002) testing are used in the test. Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test has large potential 
power gains and the test is widely used in empirical researches. Levin, Lin and Chu test 
the null hypothesis that each individual time series contains a unit root, against the 
alternatives, all-individual series are stationary. It is often argued that the commonly 
used unit root tests the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test is not very 
powerful and therefore is not used in the analysis. Im, Pesaran and Shin unit root test on 
the other hand is best applicable for small sample size. 
 
If the model displays autocorrelation problem, the estimation will proceed with panel 
generalizes least square model (panel GLS). According to Yaffee (2003), a model has to 
be estimated by methods that handle the problem afflicting them. If a model exhibits 
autocorrelation and/or moving average errors, panel generalizes least square corrected 
for errors may be used (Sayrs, 1989).  
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Summing up the statistical analysis procedure the stages of statistical inference 
procedure is summarised through the flow chart diagram given in Figure 5.5 below. The 
statistical analysis estimations for this study are conducted by using the Eviews 
statistical software version six. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Statistical Inference Procedure 
  
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Pooled Least Square Model 
Data Stationarity – Panel Unit Root Test  
Levin, Lin & Chu t-test 
Pooled Least Square Model vs Fixed Effects Model  
Redundant Fixed Effects Test 
Fixed Effects Model vs Random Effects Model 
Hausman Test Statistic 
Significant Insignificant 
 
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Overview 
This chapter provides the empirical evidence of Islamic bank financing cyclicality 
behaviour of the business cycle incident. The analyses are largely based on the 
theoretical framework, conceptual framework, research design considerations presented 
in chapter 4 and 5, and some of the practical Islamic bank financing experiences 
described in chapter 3. The empirical results obtained from the study should enable 
practitioners and policy maker to assess the Islamic bank financing behaviour more 
accurately and represent an additional source of information in the Islamic monetary 
policy making process. 
 
In estimating the Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour, the study uses an 
unbalanced panel data analysis set for 67 Islamic banks from 16 countries namely 
Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, 
Sudan, Kuwait, Turk, South Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Iran. The 
sample size collected for this study for each variable used in the analysis was initially 
635 data but was reduced after adjusting to the statistical conditions and the validity 
requirement.  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 to 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics, data stationary test or the unit root 
test and the correlation matrix procedure to test for multicollinearity for all the variables 
used in the estimation for Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour to the business cycle 
occurrence.  
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Table 5.1 reports the respective mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, 
and the Jarque-Bera value. For all variables, the values of the mean and median are not 
the same; skewness are not equal to zero and the data distributions are not symmetrical 
around the mean whilst the kurtosis values are not equal to three. The value of Jarque-
Bera is significant and this leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution.  
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistic 
 
Total 
Financing 
Growth 
Fixed Rate 
Financing 
Growth 
Contingency 
Reserve 
Growth 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
Growth 
Deposits 
Growth 
Capital 
Based 
Growth 
Regulatory 
Reserve 
Growth 
Mean 2.458 1.866 3.434 0.988  1.031 0.984  0.339 
Median 0.993 0.930 0.956 0.653  0.978 0.696  0.077 
Maximum 493.842 375.355 607.129 425.036  128.051
 
161.583  97.057 
Minimum -49.509 -75.644 -437.023 -802.957 -100.481 -536.56 -69.820 
Std. Dev. 24.699 18.295 46.473 57.508  8.731 24.494  5.742 
Skewness 16.610 15.823 3.124 -6.098  1.687 -15.91  4.778 
Kurtosis 304.274 322.362 88.854 92.649  124.203 371.706  172.027 
Jarque-Bera 2430720 2343096 196058 210783  390205 3623656     765504 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sum 1560.799 1018.994 2180.902 611.200  657.323
 
625.262  217.874 
Sum Sq. Dev. 386755.1 182406.4 1369311 2040588  48492.8
 
380400.0  21104.4 
Observations 635 546 635 618 635 635 641 
 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistic (continued) 
 Net Profit Growth 
Non-
Performing 
Financing 
Growth 
Provision for 
Bad and Doubtful 
Financings 
Growth 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Growth 
Money 
Supply 
M2 
Growth 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
Growth 
 Mean  2.825  1.777 2.746  6.603  17.328  6.103 
 Median  0.9542  0.667 0.699  5.361  15.058  3.609 
 Maximum  508.319  99.168 534.054  90.089  109.198  69.634 
 Minimum -615.040 -71.408 -650.337 -7.255 -2.721 -11.170 
 Std. Dev.  43.407  11.402 40.290  10.5145  12.325  8.321 
 Skewness -0.841  2.434 -1.647  6.116  2.727  4.410 
 Kurtosis  110.678 
 
 30.326 174.028  46.630  17.103  32.307 
 Jarque-Bera  305398  19003.87 749832.1  54412.31  6059.378  24822.80 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Sum  1785.523  1052.158 1688.957  4199.705  11020.68  3882.076 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1188918.  76840.53 996733.3  70203.22  96461.32  43968.39 
 Observations 632 592 615 636 636 636 
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Data Stationary Test: Unit Root Test 
The next level of tests of the sample data is the unit root test, which is to ensure the 
stationary of the sample data used in the analysis. The panel unit root testing is 
conducted by applying the Levin, Lin, and Chu (1993) method. Levin, Lin and Chu unit 
root test is preferable because of its large potential power gains (Cosar, 2002). Besides 
that, Levin, Lin, and Chu test is also widely used in empirical researches. Levin, Lin and 
Chu test assume the common unit root process and use the t-test. As additional and 
comparison purposes, the study provide the Im, Pesaran and Shin panel data unit root 
test. 
  
Table 5.2 summarises the unit root test of each variable employed in the regression 
(complete unit root test results are provided in appendix 2). The hypothesis testing for 
the non-stationary of the sample data shows that the null hypothesis of non-stationary 
can be rejected at 1 percent level of significant. The test shows that all of the variables 
are stationary at level. Hence, our series are well characterized as an I(0) process and 
the analysis will be regressed at level.  
 
Table 5.2: Unit Root Test 
Variables 
Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran  & Shin 
Level Level 
statistic p-value statistic p-value 
Total Financing growth -1259.97 0.000 -82.037 0.000 
Fixed Rate Financing growth -782.569 0.000 -64.637 0.000 
Contingency Reserve growth -351.894 0.000 -35.888 0.000 
Loan Loss Provisions growth -41.961 0.000 -9.834 0.000 
Deposit growth -26.023 0.000 -6.973 0.000 
Capital Based growth -111.229 0.000 -17.4589 0.000 
Provision for Bad and 
Doubtful Financings growth -245.537 0.000 -30.325 0.000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -25.153 0.000 -10.186 0.000 
Non-performing financing -71.571 0.000 -6.459 0.000 
Net Profit growth -22.046 0.000 -6.333 0.000 
GDP growth -19.107 0.000 -5.438 0.000 
M2 growth -7.335 0.000 -8.764 0.000 
CPI growth -15.814 0.000 -8.680 0.000 
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Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.3 exhibits the correlation matrix for the variables used in the model. The 
correlation coefficients between all the independent variables used in the estimation 
processes, which are low and hence suggesting the absence of multicollinearity 
problems. 
 
Table 5.3(a): Correlation Matrix Of Total Financing and The Business Cycle Indicators 
  TF GDP CPI M2 RES LLP DP CB RR NPL PR 
GDP 0.04 
 
                  
CPI -0.03 -0.11 
 
                
M2 -0.03 0.04 0.60 
 
              
RES 0.52 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 
            
LLP 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.13 
 
          
DP 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.22 
 
        
CB 0.33 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.54 -0.12 0.11 
 
      
RR 0.26 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.04 0.68 0.40 
 
    
NPL 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.09 
 
  
PR 0.48 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.65 -0.24 -0.21 0.63 -0.04 0.09 
 PR(-1) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
 
Table 5.3(b): Correlation Matrix Of Fixed Rate Financing and The Business Cycle 
Indicators 
  FR GDP CPI M2 RES LLP DP CB RR NPL PR 
GDP 0.01 
 
                  
CPI -0.04 -0.12 
 
                
M2 -0.03 0.02 0.61 
 
              
RES 0.51 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 
            
LLP 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.06 -0.14 
 
          
DP -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.22 
 
        
CB 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.56 -0.13 0.11 
 
      
RR 0.25 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.04 0.68 0.41 
 
    
NPL 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.23 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.10 
 
  
PR 0.51 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.68 -0.26 -0.22 0.69 -0.04 0.11 
 PR(-1) -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
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Table 5.3(c): Correlation Matrix Of Provision For Bad and Doubtful Financing and The 
Business Cycle Indicators 
  PBD GDP CPI M2 TF NPL PR CB 
GDP 0.00 
 
            
CPI 0.05 -0.09 
 
          
M2 0.04 0.01 0.66 
 
        
TF 0.55 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 
      
NPL 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 
 
    
PR 0.31 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.09 
 
  
CB 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.21 0.61 
 RR 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.09 -0.04 0.40 
 
Table 5.3(d): Correlation Matrix Of Contingency Reserve and The Business Cycle 
Indicators 
  RES GDP CPI M2 PR NPL CB 
GDP 0.00 
      CPI -0.01 -0.09 
     M2 -0.01 0.01 0.66 
    PR 0.64 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 
   NPL 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 
  CB 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.20 
 RR -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.40 
 
 
5.2 Islamic Bank Financing Cyclical Behaviour Estimation 
This section provides the empirical results and analyses from the estimated econometric 
models discussed in the research methodology part. The estimation model follows the 
standard panel data method. For interpretation purposes, the study performs several 
diagnostic tests to identify the preferred specification model. The study assigned the 
Redundant Fixed Effects test to determine the model that fits better in explaining the 
Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour. A high value of F-statistic and χ2 test 
statistic with significant ρ value at 5 per cent level (ρ < .05) would suggests the fixed 
effects model as the preferred specification model, or otherwise, the pooled least 
squares model would be the better model. Interpretations of the results are with the 
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emphasis on the preferred specification model and then compared with the results from 
the other specifications model. 
 
5.2.1 Islamic Bank Total Financing Cyclicality Analysis 
Table 5.4 and 5.5 provides the econometric test results on the cyclicality behaviour of 
Islamic bank total financing. Table 5.4 provides results on the cyclicality behaviour of 
overall Islamic bank total financing across regions. To verify that the result is reliable 
and not driven by a part of the sample, the study proceeds with a subsample data 
analysis based on Islamic banks operating in two main regions namely the Middle East 
countries and Southeast Asia countries. Table 5.5 provides results on the cyclicality 
behaviour of Islamic bank total financing based on the two main regions that provides 
the Islamic banking services.  
 
From Table 5.4, the pooled least square model column reports that do not control for 
bank-specific effects and thus assume all parameters are constant across cross-sectional 
units. The column presents the Fixed Effects model accounts for bank-specific effects, 
which allows the constant term to differ across banks systematically and include fixed 
time effects.  
 
As seen from Table 5.4, the regression results from the pooled least square and fixed 
effects model appeared to be considerably consistent. In order to test the null hypothesis 
that the fixed effects and the time effects are absent, we use a restricted F-test and Chi-
square test. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period fixed 
effects given in Table 5.4, part 2, shows the three sets of tests. The first set consists of 
two tests that evaluate the joint significance of the cross-section effects using the F-test 
(sums-of-squares) and Chi-square test (likelihood function). The corresponding 
restricted specification is one in which there is cross-section and period effects.  
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The hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-
statistic F(66, 430) = 1.01 (ρ-value = 0.46), so the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional 
heterogeneity cannot be rejected. The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal 
heterogeneity has F-statistics F(10,430) = 0.43 (ρ-value: 0.93), so the null hypothesis of 
no time-dimension heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level 
(Table 5.4, Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
section). The statistic values and the associated ρ-values cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the cross section effects are redundant. The remaining results evaluate 
the joint significance of all the effects, respectively. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
results suggest that the corresponding effects are statistically not significant. 
Accordingly, the pooled least square is a better estimator. These test results conclude 
that the simple pooled model is preferred to the fixed effect model. 
 
A residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model is then followed. A 
formal Wald hypothesis test is used to test for AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the 
model. The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.05 (ρ-value = 0.14 > .05), 
and failed to reject the null hypothesis (Table 5.4, part 3). Under the null hypothesis, the 
original idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated, the residuals from this equation should 
have an autocorrelation coefficient of -0.5 (EViews 6 User’s Guide, 2007). The 
hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors are 
serially uncorrelated.  
 
Looking at the relationship between business cycle occurrences and the Islamic bank 
financing operations, the conditions that need to be met in order for the Islamic bank 
financing operation to behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle are as follows: 
1. Islamic bank financing growth is negatively related to the real gross domestic 
product growth. 
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2. Islamic bank financing growth is positively related to the bank contingency 
reserve growth. 
3. Islamic bank financing growth is positively related to the bank loan loss 
provision growth. 
 
Based on the results, the association for contingency reserve and loan loss provision to 
the Islamic bank financing activities is consistent with the hypothesis of counter-
cyclical financing behaviour. The result demonstrates that the contingency reserve and 
loan loss provision are positively related to the Islamic bank financing activities. The 
results for both variables are significant at 1 per cent level. This suggests that Islamic 
bank contingency reserve and loan loss provision do manage their financing well and 
according to the counter-cyclical predictions.  
 
The finding shows that the growth in contingency reserve and loan loss provision is 
faster than the growth in the financing activities. Based on the β coefficient, one per 
cent growth of contingency reserve is related to 0.12 per cent growth of financing 
activities and one per cent growth in loan loss provision is related to 0.09 per cent 
growth in financing activities. This shows that the Islamic bank is more cautious as the 
economy grows. Contrary, as the economy contracts the growth of contingency reserve 
and loan loss provision will fall faster as compared to the financing growth. Thus, a 
larger decrease in the growth of contingency reserve and loan loss provision compared 
to the financing growth will increase the amount of excess fund for financing activities.  
 
With the faster growth in contingency reserve and loan loss provision during economic 
expansion, the bank’s earning assets will reduce and this will result in the reduction of 
the excess fund for financing supply. On the contrary, during an economic slowdown, a 
decrease of contingency reserve and loan loss provision growth will increase the growth 
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of earning assets of Islamic bank and this will lead to the increase in the excess fund for 
financing by the Islamic bank. The excess funds need to be delivered into financings to 
avoid the depletion of their amount due to zakat. The institutional internal variable 
result provides an indication that the Islamic bank total financing has the tendency to 
behave counter-cyclically to the business cycle. The contingency reserve and loan loss 
provision are able to play their role as the financing buffers to the bank financing 
activities.  
 
The insignificance of macroeconomic indicators growth namely the real gross domestic 
product (GDP), money supply M2 and consumer price index (CPI)  in influencing the 
Islamic bank financing growth indicates that the Islamic bank financing decision is not 
tied to the expansion and contraction in the macroeconomic condition. This finding 
shows that the Islamic financing behaviour is free from any speculative financing 
activities when there is fluctuation in the economic environment. The Islamic bank 
financing activities are not directly influenced by changes in the macroeconomic 
condition. The financing operations are more determined by other factors, particularly, 
the institutional factors such as the sources of funds, regulatory and prudential measures 
that has a significant relationship.  
 
Looking at the relationship between profit variables and financing operations, the 
finding shows that the Islamic bank financing operations are influenced only by current 
year’s profit and not by the previous year’s profit. An increase in the growth of current 
year’s net profit by 1 per cent is followed by the growth of financing by approximately 
by 0.16 per cent and the finding is significant at 1 per cent level. Given the previous 
year profit growth that are not significantly related to the current year financing growth, 
hence, the finding provides evidence that the pro-cyclicality behaviour related to profit 
enthusiasm does not exists on the Islamic bank operations.  
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Looking at the deposits as the main sources of funds for the Islamic bank financing 
operations, as expected, the estimated coefficient is in line with the theory. The 
statistical result shows a positive relationship and it is significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
The insignificance relationship between the Islamic bank financing growth and the 
nonperforming financing growth indicates that the loan default condition is not a 
significant factor in determining the Islamic bank financing decision. The finding shows 
that the Islamic financing behaviour is not easy to overreact and over pessimistic to any 
changes in the credit market condition and macroeconomic environment.  
 
Related to the regulatory variables as expected both the capital requirement and 
regulatory reserve have a negative relationship with the Islamic banks financing volume 
and it is significant at 1 per cent significant level. The negative association for capital 
and regulatory reserve to the Islamic bank financing activities is consistent with the 
monetary theory idea of imposing both instruments to enhance banks’ safety and 
manage the bank’s credit creation operation.  
 
The capital requirement and regulatory reserve are the key regulatory instruments aimed 
at providing buffers during adverse economic conditions and as a mechanism aimed at 
preventing excessive risk taking. The negative sign implies that both of the items are 
constrained on financing operations. The negative association between the capital 
requirements and the Islamic bank financing activities is consistent with the BASEL II 
idea of imposing the instruments to enhance banks’ safety and manage the bank’s credit 
creation operation. 
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Table 5.4: Islamic Bank Total Financing Cyclicality Behaviour 
Part                                            Model 
 Variable 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Constant 1.028 0.890 0.974 0.760 
Gross Domestic Product growth -0.012 -0.119 -0.022 -0.189 
Consumer Price Index growth -0.051 -0.847 -0.048 -0.732 
Money supply M2 growth -0.032 -0.365 -0.039 -0.425 
Contingency Reserve growth 0.116* 7.797 0.116* 7.685 
Loan Loss Provision growth  0.09* 9.097 0.09* 8.791 
Deposit growth 0.573* 7.057 0.571* 6.951 
Capital Requirement growth -0.091* -3.136 -0.091* -3.064 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.652* -11.585 -1.650* -11.386 
Nonperforming Financing growth -0.042 -0.839 -0.040 -0.793 
Net profit growth 0.161* 8.672 0.161* 8.514 
Previous Year Net profit growth 0.010 0.878 0.011 0.920 
R2 0.541 0.546 
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.527 
S.E. of regression 11.034 11.086 
F-statistic 54.327* 28.437* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.680 1.693 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 518 
Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 1.012 (66,430) 0.457 
Cross-section Chi-square 74.770 66 0.215 
Period F 0.432 (10,430) 0.931 
Period Chi-square 5.183 10 0.879 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.947 (76,430) 0.604 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 80.197 76 0.349 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing Residual (-1) Coefficient Std. Error t-stat p-value -0.049 0.034 -1.463 0.144 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value 
F-statistic 178.007 (1, 430)   0.000 
Chi-square 178.007 1   0.000 
 
 
The above finding shows the Islamic bank financing behaviour only fulfils two out of 
three conditions that are needed to make the financing operations behave counter-
cyclical. Although the real gross domestic product growth is negatively related to the 
financing growth, however, statistically it is not significant. This insignificant 
relationship of the real gross domestic product growths to the financing growth needs 
some considerations of the Islamic bank practitioners. This result shows that although 
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the growth of contingency reserve and loan loss provision is significant in influencing 
the financing growth but it is still not effective enough to make the whole operations 
behave counter-cyclically. Therefore, in order for Islamic banks to behave with better 
counter-cyclical behaviour, this study suggests the provision for bad and doubtful 
financing and contingency reserve need to be increased more during economic 
upswings and vice versa. 
 
For robustness of the analysis, the study proceeds with a subsample data analysis based 
on Islamic banks operating in the Middle East region and Southeast Asia region. Table 
5.5 presents the empirical result. The findings for both panels of Islamic banks 
operating in the Middle East countries and Southeast Asia countries are consistent with 
the overall finding except for the current year profit in Middle East countries, which is 
not significant. The result gives evidence on the Islamic bank financing pro-cyclicality 
behaviour related to profit enthusiasm does not exist in the Middle East countries.  
 
As given in Table 5.5, the regression results from the pooled least square and fixed 
effects model appeared to be considerably consistent for both regions. The Redundant 
Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the corresponding effects are statistically not 
significant. Accordingly, the pooled least square is a better estimator for both regions. 
Following the residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model the 
hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors are 
serially uncorrelated.  
 
The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period fixed effects given 
in Table 5.5, part 2, shows the three sets of tests. For banks of Middle East region, the 
hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic 
F(38, 227) = 1.05 (ρ-value = 0.4). For Southeast Asia region, the hypothesis testing 
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pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic F(16, 108) = 0.95 
(ρ-value = 0.52), hence, the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity cannot 
be rejected for both regions.  
 
The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity has F-statistics F(10,227) 
= 1.71 (ρ-value = 0.1) for the Middle East region and F(10,108) = 0.95 (ρ-value = 0.49) 
for the Southeast Asia region. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no time-dimension 
heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level (Table 5.5, 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and period fixed effects section). The 
statistic values and the associated ρ-values accepted the null hypothesis that the cross 
section effects are redundant. The remaining results evaluate the joint significance of all 
the effects, respectively. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the 
corresponding effects are statistically not significant. These test results conclude that the 
simple pooled model is preferred to the fixed effect model. 
 
A residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model is then followed. 
The Wald hypothesis test is used to test for AR(1) serial autocorrelation of the model. 
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.03 (ρ = 0.35 > .05) for the Islamic 
banks of the Middle East and for Southeast Asia Islamic banks the AR(1) residual is -
0.06 (ρ-value = 0.42 > .05), thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 5.5, part 
3). The hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors 
are serially uncorrelated.  
 
Looking at the cyclicality behaviour of Islamic bank operating in the Middle East region 
and Southeast Asia region, the Islamic bank financing operation in both regions failed to 
meet one of the needed conditions for a counter-cyclical behaviour. The relationship 
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between the total financing growth and macroeconomic indicators growth is not 
significant in both regions. 
 
The association for contingency reserve and loan loss provision to the Islamic bank 
financing activities for both regions are positively correlated to the Islamic bank 
financing activities and consistent with the counter-cyclical financing behaviour 
hypothesis. The results of both variables are significant at 1 per cent level. This suggests 
Islamic bank of both regions do manage their financing, contingency reserve and loan 
loss provision well and according to the theoretical predictions.  
 
The size of the coefficient for contingency reserve and loan loss provision of the Islamic 
banks operating in the Middle East are 0.84 and 0.2 respectively, while 0.18 and 0.08 
for the Southeast Asia Islamic banks. It shows one per cent growth in contingency 
reserve and loan loss provision is related to the growth in financing activities by 0.84 
per cent and 0.2 per cent in the Middle East region. In the Southeast Asia, it is 0.18 per 
cent and 0.08 per cent. Hence, the relationship between Islamic banks contingency 
reserve growth and loan loss provision growth to total financing growth in Middle East 
countries is better compared to Southeast Asia Islamic banks when there is a change in 
the economic condition. This shows that the Islamic bank of Middle Eastern countries is 
more cautious to the business cycle happening compared to the Southeast Asia Islamic 
banks. The institutional internal variable result provides an indication that Islamic bank 
total financing in both regions has the tendency to behave counter-cyclically to the 
business cycle. 
 
Regarding with the relationship between the total financing growth and macroeconomic 
indicators growth, the result shows that there is a negative relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables of the Islamic bank in both regions. The 
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insignificant relationship shows that the financing decision is not tied to the expansion 
and contraction in the macroeconomic condition. The finding shows that the Islamic 
financing behaviour is not easily overreacting and over pessimistic to the business cycle 
occurrences. Thus, the Islamic financing behaviour in both regions is free from any 
speculative financing activities when there is fluctuation in the economic environment.  
 
Looking at the deposits as the main sources of funds, as expected, the estimated 
coefficient has a positive sign. The statistical result is significant at 1 per cent level for 
Islamic banks operating in both regions. The estimated coefficient is in line with the 
theory. 
 
Regarding to the regulatory variables, consistent with the overall result, the items have a 
negative relationship with the Islamic banks financing volume in both of the regions. 
However, only the capital requirement is significant at 1 per cent level in both regions. 
The financing activities in Southeast Asia Islamic banks are significantly influenced by 
the regulatory reserve, whereas in the Middle East it is found to be not significant.  
 
Next, the insignificant relationship between the Islamic bank financing growth and the 
nonperforming financing growth of both regions indicates that the loan default 
condition is not a significant factor in determining the Islamic bank financing decision. 
In the event of economic swings, the Islamic banks will not overreact to the swings. The 
Islamic bank contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing will 
react as instructed by the Quran (12:46-49). The Islamic bank financing activities will 
emphasise on productivity as compared to creditworthiness. With that special 
characteristic underpinning the Islamic bank operations, hence, the nonperforming 
financing growth will not become a significant factor in influencing the financing 
behaviour.  
 226 
 
Table 5.5: Islamic Bank Total Financing Cyclicality Behaviour Based on Region 
 
Part                                                          Model  Variable 
Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
1. Constant -1.485  (-2.498) -1.240  (-1.763) 5.375  (1.619) 7.452  (1.484) 
Gross Domestic Product growth -0.016  (-1.77) -0.190  (-2.039) -0.084  (-0.508) -0.013 (-0.047) 
Consumer Price Index growth -0.018  (-0.374) -0.010 (-0.199) -0.092  (-0.171) -0.431 (-0.672) 
Money supply M2 growth -0.003  (-0.120) -0.010 (-0.352) -0.293  (-1.380) -0.385 (-1.036) 
Contingency Reserve growth 0.841*  (13.1) 0.419*  (13.427) 0.185*  (6.126) 0.188*  (5.950) 
Loan Loss Provision growth  0.203*  (6.659) 0.074*  (3.872) 0.076**  (2.406) 0.078**  (2.347) 
Deposit growth 0.852*  (12.691) 0.844*  (12.408) 0.855*  (6.258) 0.864*  (6.106) 
Capital Requirement growth -0.199*  (-6.594) -0.203*  (-6.594) -0.406*  (-6.761) -0.408*  (-6.512) 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.131  (-0.687) -0.242 (-1.255) -2.705*  (-12.640) -2.753* (-12.467) 
Nonperforming Financing growth -0.001  (-0.041) -0.001 (-0.076) -0.024  (-0.108) -0.011 (-0.049) 
Net profit growth 0.004  (0.432) 0.004 (0.482) 0.344*  (7.856) 0.342* (7.504) 
Previous Year Net profit growth 0.005  (0.614) 0.007 (0.843) 0.014  (0.723) 0.01 (0.508) 
R2 0.592 0.615 0.700 0.717 
Adjusted R2 0.577 0.586 0.678 0.671 
SEE 4.116 4.072 16.348 16.524 
F-statistic 39.971* 21.229* 31.566* 15.807* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.733 1.787 1.916 1.874 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 287 Panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 Cross-sections included: 17 
Figures in parentheses are the t statistics for the coefficient 
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Table 5.5: Islamic Bank Total Financing Cyclicality Behaviour Based on Region (Continued) 
Part                                                           Region  Variable Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 1.053 (38,227) 0.395 0.945 (16,108) 0.521 
Cross-section Chi-square 46.576 38 0.160 19.131 16 0.262 
Period F 1.712 (10,227) 0.099 0.953 (10,108) 0.489 
Period Chi-square 20.205 10 0.669 12.347 10 0.263 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.194 (48,227) 0.197 0.992 (26,108) 0.486 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 64.429 48 0.780 31.256 26 0.219 
      
3. 
Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing 
Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
-0.027 0.029 -0.929 0.353 -0.061 0.075 -0.811 0.419 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value Value df p-value 
F-statistic 39.487 (1, 227)   0.000 34.565 (1, 108)   0.000 
Chi-square 39.487 1   0.000 34.565 1   0.000 
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5.2.2 Fixed Rate Financing Cyclicality Behaviour Analysis 
The following analysis evaluates the fixed rate financing growth behaviour to the 
business cycle occurrence. The evaluation is important because of the extensive use of 
this instrument by the Islamic banks of their financing operations and critiques brought 
up by the scholars on the instrument.  
 
From Table 5.6, given in part 2, the Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section 
and period fixed effects show the three sets of tests. The calculated F-statistic with 57 
and 392 degrees of freedom is 0.95 with ρ-value = 0.58, thus, give us the no cross-
sectional heterogeneity. The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity 
have F-statistics F(10,392) = 0.8, and ρ-value = 0.63, so the null hypothesis of no time-
dimension heterogeneity is not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. The statistic 
values and the associated ρ-values accepted the null hypothesis that the cross section 
effects are redundant. The remaining results evaluate the joint significance of all the 
effects, respectively. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the 
corresponding effects are statistically not significant. The F-statistics test shows that the 
panel is sufficiently homogeneous across banks to use the pooled least square estimator. 
Accordingly, the pooled model is preferred as a better estimator.  
 
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.02 with ρ-value is 0.59 > .05 
(Table 5.6, part 3). Thus, the hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original 
idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated.  
 
The fixed rate financing operations are behaving counter-cyclically to the business cycle 
if the following conditions are met: 
1. Islamic bank fixed rate financing growth is negatively related to the real gross 
domestic product growth. 
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2. Islamic bank fixed rate financing growth is positively related to the bank 
contingency reserve growth. 
3. Islamic bank fixed rate financing growth is positively related to the bank loan 
loss provision growth. 
 
The contingency reserve growth and loan loss provision growth are positively related to 
the fixed rate financing growth with the β the coefficient size of 0.1 and 0.11 
respectively and significant at 1 per cent level. Therefore, the growth of contingency 
reserve and loan loss provision are faster compared to the fixed rate financing growth. 
The result shows that a 1 per cent growth in contingency reserve is used to manage the 
fixed rate financing growth of 0.1 per cent. On the other hand, 0.11 per cent growth of 
the fixed rate financing is protected with a 1 per cent growth in loan loss provision. This 
indicates during the business cycle expansion, growth of contingency reserve and loan 
loss provision is faster than the growth in fixed rate financing.  
 
Contrary to that, during contraction of business cycle, both of the buffer instruments 
growth rates decrease faster than the decrease in fixed rate financing growth in order to 
increase the excess fund for fixed rate financing. The finding shows the contingency 
reserve and loan loss provision have managed to play that role to pressure down Islamic 
bank fixed rate financing cyclicality behaviour and perform as the financing buffers. 
Thus, the fixed rate financing will behave counter-cyclically to the business cycle with 
the positive relationship to the growth of contingency reserve and loan loss provision.  
 
The result also shows that the growth of fixed rate financing is negatively related to the 
real gross domestic product growth, which is supposed to happen for a counter-cyclical 
financing behaviour. However, the movement of real gross domestic product growth to 
the Islamic bank fixed rate financing is not significantly related. The finding also shows 
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the money supply M2 growth and consumer price index (CPI) growth are not significant 
factors that influence Islamic bank financing.  
 
The insignificance of real gross domestic product growth, money supply M2 growth, 
and consumer price index growth in determining the Islamic bank fixed rate financing 
behaviour indicate that the Islamic bank fixed rate financing decision is not influenced 
by the expansion and contraction of the business cycle variables. This result shows the 
Islamic bank fixed rate financing activities are not affected by changes in the real gross 
domestic product growth, money supply M2 growth, and consumer price index growth. 
Somehow, this behaviour needs immediate attention from the authority and Islamic 
bank practitioners for the working and the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The large amount of fixed rate financing by the institutions 
also shows how the fixed rate financing instruments have much to do in influencing the 
behaviour of the Islamic bank total financing operations. 
 
The finding also shows the Islamic bank fixed rate financing operations are influenced 
only by the current year’s profit and not the previous year’s profit. This finding is 
significant at 1 per cent level. The previous year’s profit did not significantly influence 
the decision on current year’s fixed rate financing. Therefore, the pro-cyclicality 
behaviour of fixed rate financing based on profit enthusiasm hypothesis does not exist 
in Islamic bank operations as proven by this empirical evidence. The finding shows that 
an increase in the growth of current year net profit by 1 per cent is related to the growth 
of fixed rate financing by approximately 0.28 per cent. 
 
Next, as expected, there is a negative relationship between the regulatory variables 
growth and the Islamic banks fixed rate financing growth. Increases in the regulatory 
items will decrease the fixed rate financing growth. The relationship is significant at 1 
 231 
 
per cent level. The negative association between capital requirement and regulatory 
reserve to the Islamic bank fixed rate financing activities is consistent with the monetary 
theory idea of imposing both instruments to enhance banks’ safety and manage the 
bank’s credit creation operation. The capital requirement and regulatory reserve provide 
a buffer during adverse economic conditions and prevent excessive risk taking. 
 
Looking at the deposits as the main sources of funds, the statistical result shows a 
positive relationship and it is significant at 1 per cent significant level. The estimated 
coefficient is in line with the theory. The increase in the deposits provides the banks 
with more funds for financing activities. An increase in the deposits by 1 per cent 
increases the banks fixed rate financing activities by 0.65 per cent. 
 
The insignificance relationship between the Islamic bank fixed rate financing growth 
and the nonperforming financing growth indicates that the loan default condition is not 
a significant factor in determining the Islamic bank fixed rate financing decision. The 
finding shows that the Islamic financing behaviour is not easily overreacting and over 
pessimistic to any changes in the credit market condition and macroeconomic 
environment.  
 
Finally, from the empirical evidence of the finding on fixed rate financing behaviour 
shows that it also fails to uphold one of the conditions for the operation to behave 
counter-cyclical. The insignificant relationship of fixed rate financing instruments to the 
macroeconomic variables needs immediate consideration by the authority and Islamic 
bank practitioners.  This study suggests in order for the Islamic banks to behave with 
better counter-cyclical behaviour they need to increase the provision for bad and 
doubtful financing and contingency reserve during economic upswings and vice versa. 
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At the same time, they should practice more on the profit and risk sharing instruments 
as this shows a more true spirit of Islamic values and norms. 
 
Table 5.6: Islamic Bank Fixed Rate Financing Cyclicality Behaviour 
Part                                            Model 
 Variable 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Constant 1.414 0.981 1.217 0.765 
Gross Domestic Product growth -0.083 -0.649 -0.033 -0.233 
Consumer Price Index growth -0.081 -0.746 -0.086 -0.746 
Money supply M2 growth -0.018 -0.244 -0.022 -0.270 
Contingency Reserve growth 0.104* 5.812 0.103* 5.706 
Loan Loss Provision growth  0.114* 9.444 0.115* 9.255 
Deposit growth 0.650* 6.610 0.644* 6.479 
Capital Requirement growth -0.212* -5.617 -0.211* -5.510 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.452* -15.922 -2.462* -15.720 
Non-Performing Financing growth 0.007 0.104 0.020 0.287 
Net profit growth 0.276* 10.648 0.276* 10.496 
Previous Year Net profit growth 0.016 1.064 0.016 1.061 
R2 0.654 0.660 
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.643 
SEE 11.493 11.522 
F-statistic 74.398* 39.145* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.919 1.945 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 445 
Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 58 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.870 (57,366) 0.736 
Cross-section Chi-square 56.540 57 0.492 
Period F 0.622 (10,366) 0.795 
Period Chi-square 7.500 10 0.678 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.855 (67,366) 0.781 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 64.677 67 0.558 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing Residual (-1) Coefficient Std. Error t-stat p-value -0.063 0.039 -1.639 0.102 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value 
F-statistic 127.523 (1, 366)   0.000 
Chi-square 127.523 1   0.000 
 
This next test verifies for the sturdiness of the key result based on subsample analysis of 
the Middle East region and Southeast Asia region. Table 5.7 presents the empirical 
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result. The findings for both Middle East countries and Southeast Asia countries are 
consistent with the overall finding.  
 
From Table 5.7, the regression results from the pooled least square and fixed effects 
model appeared to be considerably consistent for both regions. The Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests results suggest that the corresponding effects are statistically not 
significant. Accordingly, the pooled least square is a better estimator for both regions. 
Following the residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model the 
hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors are 
serially uncorrelated.  
 
The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period fixed effects given 
in Table 5.7, part 2, shows the three sets of tests. The Wald hypothesis test is used to 
test for the pooled model and fixed effect models. For banks of Middle East region, the 
hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic 
F(29, 163) = 0.97 (ρ-value = 0.51). For Southeast Asia region, the hypothesis testing 
pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic F(16, 108) = 0.55 
(ρ-value = 0.92), hence, the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity is 
accepted for both regions.  
 
The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity have F-statistics 
F(10,163) = 0.46 (ρ-value = 0.91) for the Middle East region and F(10,108) = 1.27 (ρ-
value = 0.26) for the Southeast Asia region. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no time-
dimension heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level (Table 
5.7, Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and period fixed effects section). 
The statistic values and the associated ρ-values cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
cross section effects are redundant.  
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The remaining results evaluate the joint significance of all the effects, respectively. The 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the corresponding effects are 
statistically not significant. Accordingly, the pooled least square is a better estimator. 
These test results conclude that the simple pooled model is preferred to the fixed effect 
model. 
 
A residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model is then followed. 
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.16 (ρ-value = 0.09 > .05) for the 
Islamic banks of the Middle East and for Southeast Asia Islamic banks the AR(1) 
residual is -0.04 (ρ-value = 0.59 > .05), thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
(Table 5.7, part 3). The hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original 
idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated.  
 
The relationship between contingency reserve and loan loss provision with the Islamic 
bank fixed rate financing activities for both regions are positively related. This is 
consistent with the counter-cyclical financing behaviour hypothesis. The results of both 
variables are significant at 1 per cent level in Southeast Asia Islamic banks, while in the 
Middle East it is significant at 1 per cent level for contingency reserve and 5 per cent 
level for loan loss provision. This suggests that the Islamic bank in both regions did 
manage their financing, contingency reserve and loan loss provision well and according 
to the theoretical predictions.  
 
The growth ratio of the Islamic bank contingency reserve and loan loss provision to the 
fixed rate financing growth in Southeast Asia countries is found to be greater compared 
to Middle East Islamic banks. The β coefficient size of contingency reserve and loan 
loss provision in Middle East Islamic banks are 0.08 and 0.02 respectively, while for 
Southeast Asia Islamic banks are 0.21 and 0.42 respectively. This shows the Islamic 
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bank of Southeast Asia countries is more cautious compared to the Middle East Islamic 
banks as the economy fluctuates. The institutional internal variable result provides an 
indication the Islamic bank fixed rate financing of both regions have the tendency to 
behave counter-cyclically to the business cycle. 
 
Next, the insignificance of macroeconomic indicators growth in influencing the Islamic 
bank fixed rate financing growth of both regions is consistent with the overall finding. 
The finding shows the Islamic bank financing decision is not tied to the expansion and 
contraction in the macroeconomic condition. This signifies that the Islamic financing 
behaviour in both regions is free from any speculative financing activities when there is 
fluctuation in the economic environment.  
 
Consistent with the overall result, the regulatory variables have a negative relationship 
with the Islamic banks fixed rate financing growth in both of the regions. Both of the 
regulatory requirements are significant at 1 per cent level in Southeast Asia, while in the  
Middle East it is significant at 1 per cent level of regulatory reserve and 5 per cent level 
of significance for capital based.  
 
As a conclusion, looking at the relationship between business cycle occurrences and the 
Islamic bank fixed rate financing operations, the insignificant relationship between 
fixed rate financing growth and real gross domestic product growth in both regions 
makes the operations failed to meet the needed conditions to behave counter-cyclical. 
Thus, this study again suggests that the Islamic banks need to increase the provision for 
bad and doubtful financing and contingency reserve during economic upswing to make 
it more forceful in managing the fixed rate financing operations. 
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Table 5.7: Islamic Bank Fixed Rate Financing Cyclicality Behaviour Based on Region 
Part                                                    Model  Variable 
Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
1. Constant -0.986 (-1.071) -0.250 (-0.224) 8.136 (2.116) 11.931 (2.062) 
Gross Domestic Product growth 0.155 (1.359) 0.096 (0.705) -0.206 (-1.076) -0.011 (-0.035) 
Consumer Price Index growth -0.048 (-0.640) -0.067 (-0.820) -0.162 (-0.260) -0.681 (-0.919) 
Money supply M2 growth 0.007 (0.185) -0.009 (-0.228) -0.332 (-1.350) -0.613 (-1.432) 
Contingency Reserve growth 0.077* (4.358) 0.1** (1.955) 0.208* (5.950) 0.213* (5.848) 
Loan Loss Provision growth  0.016** (1.902) 0.016** (1.770) 0.415* (12.436) 0.361** (2.083) 
Deposit growth 0.870* (8.541) 0.865* (7.995) 0.697* (4.404) 0.704* (4.317) 
Capital Requirement growth -0.198** (-2.830) -0.191** (-2.604) -0.485* (-6.980) -0.481* (-6.656) 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.121* (-4.181) -1.088* (-3.894) -3.323* (-14.547) -3.371* (-14.475) 
Non-Performing Financing growth -0.035 (-1.111) -0.039 (-1.197) -0.075 (-0.297) -0.044 (-0.171) 
Net profit growth 0.037** (2.023) 0.042** (2.163) 0.383* (7.572) 0.379* (7.207) 
Previous Year Net profit growth 0.006 (0.340) 0.006 (0.364) 0.014 (0.666) 0.006 (0.288) 
R2 0.575 0.587 0.675 0.696 
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.542 0.651 0.647 
SEE 5.119 5.175 18.932 19.039 
F-statistic 24.811* 12.985* 28.021* 14.279* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.145 2.125 1.843 1.816 
*Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 214 Panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 30 Cross-sections included: 17 
Figures in parentheses are the t statistics for the coefficient 
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Table 5.7: Islamic Bank Fixed Rate Financing Cyclicality Behaviour Based on Region (continued) 
Part                                                       Region  Variable Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.972 (29,163) 0.513 0.547 (16,108) 0.916 
Cross-section Chi-square 34.142 29 0.234 11.368 16 0.786 
Period F 0.461 (10,163) 0.913 1.270 (10,108) 0.257 
Period Chi-square 5.967 10 0.818 16.228 10 0.093 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.867 (39,163) 0.693 0.847 (26,108) 0.678 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 40.343 39 0.411 27.102 26 0.404 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing 
Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
-0.159 0.078 -2.029 0.094 -0.041 0.076 -0.542 0.589 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value Value df p-value 
F-statistic 19.046 (1, 163)   0.000 36.605 (1, 108)   0.000 
Chi-square 19.046 1   0.000 36.605 1   0.000 
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5.2.3  Provision For Bad And Doubtful Financings and Contingency Reserve 
Analysis 
To confirm the cyclicality behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operations, the study 
continues to analyse the Islamic bank provision for bad and doubtful financings growth 
and the contingency reserve growth behaviour. Table 5.8 provides the explicit evidence 
of Islamic bank cyclical behaviour through its actions in anticipating for future losses by 
looking at its provision for bad and doubtful financings. Table 5.10 provide the Islamic 
bank contingency reserve growth behaviour.  
 
Provision for bad and doubtful financings behaviour to the business cycle  
Referring to the F-statistic test results given in part 2, Table 5.8, the hypothesis of “there 
is no fixed effect” in both cross sections and time section cannot be rejected, thus, it is 
determined that in both cross section and time section, there are no fixed effects. 
Accordingly, the pooled model is preferred to the fixed effects model when comparing 
only these two estimators.  
 
From Table 5.8, the Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period 
fixed effects given in part 2 shows the three sets of tests. The calculated F-statistic with 
66 and 488 degrees of freedom is 0.81 with ρ-value = 0.85, thus give us the no cross-
sectional heterogeneity. The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity 
have F-statistics F(11,488) = 0.81 and ρ-value = 0.63, so the null hypothesis of no time-
dimension heterogeneity is not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. The statistic 
values and the associated ρ-values accepted the null hypothesis that the cross section 
effects are redundant. The remaining results evaluate the joint significance of all the 
effects, respectively. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the 
corresponding effects are statistically not significant. The F-statistics test shows that the 
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panel is sufficiently homogeneous across banks to use the pooled least square estimator. 
Accordingly, the pooled model is preferred as a better estimator.  
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.02 (ρ-value = 0.6 > .05). Thus, the 
hypothesis test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors 
are serially uncorrelated (Table 5.8, part 3).  
 
The condition of the Islamic bank provisions for bad and doubtful financing needs to be 
fulfilled so that it will behave counter-cyclically to the business cycle is as follows: 
1. Banks’ provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the banks’ total financing growth. 
2. Banks’ provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the banks’ profit growth. 
3. Banks’ provisions for bad and doubtful financing growth are positively related 
to the real gross domestic product growth. 
 
From the regression result, all the internal determinant variables of the institutions are 
significant at 1 per cent level and the 5 per cent level. With a 1 per cent increase in the 
growth of financing and nonperforming financing, the provision for bad and doubtful 
financing growth will follow suit by growing at 0.4 per cent and  0.47 per cent at 1 per 
cent level of significance. While, a 1 per cent increase in net profit growth will increase 
the provision for bad and doubtful financing growth by 0.45 per cent growth at 5 per 
cent level of significant respectively.  
 
Therefore, the pro-cyclicality behaviour based on profit enthusiasm hypothesis does not 
appear in the Islamic bank operations as proven by this empirical evidence. In other 
words, the positive correlation between provision for bad and doubtful financing growth 
and bank earnings, financing and nonperforming financing growth shows the existence 
 240 
 
of income smoothening actions from the Islamic bank financing operations. This 
evidence clearly provides some indication of counter-cyclical behaviour of the Islamic 
bank financing. 
 
However, the finding also shows the macroeconomic variables namely the real gross 
domestic product growth, money supply M2 growth, and consumer price index growth 
are not significant in influencing the provision for bad and doubtful financing growth. 
Thus, make the operations failed to meet the needed conditions in order to make the 
Islamic bank operations behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle.  
 
An important aspect of provision for bad and doubtful financing is its timing with 
respect to the business cycle and the related issue of pro-cyclicality. The favourable 
conditions of an economic expansion could lead to an excessive increase in financing 
and a less critical assessment of creditworthiness. The counter-cyclical view associates 
this with higher risks and the build-up of financial imbalances. Therefore, provisions for 
bad and doubtful financing allocations are supposed to increase with the level of 
riskiness of the financing a given bank makes. This guarantees a bank's solvency and 
capitalisation when the defaults occur. Thus, provision for bad and doubtful debts 
should be positively related with the financing cycle, for banks should identify the 
underlying risk and build up loan loss reserve in good times to be drawn on in bad 
times.  
 
Hence, the insignificant relationship between the provision for bad and doubtful 
financing growth and the macroeconomic variables growth need some consideration 
from the Islamic banking services providers and policy makers. This is so because it 
provides some evidence on the capability of Islamic bank to play the role as the 
monetary transmission mechanism. 
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Table 5.8: Islamic Bank Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing 
Part                                            Model 
 Variable 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Constant 0.075 0.054 -0.008 -0.005 
Gross Domestic Product growth 0.046 0.454 0.034 0.316 
Consumer Price Index growth 0.082 0.724 0.117 0.992 
Money supply M2 growth 0.040 0.527 0.028 0.340 
Total Financing growth 0.400* 13.263 0.400* 13.110 
Non-Performing Financing growth  0.473* 6.800 0.472* 6.697 
Net profit growth  0.453** 2.014 0.039** 1.875 
Capital Requirement growth 0.116* 3.126 0.119* 3.156 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.117 -0.825 -0.095 -0.664 
R2 0.398 0.408 
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.389 
SEE 17.332 17.363 
F-statistic 53.556* 21.254* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.297 2.294 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.813 (66,488) 0.851 
Cross-section Chi-square 59.856 66 0.689 
Period F 0.812 (11,488) 0.628 
Period Chi-square 10.407 11 0.494 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.808 (77,488) 0.876 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 68.863 77 0.734 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Provision for Bad and Doubtful 
Financing Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat p-value 
-0.015 0.028 -0.535 0.593 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value 
F-statistic 65.186 (1, 488)   0.000 
Chi-square 65.186 1   0.000 
 
 
The following analysis examined the provision for bad and doubtful financing by the 
Islamic bank in the Middle East region and Southeast Asia region. Table 5.9 presents 
the empirical result. The findings are consistent with the overall finding. The pooled 
least square and fixed effects model results also appeared to be considerably consistent 
for both regions.  
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The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period fixed effects given 
in Table 5.9, part 2, shows the three sets of tests. For the Islamic banks operating in the 
Middle East the hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity 
have F-statistic F(38, 264) = 0.77 (ρ-value = 0.84). For Southeast Asia Islamic banks, 
the hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-
statistic F(16, 120) = 0.98 (ρ-value = 0.48), hence, the null hypothesis of no cross-
sectional heterogeneity cannot be rejected for both regions.  
 
The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity have F-statistics 
F(11,264) = 0.8 (ρ-value = 0.64) for Middle East Islamic banks and F(11,120) = 1.07 
(ρ-value = 0.39) for Southeast Asia Islamic banks. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
time-dimension heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance 
(Table 5.9, Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
section).  
 
The statistic values and the associated ρ-values cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
cross section effects are redundant. Based on the Redundant Fixed Effects test results 
suggest that the corresponding effects are statistically not significant. These test results 
conclude that the simple pooled model is preferred to the fixed effect model. 
 
Following the residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model the 
hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors are 
serially uncorrelated. The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.06 (ρ-value 
= 0.13 > .05) for the Islamic banks of the Middle East and for Southeast Asia Islamic 
banks the AR(1) residual is -0.03 (ρ-value = 0.35 > .05), thus, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected (Table 5.9, part 3). The hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis 
that the original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated.  
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From the regression result, all the internal determinant variables of the Islamic banks are 
significant at 1 per cent level and the 5 per cent level. With a 1 per cent increase in the 
growth of financing, the provision for bad and doubtful financing growth will increase 
by at 0.08 per cent at 5 per cent level of significance in the Middle East. In Southeast 
Asia, the Islamic bank’s provision for bad and doubtful financing growth will increase 
by 0.4 per cent with a 1 per cent level of significance. A 1 per cent increase in the 
nonperforming financing growth will increase the provision for bad and doubtful 
financing growth by 0.47 per cent growth in Middle East Islamic banks and 1.04 per 
cent in Southeast Asia with a 1 per cent level of significance respectively.  
 
Next, increase in net profit growth by 1 per cent will increase the provision for bad and 
doubtful financing growth by 0.08 per cent in Middle East Islamic banks and 0.09 per 
cent growth in Southeast Asia at 1 per cent level of significance. Therefore, the pro-
cyclicality behaviour based on profit enthusiasm hypothesis does not appear in the 
Islamic bank operations as proven by this empirical evidence. In other words, the 
positive correlation between provision for bad and doubtful financing growth and bank 
earnings, financing and nonperforming financing growth shows the existence of income 
smoothening actions from the Islamic bank financing operations. This evidence clearly 
provides some indication of counter-cyclical behaviour of the Islamic bank financing. 
 
Finally, the finding also shows the relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
the provision for bad and doubtful financing growth are not significant. Thus, make the 
operations failed to meet the needed conditions in order to make the Islamic bank 
financing operations behave counter-cyclical to the business cycle. Hence, the 
insignificant relationship needs some consideration from the Islamic banking services 
providers and policy makers.   
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Table 5.9: Islamic Bank Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing Based on Region 
 
Part                                                         Model  Variable 
Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
1. Constant -0.160 (-0.060) 0.704 (0.222) 1.544 (0.764) -1.337 (-0.451) 
Gross Domestic Product growth 0.108 (0.292) 0.201 (0.461) 0.078 (1.162) 0.066 (0.577) 
Consumer Price Index growth 0.184 (0.8594) 0.220 (0.985) 0.297 (0.933) 0.397 (1.052) 
Money supply M2 growth 0.085 (0.743) 0.053 (0.430) 0.025 (0.189) 0.202 (0.945) 
Total Financing growth 0.078** (2.347) 0.197** (2.559) 0.403* (21.345) 0.398* (20.565) 
Non-Performing Financing growth  0.471* (4.865) 0.477* (4.858) 1.042* (8.728) 1.056* (8.5130) 
Net profit growth  0.077* (4.358) 0.004 (0.106) 0.087* (4.717) 0.089* (4.711) 
Capital Requirement growth 0.017 (0.110) -0.028 (-0.169) 0.036 (1.266) 0.029 (1.000) 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.541 (-1.033) -0.572 (-1.070) -0.005 (-0.044) 0.055 (0.444) 
R2 0.388 0.396 0.872 0.881 
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.377 0.866 0.866 
SEE 18.077 18.137 10.450 10.466 
F-statistic 46.741* 19.509* 144.250* 56.512* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.319 2.314 2.078 2.108 
*Significant at 1%;    **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 322 Panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 Cross-sections included: 17 
Figures in parentheses are the t statistics for the coefficient 
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Table 5.9: Islamic Bank Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing Based on Region (continued) 
 
Part                                                        Region  Variable Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.765 (38,264) 0.839 0.978 (16,120) 0.485 
Cross-section Chi-square 33.646 38 0.671 19.122 16 0.262 
Period F 0.799 (11,264) 0.641 1.073 (11,120) 0.389 
Period Chi-square 10.544 11 0.482 14.637 11 0.200 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.753 (49,264) 0.883 0.974 (27,120) 0.509 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 42.148 49 0.745 30.919 27 0.275 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing 
Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
-0.058 0.038 -1.516 0.130 -0.027 0.029 -0.929 0.353 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value Value df p-value 
F-statistic 35.690 (1, 264)   0.000 14.707 (1, 120)   0.000 
Chi-square 35.690 1   0.000 14.707 1   0.000 
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Islamic bank contingency reserve behaviour to business cycle 
The following analysis examines the Islamic bank policy on its contingency reserve by 
looking at the association of the banks contingency reserve growths movements towards 
the periodic occurrences of the upswings and downswings of economic activities. The 
analysis is to determine whether the Islamic bank contingency reserve policy is 
following the instruction in the Quran (12:46-49), that is to increase the contingency 
reserve growth of economic expansion and to reduce it in the event of economic 
contraction. 
 
Table 5.10 provides the result of the Islamic bank contingency reserve management 
analysis during the business cycle occurrence. In this case, the outputs of Redundant 
Fixed Effects tests (part 2) provide that there is no fixed effect of both cross sections 
and time section. The hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional 
heterogeneity have F-statistic F(66, 498) = 0.96 (ρ-value = 0.57), so the null hypothesis 
of no cross-sectional heterogeneity cannot be rejected. The hypothesis testing pooled 
against temporal heterogeneity have F-statistics F(11,498 = 0.68 (ρ-value = 0.76), so the 
null hypothesis of no time-dimension heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent 
significance level (Table 5.10, Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and 
period fixed effects section). Therefore, the pooled least square should be consistent and 
efficient against the use of the fixed effects model. Thus, the study concludes that the 
pooled least square model is the preferred specification model for the data.  
 
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.08 (ρ-value = 0.2 > .05) (Table 
5.10, part 3). Thus, the hypothesis test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated. 
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The study hypothesises that the Islamic bank operation is behaving as instructed in the 
Quran (12:46-49) if the contingency reserve growth is positively related to the bank’s 
profit growth and positively related to the real gross domestic product growth. 
 
The only condition met by the Islamic banking institutions is the current year’s profit 
growth behaviour, which is positively correlated to the contingency reserve growth and 
significant at 1 per cent level. An increase in current year’s profit growth of 1 per cent 
increases the growth of contingency reserve by 0.32 per cent.  
 
Regarding with the relationship between the contingency reserve growth and 
macroeconomic indicators growth, the result shows that there is a positive relationship 
between the variables. However, the relationship is not significant. Thus, make the 
bank’s contingency reserve growth failed to behave as instructed by Quran (12:46-49). 
This finding may explain the reason for the insignificant behaviour of Islamic bank 
financing growth of the real gross domestic product growth, money supply M2 growth, 
and general price level growth given by the consumer price index growth discussed 
earlier.  
 
The study also shows a significant relationship between the Islamic bank contingency 
reserve growth and the nonperforming financing growth. This indicates that the loan 
default condition is an important factor that influences the Islamic bank contingency 
reserve management. Contingency reserve growth increase by 0.21 per cent with 1 per 
cent increase in the nonperforming financing growth. 
 
Related to the regulatory variables as expected the capital requirement is positively 
related to the Islamic bank contingency reserve growth and it is significant at 1 per cent 
significant level. Both of the items complement each other in providing buffers during 
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undesirable economic conditions and as a mechanism aimed at preventing excessive 
risk taking.  
 
A regulatory reserve on the other hand is negatively related to the Islamic bank 
contingency reserve growth and it is significant at 1 per cent significant level. The 
negative association for regulatory reserve and the Islamic bank contingency reserve 
growth is consistent with the insufficiency of fund resources faced by the Islamic bank. 
An Increase in regulatory reserve growth decreases the growth in contingency reserve 
by 4.9 per cent.   
 
The overall result provides indication that Islamic bank contingency reserve policy did 
not fully comply with Allah’s instruction as stated in the following verses of the Quran 
(12:46-49):  
“For seven years you shall sow continuously, then what you reap leave 5 it 
on the ear, except a little whereof you eat (47). Then thereafter there shall 
come upon you seven hard years, in which you shall devour all that you 
have reserved for them, except a little you keep in store” (48). 
 
For the Islamic bank financing operations to behave counter-cyclically, it is vital for the 
institutions to adhere to Allah’s instruction (Quran: 12:47-48). It is important to the 
Islamic bank to reserve more during the economic expansion to reduce the earning asset 
growth so that the financing growth will be slower. During economic downturns, the 
banks should reduce the contingency reserve growth more so that the earning assets can 
be increased and financing growth will be higher. 
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Table 5.10: Islamic Bank Provision for Contingency Reserve 
Part                                            Model 
 Variable 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Constant 0.360 0.156 0.562 0.225 
Gross Domestic Product growth 0.125 0.742 0.137 0.759 
Consumer Price Index growth 0.046 0.248 0.081 0.416 
Money supply M2 growth 0.030 0.241 0.037 0.272 
Net profit growth 0.298* 8.069 0.296* 7.908 
Deposits growth 2.307* 10.366 2.276* 10.125 
Non-Performing Financing growth  0.206** 1.912 0.223** 2.046 
Financing growth 0.735* 13.122 0.735* 12.997 
Capital Based growth 0.911* 12.418 0.908* 12.225 
Regulatory Reserve growth -4.906* -15.144 -4.836* -14.745 
R2 0.649 0.654 
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.642 
SEE 28.734 28.821 
F-statistic 118.247* 53.268* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.101 2.096 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 585 
Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.959 (66,498) 0.571 
Cross-section Chi-square 69.983 66 0.345 
Period F 0.678 (11,498) 0.760 
Period Chi-square 8.699 11 0.650 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.919 (77,498) 0.669 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 77.751 77 0.455 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Provision for Contingency 
Reserve Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat p-value 
-0.078 0.060 -1.299 0.195 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value 
F-statistic 77.930 (1, 498)   0.000 
Chi-square 77.930 1   0.000 
 
Next, the study proceeds with a subsample data analysis based on Islamic banks 
operating in the Middle East region and Southeast Asia region. Table 5.11 presents the 
empirical result. The findings for both panels of Middle East countries and Southeast 
Asia countries are consistent with the overall finding.  
 
As given in Table 5.11, the regression results from the pooled least square and fixed 
effects model appeared to be considerably consistent for both regions. The Redundant 
Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that the corresponding effects are statistically not 
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significant. Accordingly, the pooled least square is a better estimator for both regions. 
Following the residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model the 
hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors are 
serially uncorrelated.  
 
The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on the cross-section and period fixed effects given 
in Table 5.11, part 2, shows the three sets of tests. For banks of Middle East region, the 
hypothesis testing pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic 
F(38, 274) = 0.82 (ρ-value = 0.76). For Southeast Asia region, the hypothesis testing 
pooled model against cross-sectional heterogeneity have F-statistic F(16, 119) = 0.9 (ρ-
value = 0.58), hence, the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity cannot be 
rejected for both regions.  
 
The hypothesis testing pooled against temporal heterogeneity have F-statistics F(11, 
274) = 0.77 (ρ-value = 0.67) for the Middle East region and F(11,119) = 0.81 (ρ-value = 
0.63) for the Southeast Asia region. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no time-dimension 
heterogeneity is also not rejected at the 5 per cent significance level (Table 5.11, 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test – Test cross-section and period fixed effects section). The 
statistic values and the associated ρ-values cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
cross section effects are redundant. The remaining results evaluate the joint significance 
of all the effects, respectively. The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests results suggest that 
the corresponding effects are statistically not significant. Accordingly, the pooled least 
square is a better estimator.  
 
A residual test of AR(1) serial autocorrelation on the pooled model is then followed. 
The estimated coefficient for the AR(1) residual is -0.08 (ρ = 0.15 > .05) for the Islamic 
banks  of  the  Middle  East  and for Southeast Asia Islamic banks the AR(1) residual is 
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-0.1 (ρ-value = 0.23 > .05), thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 5.11, part 
3). The hypothesis test accepts the null hypothesis that the original idiosyncratic errors 
are serially uncorrelated.  
 
The relationship between contingency reserve and bank’s profit for both regions are 
positively related and consistent with the overall finding. The results of both variables 
are significant at 1 per cent level in Southeast Asia and 5 per cent in the Middle East 
region. This suggests Islamic bank of both regions did manage their contingency reserve 
well and according to the theoretical predictions. A 1 per cent increase in the profit 
growth increases the contingency reserve growth of 0.13 per cent by the Islamic banks 
in the Middle East region. On the other hand, the contingency reserve growth of the 
Islamic banks of Southeast Asia increased by 0.43 per cent with an increase in the profit 
growth. 
 
Next, the empirical result shows the relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
the provision for contingency reserve growth in both regions are not significant. Thus, 
make the operations failed to meet the needed conditions in order to make the Islamic 
bank operations behave as instructed by the Quran (12:47-48).  
 
The study also shows a significant relationship between the Islamic bank contingency 
reserve growth and the nonperforming financing growth of both regions. This indicates 
that the loan default condition is a significant factor in influencing the Islamic bank 
decision on contingency reserve in both regions. An increase in nonperforming 
financing growth increases the contingency reserve growth of 0.12 per cent in the 
Middle East region and 1.0 per cent in Southeast Asia with the significant level at 5 per 
cent in both regions. 
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Related to the regulatory variables, the capital requirement is positively related to the 
Islamic bank contingency reserve growth of both regions and the results is significant at 
1 per cent level in Southeast Asia and 5 per cent level in the Middle East region. The 
coefficient size is 0.36 in the Middle East region and 0.79 in Southeast Asia. Regulatory 
reserve is significant only in Southeast Asia and it is negatively related to the Islamic 
bank contingency reserve growth at 1 per cent significant level.  
 
As a conclusion, looking at the relationship between contingency reserve and the 
macroeconomic variables, the Islamic bank management on contingency reserve in both 
regions failed to meet the needed conditions to behave as instructed by the Quran 
(12:46-49). The result provides indication that Islamic bank contingency reserve policy 
did not fully complies with the Quran instruction in verse 46 to 49 (chapter 12).  
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Table 5.11: Islamic Bank Provision for Contingency Reserve Based on Region 
Part                                                          Model  Variable 
Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
1. Constant 4.985 (1.473) 4.272 (1.063) 8.541 (1.363) 3.425 (0.367) 
Gross Domestic Product growth 0.249 (-0.531) 0.434 (-0.786) 0.103 (-0.497) 0.099 (-0.279) 
Consumer Price Index growth 0.089 (-0.326) 0.013 (0.045) 1.014 (-1.027) 0.606 (-0.517) 
Money supply M2 growth 0.014 (0.093) 0.077 (0.494) 0.522 (-1.293) 0.228 (-0.342) 
Net profit growth 0.127** (2.635) 0.112** (2.292) 0.429* (6.843) 0.418* (6.429) 
Deposits growth 0.112**(2.203) 0.104**(2.019) 3.070* (9.183) 3.015* (8.547) 
Non-Performing Financing growth  0.116** (2.102) 0.115** (2.284) 1.006** (2.666) 1.156** (2.952) 
Financing growth 0.367**(3.012) 0.374 **(3.030) 0.857* (12.280) 0.867* (12.092) 
Capital Requirement growth 0.361** (2.083) 0.366** (2.076) 0.787* (6.701) 0.801* (6.572) 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.945 (-1.651) -1.114** (-1.917) -5.734 *(-10.064) -5.697 *(-9.482) 
R2 0.484 0.494 0.833 0.844 
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.407 0.823 0.821 
SEE 37.718 37.755 32.317 32.502 
F-statistic 6.407* 5.717* 80.902* 36.460* 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.201 2.202 2.126 2.106 
*Significant at 1%;     **Significant at 5% Panel (unbalanced) observations: 322 Panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 Cross-sections included: 17 
Figures in parentheses are the t statistics for the coefficient 
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Table 5.11: Islamic Bank Provision for Contingency Reserve Based on Region (continued) 
 
Part                                                          Region  Variable Middle East Region Southeast Asia Region 
2. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests (H0: There is no fixed effects) 
Test cross-section and period fixed effects Statistic df p-value Statistic df p-value 
Cross-section F 0.822 (38,274) 0.764 0.895 (16,119) 0.576 
Cross-section Chi-square 35.811 38 0.571 17.727 16 0.340 
Period F 0.772 (11,274) 0.668 0.809 (11,119) 0.631 
Period Chi-square 10.128 11 0.519 11.252 11 0.422 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.877 (49,274) 0.705 0.872 (27,119) 0.649 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 48.330 49 0.500 28.165 27 0.403 
3. Residual Test Statistic (H0: Original idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated) 
Total Financing 
Residual (-1) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
-0.083 0.058 -1.435 0.152 -0.099 0.081 -1.212 0.228 
Wald Test: Residual Test Statistic Value df p-value Value df p-value 
F-statistic 51.333 (1, 274)   0.000 15.065 (1, 119)   0.000 
Chi-square 51.333 1   0.000 15.065 1   0.000 
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5.3 Conclusion of Empirical Findings and Analysis 
From the above empirical evidence taken as a whole, what can be concluded is that 
there are indications of a counter-cyclical behaviour from the Islamic bank financing 
operations. However, the counter-cyclical behaviour has a very low significant level 
because of the failure of contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful 
financing to put a more forceful pressure on the Islamic bank financing operations to the 
macroeconomic swing. This argument is evident from the insignificant relationship 
between the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing with all 
the main macroeconomic business cycle indicators namely the gross domestic product, 
money supply M2 and the general price level growth.  
 
Although the result shows that the relationship given by the coefficient sign follows the 
theoretical perspective of a counter-cyclical bank financing operation, however, 
statistically it has an insignificant relationship. In general, adherence to verse 46-49 of 
chapter 12 in the Quran and the Islamic values of managing the financial and 
commercial transaction activities is a decisive solution in achieving a counter-cyclical 
behaviour of the Islamic bank financing operation. This, effectively, will be able to 
generate a more resilient and stable financial market. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.0 Overview 
The increase in the instability of the economic environment for the past 30 years has 
been in relation to the instability of the interest-based financial system. This has been 
one of the hottest issues debated among the economists, bankers, financial practitioners, 
and policy maker for the last twenty years. Issues arise whether the systems, policies, or 
instruments currently applied are able to stabilise the economic fluctuations. The 
business cycle occurrences related to the financial crisis since early 1990’s until now 
has greatly increased the interest in the issue of the bank’s lending pro-cyclical 
behaviour. This has inspired scholars to look for another alternative and instruments that 
can reduce the instability of the economic atmosphere.  
 
For the Muslim scholars, the Islamic economic system and in particular the Islamic 
financial system with its unique characteristics and the profit and risk sharing 
instrument offers a solution for achieving a resilient and stable economic environment. 
However, the original idea of applying profit and risk sharing instrument by the Islamic 
bank in its operation is currently difficult to practice due to various practical and 
operational reasons. For those reasons, on average 60 per cent of Islamic bank financing 
is in the form of trade-based financing with fixed rate financing instruments. With the 
prevailing large amount of fixed rate financing instruments used by the Islamic bank, 
some of the Islamic bank proponents question the capability of Islamic bank of 
stabilising the economic environment.  
 
With that in mind, this particular study takes the initiative to provide some of the 
empirical evidence of the advantages of the Islamic banking system. This study has 
 257 
 
been able to provide some of the empirical evidence of the cyclicality behaviour of the 
present Islamic bank financing operation practices to the business cycle phenomenon.  
 
The empirical results of this research have also provided some of the initial indications 
on the resiliency and stability of the Islamic bank financing operations towards the 
expansions and contractions in the economic atmosphere. The finding have also proven 
the claims made by some of the proponents of Islamic bank of the limited impact of the 
recent financial crisis on the Islamic banking sector due to their unique portfolio of 
assets. Aziz (2010) even claims that: 
“Despite the unprecedented disruptions in the international financial 
system, studies show that the Islamic financial industry has weathered 
the global financial crisis relatively well.” 
 
6.1 Conclusion and Recommendation 
With the financing growth that is not tied to the growth of the main business cycle 
indicators, namely the real gross domestic product, money supply and general price 
level, the findings shows that the Islamic bank operations are free from any speculative 
activities. Thus, financing activities of Islamic banks have the potential to behave 
counter-cyclically to the rise and falls of the economic activities. In some ways, the 
behaviour of the Islamic bank was not too enthusiastic to the movement in economic 
environment fluctuations as compared to its counterpart, the interest-based bank.  
 
The contingency reserve and provision for loan losses growth is positively correlated to 
the institution’s financing growth, which has managed the Islamic bank financing’s pro-
cyclical behaviour. Hence, the banking sector needs to increase its security through the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing during an economic 
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upturn. In the event of economic downturns, the banks need to increase their investment 
and financing activities.  
 
When the economy is expanding, there is an increase in financing volume and jointly 
followed by the increase in bank’s contingency reserve and provision for bad and 
doubtful financing for safety reason. This will shield the bank of the unexpected and 
expected loss appropriate with the increase in the economic risk. In the event of an 
economic upswing, the Islamic bank financing growth is at a diminishing rate of the 
increase in contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing. During 
weak economic environment, the contingency reserve and provision for bad and 
doubtful financing growth is on the reducing trend in order to increase the excess fund 
for financing activities. By avoiding speculative financial transactions and financial risk 
transaction, the Islamic bank is able to protect itself from economic fluctuation.  
 
Most importantly, the result of this study confirms the possibility of Islamic bank 
operations in stabilising the economic environment at least for the short run business 
cycle event related to the Juglar fixed investment cycle and Kitchin inventory cycle. The 
contingency reserve and provision for loan losses policy has managed the Islamic bank 
financings to behave counter-cyclical. The empirical evidence is also able to provide 
some initial statistical proof of the recent financial crisis limited impact on the Islamic 
banking sector due to their unique asset portfolio of assets. 
 
The finding shows the bank fixed rate financing growth is at a diminishing rate during 
strong economic growth and at an increasing rate when the economy is weaker. With its 
special characteristics based on shariah underpinning its operations, the fixed rate 
financing is also acting towards a counter-cyclical behaviour to the business cycle 
event. The contingency reserve and provision for loan losses management is able to 
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reduce the degree of cyclicality behaviour of fixed rate financing. Therefore, the view of 
pro-cyclical behaviour of fixed rate financing is unsubstantiated as long as the Islamic 
bank follows Allah’s instructions (Quran’s: 12: 46-49). 
 
The finding of this study also shows the current financing operation practiced by the 
Islamic bank has the tendency to manage the business cycle at least for the short run. 
One of the main contributing factors of this behaviour is the bank policy on the 
contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing that follows the 
shariah policy on the contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing, 
as dictated by the Quran’s (12:46-49) instruction.  
 
Although the degree of associations is low as opposed to the gross domestic product 
growth and the buffering policy that is positively associated with it, the institutions still 
need to be more careful so that over-financing of fixed rate financing can be avoided. 
The concern is on the large amount of fixed rate financing instruments used by the 
Islamic bank financing operation that might distort the capability of the system to 
stabilise the economy. The empirical finding suggests that the Islamic bank should go 
for more profit and risk sharing to avoid any unwelcome outcome from this financing 
instrument. 
 
With the combination of both financing instruments in operation, namely the profit and 
risk sharing and fixed rate financing instrument, the Islamic bank asset management 
need to determine the optimum combination of excess reserve for financing provision of 
the liquidity and safety requirement, particularly, in a turbulent, dynamic, complex, and 
an unpredictable business cycle environment. With the current financing instruments 
applied to the Islamic bank, it is necessary to look at how an Islamic bank should 
 260 
 
determine the ratio of the profit and risk sharing instruments with the fixed income 
instrument. 
 
Although the contingency reserve and provision for loan losses are able to control the 
financing activities from behaving pro-cyclically to the business cycle, the finding also 
shows that Islamic banks need to observe its management of contingency reserve and 
provision for bad and doubtful financing. The amount of contingency reserve and 
provision for bad and doubtful financing is still not large enough to manage the earning 
assets that have a direct influence on the financing volume. This is evidence of the 
insignificant relationship of financing growth of the Islamic bank to the real gross 
domestic product growth, money supply M2 growth, and the consumer price index 
growth. Therefore, the policy on contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful 
financing needs some serious consideration from the Islamic bank management and 
policy makers so that it will also be able to confirm the capability of Islamic bank to 
work as the transmitter mechanism of monetary policy. This will, consequently, mellow 
down the business cycle happening.  
 
Another important aspect to be raised up from this study is the need to do an in-depth 
analysis on the chapter Yusuf (12) from verse 47 and 48 in the Quran. Through the 
statistical and dynamic analyses, the precise amount of provisioning on the contingency 
reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing could be determined. A forceful 
provisioning for contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing 
system may perhaps make the correlation more convincing with higher coefficients 
between the financing activities and the macroeconomics business cycle indicators, 
namely the real gross domestic product, money supply M2, and the consumer price 
index. As an example, Spain has implemented a dynamic provisioning system called 
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‘statistical provisioning’ that came into effect on July 1st, 2000 (De Lis et al., 2000). A 
similar provisioning approach is compulsive for Portuguese banks.  
 
In this dynamic provisioning system, the banks estimate their expected credit losses 
over the business cycle using their own internal models or a standard approach 
developed by the regulators. As a result, banks build up their statistical provisions 
during upswing phases.  The statistical provision is obvious to anticipate the next 
economic cycle rather than to reflect past ones (De Lis et al., 2000).  
 
During upswing phases, banks build up their statistical provisions (when 
contemporaneous problem loans and consequently specific provisions are weak 
compared to total loans) and draw down these contingency reserve during downturns. 
According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), the full business cycle occurrences are 
therefore smoothed with this approach over the specific, general, and statistical 
provisions. The Spanish strategy would possibly be relevant to what is mentioned in 
that chapter Yusuf (Quran; 12:47-48). Bikker and Metzmakers (2005) reported that the 
French supervisors firmly advocated a comparative approach, called ‘dynamic 
provisioning’. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, also allowed certain forward-
looking elements in provisioning. 
 
Furthermore, studies by De Lis et al. (2000), Borio et al. (2000), and Jim´enez and 
Saurina, (2006) show the positive outcomes of the effect of dynamic provisioning to 
smooth bank income and to stabilize bank capital. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) 
subsequent studies show that provisioning also influences credit fluctuations. The effect 
of non-discretionary provisions on credit fluctuation results directly from an 
unsatisfactory backward-looking provisioning system. This system could therefore 
remove the banks’ incentive to grant new loans when non-discretionary provisions are 
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decreasing, that is when the expected credit risk could be underestimated (Bouvatier and 
Lepetit, 2008). 
 
It is also important for the banking institutions to have their own internal models to 
manage their contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing to 
comply with the Quran’s (12:46-49) instruction and to anticipate future economic cycle. 
A standard approach also needs to be developed by the regulators following the Quran’s 
(12:46-49) instruction. The existing contingency reserve policy model practiced by the 
bank needs to be reviewed to suit with the Quran’s (12:46-49) instruction.  
 
From the reserve requirement theoretical view, the reserve requirement is to make the 
institutions to be less enthusiastic and they trim down the speculative activities during 
an economic upswing. This is the essence behind chapter Yusuf (12) verse 46 to verse 
49. However, as we know, reserve requirements are no longer binding for most banks. 
Central banks in many countries in the world have been reducing or eliminating their 
reserve requirements. Many economists advocate the elimination of reserve 
requirements especially in the United States. This has already been done in Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand (Mishkin 2007). The argument according to economists is 
that the reserve requirements act as a tax on banks (Mishkin, 2007). Since central banks 
typically do not pay interest on reserve, the bank earns nothing on them and loses the 
interest that could have been earned if the bank held loans instead.  
 
The cost imposed on banks from the reserve requirement means that banks, in effect, 
have a higher cost of funds than intermediaries that are not subject to the reserve 
requirements, making them less competitive. Central banks thus reduced reserve 
requirements to make banks more competitive and stronger. This might be one of the 
main contributing factors to the relentless economic instability for the past twenty years.  
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Ultimately, in reference to the overall finding of this study, adherence to the Islamic 
values in financial transaction activities offers a solution in achieving financial market 
stability. The ban on interest-based instrument and all of its forms of usage, avoiding 
from speculative, ambiguous, uncertain, and transactions of financial risk and abiding to 
all other forms of shariah instructions are the criteria needed to achieve a stable 
economic environment. Indirectly, the empirical evidence also provides some initial 
explanation of the limited impact of the recent financial crisis on the Islamic banking 
sector due to their unique portfolio management. 
 
6.2 Limitation of Study and Future Research Suggestion 
The overall result of this research shows a possible counter-cyclical economic 
behaviour of the Islamic bank financing. However, in some way, this study has its own 
limitation. The limitation of this paper comes in the form of small sample size and it is 
only able to analyse the short run cyclical behaviour of the Islamic bank financing 
activities. The reason for this is that, it is mainly because of the recent nature of the 
Islamic bank and the lack of a systematic financial record of the Islamic bank at the 
early stage of their establishment in the financial market scene.  
 
A larger sample size with a longer time span will be able to provide a more concrete 
evidence and understanding of the Islamic bank cyclicality behaviour. Monitoring the 
Islamic bank financing cyclicality behaviour is essential for managerial as well as 
regulatory purposes. Without persistent monitoring of the Islamic bank financing 
behaviour, existing problems can remain unnoticed and will lead to financial failure in 
the future. 
 
Another limitation foreseen in this study is how to determine the precise amount of 
provision for bad and doubtful debts and contingency reserve needed for the Islamic 
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bank to put into operation in the event of economic cycle. The statistical provisioning 
(as the term used by De Lis et al., 2000) and dynamic reserve model needs to be 
developed to fit the Quran’s (12:46-49) instruction. The study also does not separate the 
various forms of contingency reserve and provision for bad and doubtful financing 
proportions by the Islamic banks for the reason of the different names and items used by 
some of the banks. The study also does not take into consideration the effectiveness of 
the profit equalisation reserve. Those limitations definitely invite the needs for further 
research. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Islamic Bank List 
 Islamic Bank Institution Country Year 
1. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 1998-2009 
2. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 2000-2009 
3. Maybank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
4. HongLeong Bank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
5. Public Bank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
6. RHB Bhd (RHB) (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
7. Affin Bank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
8. AM Bank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
9. Alliance Bank Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1999-2009 
10. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Malaysia Bhd 
(Islamic bank division) 
Malaysia 1998-2009 
11. Citibank Malaysia Bhd (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 1998-2009 
12. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd (Islamic bank 
division) 
Malaysia 1998-2009 
13. Overseas Chinese Bank Malaysia Bhd (Islamic bank 
division) 
Malaysia 1998-2009 
14. Bank Rakyat Malaysia 1998-2008 
15 Eon Bank (Islamic bank division) Malaysia 2001-2008 
16. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 1998-2008 
17. Development Islamic Bank UAE 1998-2008 
18. Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 2002-2009 
19. Al Jazira Bank Saudi Arabia 1998-2009 
20 Al Rajhi Banking Saudi Arabia 1998-2009 
21. The National Commercial Bank Saudi Arabia 1998-2009 
22. Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia 1998-2009 
23. The Saudi British Bank Saudi Arabia 2000-2009 
24. Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia 2001-2009 
25 The Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia 2001-2009 
26 Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia 2000-2009 
27 Shamil Bank Bahrain 1999-2008 
28 Gulf Finance House Bahrain 2001-2009 
29 ABC Islamic Bank Bahrain 2003 -2009 
30 AlBaraka Islamic Bank Bahrain 1998-2009 
31 Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain 1998-2009 
32 ARCAPITA Bahrain 1998-2009 
33 Kuwait Finance House Bahrain 2002-2009 
34 Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt Egypt  1999-2009 
35 Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank Egypt  1998-2008 
36 Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar 1998-2009 
37 Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar 1998-2009 
38 Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 1998-2008 
39 Islamic International Arab Bank Jordan 1998-2008 
40 Tadhamon International Islamic Bank Yemen 1998-2008 
41 Islamic Bank of Yemen Yemen 1999-2006 
42 Saba Islamic Bank Yemen 2004-2008 
43 Omdurman National Bank Sudan 1998-2008 
44 Sudanese Islamic Bank Sudan 2000-2007 
45 Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan 2003-2009 
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46 Tadamon Islamic Bank Sudan 1998-2007 
47 Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 1998-2009 
48 Kuveyt Turk 1998-2009 
49 Baraka Turk 1998-2009 
50 Baraka South Africa 1998 -2009 
51 Meezan Pakistan 2000 -2009 
52 Faysal Bank Pakistan 2000 -2009 
53 AlBaraka Islamic Bank Pakistan 2003 -2009 
54 Islami Bank Bangladesh Bangladesh 1999-2009 
55 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited Bangladesh 1998-2008 
56 Social Islami Bank Bangladesh 1998-2008 
57 Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited Bangladesh 2001-2009 
58 Export Import Bank of Bangladesh Limited Bangladesh 2003-2009 
59 PT Bank Syariah Mandiri Indonesia 1999-2009 
60 PT Bank Muamalat   Indonesia 1999-2009 
61 Bank Keshavarzi Iran 1998-2008 
62 Bank Saderat Iran Iran 1999-2009 
63 Bank sepah Iran 1998-2008 
64 Bank Mellat Iran 2003-2009 
65 Karafarin Bank Iran 2000-2009 
66 Parsian Bank Iran 2002-2009 
67 Bank Tejarat Iran 2003-2009 
 
 286 
 
APPENDIX 2 
       
Statistical Result 
 
Panel unit root test 
 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series: Total Financing Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1259.97  0.0000  66  490 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -82.0377  0.0000  66  490 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  280.227  0.0000  66  490 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  514.210  0.0000  66  560 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series: Fixed Rate Financing Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -782.569  0.0000  56  416 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -64.6375  0.0000  56  416 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  247.969  0.0000  56  416 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  438.970  0.0000  56  477 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Reserve Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -351.894  0.0000  66  492 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -35.8884  0.0000  66  492 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  260.130  0.0000  66  492 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  461.159  0.0000  66  560 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Panel unit root test:  Series:  Loan Loss Provisions Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -41.9611  0.0000  63  456 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -9.83446  0.0000  63  456 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  272.662  0.0000  63  456 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  436.461  0.0000  63  523 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Deposits 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -26.0239  0.0000  66  494 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.97353  0.0000  66  494 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  267.791  0.0000  66  494 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  501.376  0.0000  66  563 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Capital Based Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -111.229  0.0000  66  492 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -17.4589  0.0000  66  492 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  287.269  0.0000  66  492 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  337.065  0.0000  66  561 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Regulatory Reserve Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -25.1537  0.0000  65  507 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -10.1861  0.0000  65  507 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  366.872  0.0000  65  507 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  420.935  0.0000  65  507 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Panel unit root test:  Series:  Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Financing Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -245.537  0.0000  58  435 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -30.3252  0.0000  58  435 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  201.235  0.0000  58  435 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  337.409  0.0000  58  496 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Non-performing financing 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -71.5718  0.0000  66  447 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.45997  0.0000  66  447 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  201.149  0.0001  66  447 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  431.456  0.0000  66  516 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Net Profit Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -22.0467  0.0000  65  481 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.33331  0.0000  65  481 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  236.701  0.0000  65  481 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  467.712  0.0000  65  550 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Real Gross Domestic Product Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -19.1078  0.0000  66  493 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.43872  0.0000  66  493 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  268.242  0.0000  66  493 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  312.548  0.0000  66  562 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Panel unit root test:  Series:  Money supply M2 Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -7.33583  0.0000  66  493 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -8.76408  0.0000  66  493 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  208.170  0.0000  66  493 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  210.600  0.0000  66  562 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Panel unit root test:  Series:  Consumer Price Index Growth 
Sample: 1998 2009 Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -15.8148  0.0000  66  493 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -8.68066  0.0000  66  493 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  173.405  0.0091  66  493 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  248.650  0.0000  66  562 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality 
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Equation: Islamic Banks Total Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 1.011686 (66,430) 0.4570 
Cross-section Chi-square 74.770428 66 0.2149 
Period F 0.432430 (10,430) 0.9306 
Period Chi-square 5.183253 10 0.8786 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.947406 (76,430) 0.6040 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 80.197055 76 0.3489 
Cross-section fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 518 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.973557 1.281596 0.759645 0.4478 
GDP growth -0.022452 0.118515 -0.189444 0.8498 
CPI growth -0.048021 0.065577 -0.732285 0.4643 
M2 growth -0.039278 0.092396 -0.425104 0.6709 
Reserve growth 0.116412 0.015147 7.685410 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.089516 0.010183 8.790970 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.570732 0.082103 6.951421 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.090565 0.029558 -3.063996 0.0023 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-1.650011 0.144921 -11.38562 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
  
-0.040182 0.050662 -0.793127 0.4281 
Net profit growth 0.160846 0.018892 8.513940 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.010936 0.011889 0.919807 0.3581 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.546277     Mean dependent var 1.576629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527067     S.D. dependent var 16.12040 
S.E. of regression 11.08602     Akaike info criterion 7.690789 
Sum squared resid 60958.29     Schwarz criterion 7.871290 
Log likelihood -1969.914     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.761510 
F-statistic 28.43709     Durbin-Watson stat 1.692726 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 518 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 
 
Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.648390 1.376440 0.471063 0.6378 
GDP growth -0.032797 0.115889 -0.283005 0.7773 
CPI growth -0.055764 0.065898 -0.846207 0.3979 
M2 growth -0.038511 0.109135 -0.352880 0.7243 
Reserve growth 0.113048 0.015934 7.094602 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.086117 0.010596 8.126982 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.540652 0.086616 6.241946 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.087177 0.030907 -2.820648 0.0050 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-1.635153 0.151612 -10.78515 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
  
-0.034134 0.055110 -0.619391 0.5360 
Net profit growth 0.153941 0.019884 7.741825 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.002798 0.012594 0.222138 0.8243 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.603313     Mean dependent var 1.576629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.533893     S.D. dependent var 16.12040 
S.E. of regression 11.00573     Akaike info criterion 7.772667 
Sum squared resid 53295.49     Schwarz criterion 8.412625 
Log likelihood -1935.121     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.023405 
F-statistic 8.690733     Durbin-Watson stat 1.926293 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 518 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.028726 1.155471 0.890309 0.3737 
GDP growth -0.012813 0.107440 -0.119258 0.9051 
CPI growth -0.050694 0.059860 -0.846886 0.3975 
M2 growth -0.031929 0.087545 -0.364718 0.7155 
Reserve growth 0.116244 0.014909 7.796672 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.089934 0.009886 9.096838 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.573551 0.081278 7.056676 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.091447 0.029165 -3.135528 0.0018 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-1.651797 0.142578 -11.58521 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
  
-0.042040 0.050110 -0.838963 0.4019 
Net profit growth 0.161333 0.018604 8.671859 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.010265 0.011693 0.877901 0.3804 
R-squared 0.541499     Mean dependent var 1.576629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.531532     S.D. dependent var 16.12040 
S.E. of regression 11.03357     Akaike info criterion 7.662655 
Sum squared resid 61600.26     Schwarz criterion 7.761110 
Log likelihood -1972.628     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.701230 
F-statistic 54.32696     Durbin-Watson stat 1.680220 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 10 Cross-sections included: 67 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 437 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.049421 0.033772 -1.463402 0.1441 
R-squared 0.003743     Mean dependent var -0.286567 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003743     S.D. dependent var 8.460269 
S.E. of regression 8.444419     Akaike info criterion 7.107174 
Sum squared resid 31090.38     Schwarz criterion 7.116511 
Log likelihood -1551.918     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.110858 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.789642  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 178.0072 (1, 436)   0.0000 
Chi-square 178.0072 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.450579 0.033772 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Middle East Banks Total Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 1.052530 (38,227) 0.3950 
Cross-section Chi-square 46.575566 38 0.1603 
Period F 1.712088 (10,227) 0.0991 
Period Chi-square 20.204731 10 0.6685 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.194307 (48,227) 0.1970 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 64.428857 48 0.7800 
Cross-section fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 287 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -1.240099 0.703219 -1.763459 0.0790 
GDP growth -0.189845 0.093115 -2.038827 0.0725 
CPI growth -0.009895 0.049758 -0.198861 0.8425 
M2 growth -0.009507 0.026985 -0.352310 0.7249 
Reserve growth 0.418785 0.031189 13.42723 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.074237 0.019171 3.872283 0.0001 
Deposit growth 0.844410 0.068055 12.40776 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.203349 0.030837 -6.594356 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.241999 0.192805 -1.255145 0.2105 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.001473 0.019268 -0.076467 0.9391 
Net profit growth 0.004143 0.008600 0.481808 0.6303 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.007018 0.008329 0.842566 0.4002 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.614821     Mean dependent var 1.120417 
Adjusted R-squared 0.585860     S.D. dependent var 6.326962 
S.E. of regression 4.071635     Akaike info criterion 5.716322 
Sum squared resid 4409.804     Schwarz criterion 5.984089 
Log likelihood -799.2922     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.823639 
F-statistic 21.22939     Durbin-Watson stat 1.787050 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 287 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -2.244639 0.799766 -2.806621 0.0054 
GDP growth -0.355919 0.205715 -1.730155 0.0859 
CPI growth -0.017205 0.074992 -0.229417 0.8187 
M2 growth -0.001969 0.027063 -0.072764 0.9421 
Reserve growth 0.415251 0.033392 12.43579 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.492011 0.073130 6.727844 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.836664 0.074284 11.26306 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.207943 0.032824 -6.335147 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.028555 0.202392 -0.141090 0.8879 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.009472 0.021440 -0.441816 0.6590 
Net profit growth 0.005550 0.009319 0.595479 0.5521 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.006287 0.008849 0.710412 0.4781 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.649873     Mean dependent var 1.120417 
Adjusted R-squared 0.579260     S.D. dependent var 6.326962 
S.E. of regression 4.103952     Akaike info criterion 5.816030 
Sum squared resid 4008.497     Schwarz criterion 6.440819 
Log likelihood -785.6003     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.066436 
F-statistic 9.203215     Durbin-Watson stat 1.979598 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: TF 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 287 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -1.484726 0.594414 -2.497799 0.0131 
GDP growth -0.015684 0.008862 -1.769899 0.0883 
CPI growth -0.017826 0.047671 -0.373929 0.7087 
M2 growth -0.003008 0.025034 -0.120171 0.9044 
Reserve growth 0.840550 0.064164 13.09997 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.203809 0.030606 6.659110 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.851711 0.067113 12.69070 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.198785 0.030144 -6.594448 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.130568 0.190076 -0.686927 0.4927 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.000798 0.019382 -0.041155 0.9672 
Net profit growth 0.003707 0.008586 0.431768 0.6662 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.005069 0.008257 0.613957 0.5397 
R-squared 0.591543     Mean dependent var 1.120417 
Adjusted R-squared 0.576744     S.D. dependent var 6.326962 
S.E. of regression 4.116202     Akaike info criterion 5.705312 
Sum squared resid 4676.300     Schwarz criterion 5.845571 
Log likelihood -807.7123     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.761526 
F-statistic 39.97145     Durbin-Watson stat 1.732625 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 10 Cross-sections included: 39 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 237 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.026634 0.028659 -0.929346 0.3532 
R-squared 0.001189     Mean dependent var 0.562118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001189     S.D. dependent var 21.74483 
S.E. of regression 21.73189     Akaike info criterion 8.997587 
Sum squared resid 219135.7     Schwarz criterion 9.006495 
Log likelihood -2090.939     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.001093 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.798314  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 39.48678 (1, 236)   0.0000 
Chi-square 39.48678 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.354967 0.056489 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Southeast Asia Islamic Banks Total Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.945041 (16,108) 0.5212 
Cross-section Chi-square 19.130901 16 0.2619 
Period F 0.953081 (10,108) 0.4885 
Period Chi-square 12.347116 10 0.2625 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.991635 (26,108) 0.4856 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 31.256294 26 0.2189 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 
 
Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 7.451760 5.021734 1.483902 0.1404 
GDP growth -0.012744 0.276662 -0.046065 0.9633 
CPI growth -0.431400 0.642885 -0.671038 0.5034 
M2 growth -0.384919 0.371894 -1.035023 0.3027 
Reserve growth 0.187956 0.031594 5.949047 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.077536 0.033042 2.346615 0.0205 
Deposit growth 0.864122 0.141523 6.105855 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.408207 0.062689 -6.511665 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.753230 0.220844 -12.46685 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.011147 0.226414 -0.049235 0.9608 
Net profit growth 0.342404 0.045629 7.504111 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.009802 0.019344 0.506730 0.6132 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.716638     Mean dependent var 2.945223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.671300     S.D. dependent var 28.82065 
S.E. of regression 16.52357     Akaike info criterion 8.579831 
Sum squared resid 34128.55     Schwarz criterion 9.008980 
Log likelihood -605.3277     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.754204 
F-statistic 15.80655     Durbin-Watson stat 1.874642 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 4.688384 3.702032 1.266435 0.2078 
GDP growth -0.057776 0.175518 -0.329175 0.7426 
CPI growth 0.895504 0.900681 0.994252 0.3221 
M2 growth -0.452791 0.224853 -2.013718 0.0463 
Reserve growth 0.189901 0.032388 5.863276 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.075977 0.033278 2.283078 0.0242 
Deposit growth 0.824714 0.145037 5.686231 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.386598 0.065086 -5.939793 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.766244 0.227577 -12.15520 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
0.082390 0.246707 0.333958 0.7390 
Net profit growth 0.314906 0.046078 6.834160 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.004503 0.020183 0.223118 0.8238 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.729658     Mean dependent var 2.945223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.670592     S.D. dependent var 28.82065 
S.E. of regression 16.54134     Akaike info criterion 8.614983 
Sum squared resid 32560.31     Schwarz criterion 9.166746 
Log likelihood -601.8937     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.839177 
F-statistic 12.35322     Durbin-Watson stat 2.020431 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11  Cross-sections included: 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 5.374808 3.319834 1.618999 0.1078 
GDP growth -0.083890 0.165154 -0.507949 0.6123 
CPI growth -0.091843 0.538048 -0.170697 0.8647 
M2 growth -0.292689 0.212073 -1.380128 0.1698 
Reserve growth 0.184537 0.030125 6.125693 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.075305 0.031298 2.406023 0.0175 
Deposit growth 0.854568 0.136563 6.257692 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.405601 0.059995 -6.760597 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.704565 0.213964 -12.64027 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.023337 0.217353 -0.107369 0.9147 
Net profit growth 0.343115 0.043675 7.856043 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.013297 0.018396 0.722783 0.4711 
R-squared 0.700440     Mean dependent var 2.945223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.678251     S.D. dependent var 28.82065 
S.E. of regression 16.34793     Akaike info criterion 8.498432 
Sum squared resid 36079.38     Schwarz criterion 8.723224 
Log likelihood -609.3855     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.589770 
F-statistic 31.56613     Durbin-Watson stat 1.916303 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 10 Cross-sections included: 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 126 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.060613 0.074736 -0.811033 0.4189 
R-squared 0.003641     Mean dependent var -0.513805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003641     S.D. dependent var 12.88980 
S.E. of regression 12.86631     Akaike info criterion 7.955006 
Sum squared resid 20692.73     Schwarz criterion 7.977516 
Log likelihood -500.1654     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.964151 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.181670  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 34.56505 (1, 125)   0.0000 
Chi-square 34.56505 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.439387 0.074736 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Islamic Banks Fixed Rate Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.869923 (57,366) 0.7357 
Cross-section Chi-square 56.539628 57 0.4923 
Period F 0.622057 (10,366) 0.7951 
Period Chi-square 7.499704 10 0.6776 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.854558 (67,366) 0.7813 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 64.677408 67 0.5577 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 445 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 58 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.217321 1.590846 0.765204 0.4446 
GDP growth -0.033153 0.142268 -0.233034 0.8158 
CPI growth -0.085887 0.115130 -0.745999 0.4561 
M2 growth -0.022372 0.082709 -0.270497 0.7869 
Reserve growth 0.103452 0.018130 5.706017 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.115014 0.012428 9.254723 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.643922 0.099393 6.478539 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.210627 0.038225 -5.510230 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.461571 0.156584 -15.72045 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
0.019740 0.068797 0.286925 0.7743 
Net profit growth 0.275761 0.026274 10.49573 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.015777 0.014876 1.060533 0.2895 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.660253     Mean dependent var 1.956194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643386     S.D. dependent var 19.29474 
S.E. of regression 11.52228     Akaike info criterion 7.774617 
Sum squared resid 56158.72     Schwarz criterion 7.977218 
Log likelihood -1707.852     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.854506 
F-statistic 39.14488     Durbin-Watson stat 1.945022 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: FR 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 445 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 58 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.351380 1.712765 0.789005 0.4306 
GDP growth -0.052071 0.138812 -0.375120 0.7078 
CPI growth -0.027688 0.134850 -0.205322 0.8374 
M2 growth -0.037423 0.084435 -0.443217 0.6579 
Reserve growth 0.102857 0.019322 5.323344 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.106324 0.013087 8.124545 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.597729 0.106204 5.628103 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.200799 0.040538 -4.953363 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.479952 0.165076 -15.02312 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
0.017122 0.075811 0.225857 0.8214 
Net profit growth 0.258486 0.027932 9.254240 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.004215 0.015939 0.264426 0.7916 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.695704     Mean dependent var 1.956194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640672     S.D. dependent var 19.29474 
S.E. of regression 11.56604     Akaike info criterion 7.875650 
Sum squared resid 50298.74     Schwarz criterion 8.511082 
Log likelihood -1683.332     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.126213 
F-statistic 12.64176     Durbin-Watson stat 2.171875 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 445 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 58 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.413929 1.440670 0.981439 0.3269 
GDP growth -0.082753 0.127498 -0.649051 0.5166 
CPI growth -0.080735 0.108203 -0.746149 0.4560 
M2 growth -0.018271 0.075035 -0.243501 0.8077 
Reserve growth 0.103594 0.017824 5.811948 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.114234 0.012095 9.444493 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.650068 0.098340 6.610415 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.212326 0.037803 -5.616653 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -2.451878 0.153997 -15.92161 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
0.007052 0.067722 0.104136 0.9171 
Net profit growth 0.276177 0.025937 10.64820 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.015559 0.014625 1.063853 0.2880 
R-squared 0.653982     Mean dependent var 1.956194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.645192     S.D. dependent var 19.29474 
S.E. of regression 11.49306     Akaike info criterion 7.747960 
Sum squared resid 57195.15     Schwarz criterion 7.858470 
Log likelihood -1711.921     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.791536 
F-statistic 74.39831     Durbin-Watson stat 1.919103 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 
 
Cross-sections included: 58 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 373 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.063360 0.038666 -1.638652 0.1021 
R-squared 0.006613     Mean dependent var -0.245620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006613     S.D. dependent var 10.41798 
S.E. of regression 10.38347     Akaike info criterion 7.520985 
Sum squared resid 40107.74     Schwarz criterion 7.531499 
Log likelihood -1401.664     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.525160 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.017951  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 127.5227 (1, 372)   0.0000 
Chi-square 127.5227 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.436640 0.038666 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Middle East Islamic Banks Fixed Rate Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.972229 (29,163) 0.5126 
Cross-section Chi-square 34.141924 29 0.2341 
Period F 0.460882 (10,163) 0.9130 
Period Chi-square 5.966874 10 0.8180 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.867084 (39,163) 0.6929 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 40.343383 39 0.4107 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 214 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -0.250355 1.119155 -0.223700 0.8232 
GDP growth 0.096288 0.136569 0.705048 0.4816 
CPI growth -0.066514 0.081157 -0.819574 0.4135 
M2 growth -0.009079 0.039827 -0.227963 0.8199 
Reserve growth 0.099868 0.051085 1.954957 0.0505 
LLP growth  0.015684 0.008862 1.769899 0.0503 
Deposit growth 0.864582 0.108146 7.994589 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.191331 0.073469 -2.604254 0.0099 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.087996 0.279380 -3.894329 0.0001 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.038609 0.032245 -1.197355 0.2326 
Net profit growth 0.041824 0.019339 2.162711 0.0318 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.006338 0.017423 0.363735 0.7165 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.586810     Mean dependent var 1.465256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.541618     S.D. dependent var 7.643327 
S.E. of regression 5.174833     Akaike info criterion 6.222618 
Sum squared resid 5141.548     Schwarz criterion 6.568653 
Log likelihood -643.8201     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.362447 
F-statistic 12.98465     Durbin-Watson stat 2.125298 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 214 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 30 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -1.480449 1.183388 -1.251026 0.2126 
GDP growth 0.139314 0.141074 0.987524 0.3248 
CPI growth 0.025656 0.116679 0.219884 0.8262 
M2 growth 0.011019 0.039799 0.276867 0.7822 
Reserve growth 0.316709 0.043340 7.307569 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.067106 0.027661 2.426024 0.0166 
Deposit growth 0.870910 0.113596 7.666727 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.202180 0.075898 -2.663846 0.0085 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.278950 0.284225 -4.499785 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.036495 0.034810 -1.048411 0.2959 
Net profit growth 0.041215 0.019941 2.066832 0.0402 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.011493 0.017773 0.646678 0.5187 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.637782     Mean dependent var 1.465256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.554032     S.D. dependent var 7.643327 
S.E. of regression 5.104280     Akaike info criterion 6.268529 
Sum squared resid 4507.285     Schwarz criterion 6.913412 
Log likelihood -629.7326     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.529120 
F-statistic 7.615308     Durbin-Watson stat 2.513960 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: FR 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 214 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 30 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -0.986433 0.921108 -1.070921 0.2855 
GDP growth 0.154711 0.113879 1.358558 0.1758 
CPI growth -0.048054 0.075102 -0.639846 0.5230 
M2 growth 0.006718 0.036253 0.185317 0.8532 
Reserve growth 0.077437 0.017770 4.357693 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.015758 0.008284 1.902178 0.0506 
Deposit growth 0.869807 0.101837 8.541152 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.197557 0.069834 -2.828946 0.0051 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.121258 0.268202 -4.180657 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.034937 0.031442 -1.111165 0.2678 
Net profit growth 0.037451 0.018514 2.022889 0.0444 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.005701 0.016772 0.339944 0.7342 
R-squared 0.574661     Mean dependent var 1.465256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.551499     S.D. dependent var 7.643327 
S.E. of regression 5.118750     Akaike info criterion 6.158139 
Sum squared resid 5292.724     Schwarz criterion 6.346885 
Log likelihood -646.9209     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.234409 
F-statistic 24.81053     Durbin-Watson stat 2.145467 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 10 Cross-sections included: 30 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 173 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.158661 0.078214 -2.028564 0.0940 
R-squared 0.023366     Mean dependent var -6.32E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023366     S.D. dependent var 5.130230 
S.E. of regression 5.069940     Akaike info criterion 6.090299 
Sum squared resid 4421.138     Schwarz criterion 6.108526 
Log likelihood -525.8108     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.097693 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.358964  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 19.04613 (1, 172)   0.0000 
Chi-square 19.04613 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.341339 0.078214 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Southeast Asia Islamic Banks Fixed Rate Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.546579 (16,108) 0.9157 
Cross-section Chi-square 11.368005 16 0.7862 
Period F 1.269699 (10,108) 0.2566 
Period Chi-square 16.228191 10 0.0933 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.847273 (26,108) 0.6779 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 27.101545 26 0.4040 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 11.93147 5.786111 2.062088 0.0413 
GDP growth -0.011263 0.318774 -0.035331 0.9719 
CPI growth -0.680831 0.740741 -0.919122 0.3598 
M2 growth -0.613468 0.428501 -1.431660 0.1547 
Reserve growth 0.212889 0.036403 5.848064 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.361383 0.173503 2.082856 0.0380 
Deposit growth 0.704027 0.163065 4.317458 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.480789 0.072231 -6.656295 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -3.371384 0.232904 -14.47544 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.044489 0.260877 -0.170538 0.8649 
Net profit growth 0.378879 0.052574 7.206560 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.006411 0.022289 0.287648 0.7741 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.695549     Mean dependent var 3.145603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646837     S.D. dependent var 32.03681 
S.E. of regression 19.03869     Akaike info criterion 8.863202 
Sum squared resid 45308.95     Schwarz criterion 9.292350 
Log likelihood -626.0137     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.037575 
F-statistic 14.27875     Durbin-Watson stat 1.816370 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: Fixed Rate Financing 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 7.537107 4.331226 1.740179 0.0844 
GDP growth -0.155106 0.205349 -0.755331 0.4515 
CPI growth -0.597171 1.053760 -0.566705 0.5720 
M2 growth -0.154666 0.089163 -1.734653 0.0842 
Reserve growth 0.213086 0.037893 5.623360 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.186438 0.028159 6.620803 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.661337 0.169687 3.897381 0.0002 
Capital Based growth -0.462904 0.076148 -6.079001 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -3.387945 0.249768 -13.56435 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
0.165389 0.288637 0.572999 0.5677 
Net profit growth 0.350975 0.053910 6.510435 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.003299 0.023614 0.139717 0.8891 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
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R-squared 0.700523     Mean dependent var 3.145603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635091     S.D. dependent var 32.03681 
S.E. of regression 19.35269     Akaike info criterion 8.928920 
Sum squared resid 44568.69     Schwarz criterion 9.480683 
Log likelihood -624.8112     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.153114 
F-statistic 10.70614     Durbin-Watson stat 1.915407 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: FR 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 8.136168 3.844640 2.116237 0.0362 
GDP growth -0.205892 0.191262 -1.076492 0.2836 
CPI growth -0.162114 0.623104 -0.260172 0.7951 
M2 growth -0.331652 0.245598 -1.350384 0.1792 
Reserve growth 0.207563 0.034887 5.949538 0.0000 
LLP growth  0.415251 0.033392 12.43579 0.0000 
Deposit growth 0.696560 0.158151 4.404398 0.0000 
Capital Based growth -0.484998 0.069479 -6.980486 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -3.323244 0.228454 -14.54669 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
 
-0.074728 0.251713 -0.296879 0.7670 
Net profit growth 0.382993 0.050580 7.572086 0.0000 
Previous Year Net profit 
 
0.014191 0.021304 0.666083 0.5065 
R-squared 0.674859     Mean dependent var 3.145603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.650775     S.D. dependent var 32.03681 
S.E. of regression 18.93224     Akaike info criterion 8.791963 
Sum squared resid 48388.01     Schwarz criterion 9.016755 
Log likelihood -630.8133     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.883301 
F-statistic 28.02050     Durbin-Watson stat 1.842810 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 Periods included: 10 Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 126 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.041117 0.075845 -0.542115 0.5887 
R-squared 0.000531     Mean dependent var -0.635733 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000531     S.D. dependent var 14.96500 
S.E. of regression 14.96103     Akaike info criterion 8.256679 
Sum squared resid 27979.04     Schwarz criterion 8.279189 
Log likelihood -519.1708     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.265824 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.175190  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 36.60537 (1, 125)   0.0000 
Chi-square 36.60537 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.458883 0.075845 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Islamic Banks Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.812668 (66,488) 0.8510 
Cross-section Chi-square 59.856122 66 0.6893 
Period F 0.811691 (11,488) 0.6284 
Period Chi-square 10.407169 11 0.4942 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.807819 (77,488) 0.8761 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 68.862881 77 0.7344 
Cross-section fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -0.008171 1.496195 -0.005461 0.9956 
GDP growth 0.034413 0.108774 0.316370 0.7518 
CPI growth 0.117302 0.118255 0.991940 0.3217 
M2 growth 0.028057 0.082545 0.339893 0.7341 
Total Financing growth 0.399835 0.030498 13.11025 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
0.471651 0.070430 6.696735 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.038700 0.020644 1.874590 0.0604 
Capital Based growth 0.118877 0.037669 3.155787 0.0017 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.095380 0.143604 -0.664186 0.5068 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.408048     Mean dependent var 2.922224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.388849     S.D. dependent var 22.20980 
S.E. of regression 17.36276     Akaike info criterion 8.579073 
Sum squared resid 167313.3     Schwarz criterion 8.723150 
Log likelihood -2443.194     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.635270 
F-statistic 21.25419     Durbin-Watson stat 2.293946 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.689716 1.639619 0.420656 0.6742 
GDP growth 0.050804 0.109285 0.464881 0.6422 
CPI growth 0.040535 0.140726 0.288042 0.7734 
M2 growth 0.021346 0.084652 0.252158 0.8010 
Total Financing growth 0.401629 0.032624 12.31069 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
0.488214 0.077404 6.307366 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.244158 0.135227 1.805544 0.0732 
Capital Based growth 0.108531 0.040179 2.701186 0.0071 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.121996 0.153526 -0.794628 0.4272 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.456654     Mean dependent var 2.922224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.377325     S.D. dependent var 22.20980 
S.E. of regression 17.52569     Akaike info criterion 8.685031 
Sum squared resid 153575.0     Schwarz criterion 9.246172 
Log likelihood -2418.604     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.903903 
F-statistic 5.756487     Durbin-Watson stat 2.539204 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
 
Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 574 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.074994 1.390697 0.053926 0.9570 
GDP growth 0.046150 0.101600 0.454230 0.6498 
CPI growth 0.081792 0.112930 0.724278 0.4692 
M2 growth 0.040396 0.076709 0.526613 0.5987 
Total Financing growth 0.400307 0.030182 13.26290 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
0.472836 0.069538 6.799688 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.452791 0.224853 2.013718 0.0463 
Capital Based growth 0.116382 0.037235 3.125640 0.0019 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.117311 0.142268 -0.824574 0.4100 
R-squared 0.398441     Mean dependent var 2.922224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.391002     S.D. dependent var 22.20980 
S.E. of regression 17.33216     Akaike info criterion 8.556844 
Sum squared resid 170028.5     Schwarz criterion 8.617507 
Log likelihood -2447.814     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.580505 
F-statistic 53.55559     Durbin-Watson stat 2.296798 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 494 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.015183 0.028366 -0.535257 0.5927 
R-squared 0.022174     Mean dependent var -0.357246 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022174     S.D. dependent var 16.90751 
S.E. of regression 16.71901     Akaike info criterion 8.472992 
Sum squared resid 137806.0     Schwarz criterion 8.481499 
Log likelihood -2091.829     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.476332 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.275615  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 65.18632 (1, 493)   0.0000 
Chi-square 65.18632 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.352538 0.043664 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Middle East Islamic Banks Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.765216 (38,264) 0.8391 
Cross-section Chi-square 33.645901 38 0.6710 
Period F 0.798916 (11,264) 0.6411 
Period Chi-square 10.544242 11 0.4822 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.753455 (49,264) 0.8834 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 42.147551 49 0.7451 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 322 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.704497 3.179372 0.221584 0.8248 
GDP growth 0.200506 0.434984 0.460951 0.6452 
CPI growth 0.220879 0.224294 0.984774 0.3255 
M2 growth 0.052887 0.122991 0.430003 0.6675 
Total Financing growth 0.197148 0.077029 2.559393 0.0111 
Non-Performing 
   
0.477044 0.098206 4.857584 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.004123 0.038774 0.106324 0.9154 
Capital Based growth -0.027625 0.163151 -0.169322 0.8657 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.572294 0.534867 -1.069973 0.2855 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.396410     Mean dependent var 3.164027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.376091     S.D. dependent var 22.96159 
S.E. of regression 18.13689     Akaike info criterion 8.667583 
Sum squared resid 166118.1     Schwarz criterion 8.814185 
Log likelihood -2248.573     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.724998 
F-statistic 19.50942     Durbin-Watson stat 2.313915 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation: Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 322 
Sample: 1998 
 
Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.458892 3.664416 0.398124 0.6908 
GDP growth 0.022966 0.459710 0.049958 0.9602 
CPI growth -0.076767 0.336957 -0.227825 0.8200 
M2 growth 0.045523 0.126825 0.358946 0.7199 
Total Financing growth 0.418785 0.031189 13.42723 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
0.486854 0.107554 4.526591 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.008406 0.040985 0.205108 0.8376 
Capital Based growth 0.006444 0.173162 0.037216 0.9703 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.388984 0.574056 -0.677605 0.4986 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.453376     Mean dependent var 3.164027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.364504     S.D. dependent var 22.96159 
S.E. of regression 18.30453     Akaike info criterion 8.782598 
Sum squared resid 150440.0     Schwarz criterion 9.385292 
Log likelihood -2222.649     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.018638 
F-statistic 5.101442     Durbin-Watson stat 2.591444 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
  
Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 322 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -0.159688 2.655718 -0.060130 0.9521 
GDP growth 0.107500 0.368200 0.291961 0.7705 
CPI growth 0.183893 0.214074 0.859019 0.3910 
M2 growth 0.085037 0.114503 0.742664 0.4582 
Total Financing growth 0.077536 0.033042 2.346615 0.0205 
Non-Performing 
   
0.471361 0.096882 4.865306 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.077437 0.017770 4.357693 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.017365 0.157740 0.110084 0.9124 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.540765 0.523361 -1.033254 0.3023 
R-squared 0.388495     Mean dependent var 3.164027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380183     S.D. dependent var 22.96159 
S.E. of regression 18.07731     Akaike info criterion 8.642370 
Sum squared resid 168296.3     Schwarz criterion 8.707526 
Log likelihood -2251.980     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.667888 
F-statistic 46.74059     Durbin-Watson stat 2.319136 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 273 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.058231 0.038401 -1.516404 0.1301 
R-squared 0.004067     Mean dependent var -0.293476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004067     S.D. dependent var 8.533574 
S.E. of regression 8.516203     Akaike info criterion 7.124104 
Sum squared resid 31621.21     Schwarz criterion 7.133440 
Log likelihood -1555.617     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.127788 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.954207  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 35.68973 (1, 272)   0.0000 
Chi-square 35.68973 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.355190 0.059455 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Southeast Asia Islamic Banks Provision for Bad and Doubtful Financing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.978062 (16,120) 0.4849 
Cross-section Chi-square 19.122298 16 0.2624 
Period F 1.073155 (11,120) 0.3886 
Period Chi-square 14.637413 11 0.1997 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.974227 (27,120) 0.5089 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 30.918535 27 0.2745 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant -1.337423 2.963125 -0.451355 0.6524 
GDP growth 0.066164 0.114671 0.576990 0.5649 
CPI growth 0.397126 0.377597 1.051718 0.2948 
M2 growth 0.201823 0.213630 0.944732 0.3465 
Total Financing growth 0.398074 0.019357 20.56473 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
1.055548 0.123992 8.513040 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.089307 0.018959 4.710525 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.029277 0.029291 0.999535 0.3193 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
0.054686 0.123101 0.444239 0.6576 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.881305     Mean dependent var 3.627572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.865711     S.D. dependent var 28.55961 
S.E. of regression 10.46582     Akaike info criterion 7.647821 
Sum squared resid 15006.07     Schwarz criterion 8.019277 
Log likelihood -577.5300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.798690 
F-statistic 56.51241     Durbin-Watson stat 2.107964 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.962969 2.234955 0.430867 0.6673 
GDP growth 0.083846 0.069791 1.201385 0.2318 
CPI growth 0.008105 0.523732 0.015476 0.9877 
M2 growth 0.005373 0.136284 0.039426 0.9686 
Total Financing growth 0.404219 0.020244 19.96723 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
1.132623 0.136052 8.324953 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.084552 0.019607 4.312265 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.024008 0.030502 0.787085 0.4326 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.010052 0.126691 -0.079344 0.9369 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.884831     Mean dependent var 3.627572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.864764     S.D. dependent var 28.55961 
S.E. of regression 10.50266     Akaike info criterion 7.681772 
Sum squared resid 14560.37     Schwarz criterion 8.150981 
Log likelihood -575.1782     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.872344 
F-statistic 44.09306     Durbin-Watson stat 2.273954 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: PBD 
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 1.543935 2.021303 0.763832 0.4462 
GDP growth 0.077592 0.066789 1.161748 0.2472 
CPI growth 0.297366 0.318727 0.932980 0.3523 
M2 growth 0.024648 0.130411 0.189006 0.8503 
Total Financing growth 0.402764 0.018869 21.34511 0.0000 
Non-Performing 
   
1.042204 0.119408 8.728093 0.0000 
Net profit growth 0.086916 0.018425 4.717392 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.036058 0.028477 1.266224 0.2074 
Regulatory Reserve 
 
-0.005258 0.118948 -0.044201 0.9648 
R-squared 0.872166     Mean dependent var 3.627572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.866120     S.D. dependent var 28.55961 
S.E. of regression 10.44986     Akaike info criterion 7.580975 
Sum squared resid 16161.55     Schwarz criterion 7.737378 
Log likelihood -583.3161     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.644499 
F-statistic 144.2501     Durbin-Watson stat 2.078165 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 137 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.026634 0.028659 -0.929346 0.3532 
R-squared 0.001189     Mean dependent var 0.562118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001189     S.D. dependent var 21.74483 
S.E. of regression 21.73189     Akaike info criterion 8.997587 
Sum squared resid 219135.7     Schwarz criterion 9.006495 
Log likelihood -2090.939     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.001093 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.798314  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 14.70679 (1, 136)   0.0002 
Chi-square 14.70679 1   0.0001 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.312890 0.081589 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Islamic Banks Provision for Contingency Reserve  
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.958859 (66,498) 0.5706 
Cross-section Chi-square 69.982503 66 0.3454 
Period F 0.678216 (11,498) 0.7597 
Period Chi-square 8.698706 11 0.6497 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.919323 (77,498) 0.6692 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 77.750899 77 0.4546 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
 Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 585 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.562371 2.495942 0.225314 0.8218 
GDP growth 0.137447 0.181096 0.758974 0.4482 
CPI growth 0.080964 0.194836 0.415551 0.6779 
M2 growth 0.036869 0.135773 0.271548 0.7861 
Net profit growth 0.295567 0.037373 7.908497 0.0000 
Deposits growth 2.276195 0.224805 10.12520 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.222845 0.108919 2.045977 0.0412 
Financing growth 0.735365 0.056579 12.99711 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.908011 0.074273 12.22531 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -4.835500 0.327942 -14.74497 0.0000 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.653851     Mean dependent var 3.692768 
Adjusted R-squared 0.641576     S.D. dependent var 48.14042 
S.E. of regression 28.82096     Akaike info criterion 9.595320 
Sum squared resid 468485.4     Schwarz criterion 9.752250 
Log likelihood -2785.631     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.656479 
F-statistic 53.26772     Durbin-Watson stat 2.096216 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
 Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 585 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 67 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.548881 2.700999 0.203214 0.8390 
GDP growth 0.140415 0.180108 0.779615 0.4360 
CPI growth 0.093677 0.230984 0.405557 0.6852 
M2 growth 0.009048 0.137609 0.065751 0.9476 
Net profit growth 0.288655 0.039445 7.317977 0.0000 
Deposits growth 2.276438 0.239144 9.519096 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.179728 0.117487 1.529777 0.1267 
Financing growth 0.704030 0.058873 11.95848 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.908422 0.078570 11.56200 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -4.878802 0.346218 -14.09170 0.0000 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.688278     Mean dependent var 3.692768 
Adjusted R-squared 0.642346     S.D. dependent var 48.14042 
S.E. of regression 28.78996     Akaike info criterion 9.678596 
Sum squared resid 421890.8     Schwarz criterion 10.24653 
Log likelihood -2754.989     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.899932 
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F-statistic 14.98487     Durbin-Watson stat 2.346711 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
  
Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
 Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 585 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.360145 2.315239 0.155554 0.8764 
GDP growth 0.125271 0.168905 0.741666 0.4586 
CPI growth 0.046168 0.186047 0.248152 0.8041 
M2 growth 0.030424 0.126161 0.241153 0.8095 
Net profit growth 0.297338 0.036848 8.069371 0.0000 
Deposits growth 2.307061 0.222564 10.36584 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.205907 0.107719 1.911529 0.0544 
Financing growth 0.735090 0.056021 13.12159 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.910574 0.073327 12.41803 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -4.906396 0.323981 -15.14407 0.0000 
R-squared 0.649223     Mean dependent var 3.692768 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643733     S.D. dependent var 48.14042 
S.E. of regression 28.73411     Akaike info criterion 9.570993 
Sum squared resid 474748.1     Schwarz criterion 9.645721 
Log likelihood -2789.515     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.600116 
F-statistic 118.2466     Durbin-Watson stat 2.101076 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 67 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 509 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.078002 0.060058 -1.298778 0.1951 
R-squared 0.004280     Mean dependent var 1.167616 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004280     S.D. dependent var 26.24113 
S.E. of regression 26.18491     Akaike info criterion 9.371954 
Sum squared resid 183754.1     Schwarz criterion 9.385317 
Log likelihood -1259.528     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.377321 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.905118  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 77.93003 (1, 498)   0.0000 
Chi-square 77.93003 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.372533 0.042200 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Middle East Islamic Banks Provision for Contingency Reserve  
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.821633 (38,274) 0.7640 
Cross-section Chi-square 35.810641 38 0.5711 
Period F 0.772037 (11,274) 0.6679 
Period Chi-square 10.127943 11 0.5189 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.876605 (49,274) 0.7051 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 48.329774 49 0.5002 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 333 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 4.272346 4.017463 1.063444 0.2884 
GDP growth 0.433900 0.552196 0.785771 0.4326 
CPI growth 0.012656 0.279634 0.045260 0.9639 
M2 growth 0.076527 0.154756 0.494498 0.6213 
Net profit growth 0.111708 0.048745 2.291679 0.0226 
Deposits growth 0.103529 0.051276 2.019045 0.0443 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.114624 0.050190 2.283791 0.0231 
Financing growth 0.373748 0.123346 3.030073 0.0026 
Capital Based growth 0.366222 0.176390 2.076213 0.0387 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.114452 0.581456 -1.916656 0.0542 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.493628     Mean dependent var 3.888035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.407279     S.D. dependent var 49.03926 
S.E. of regression 37.75455     Akaike info criterion 10.23527 
Sum squared resid 677067.8     Schwarz criterion 10.87163 
Log likelihood -2768.524     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.48381 
F-statistic 5.716617     Durbin-Watson stat 2.202049 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 333 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 6.353194 4.596868 1.382070 0.1680 
GDP growth 0.328173 0.577362 0.568402 0.5702 
CPI growth 0.578691 0.425984 1.358480 0.1754 
M2 growth 0.062512 0.158306 0.394880 0.6932 
Net profit growth 0.126199 0.051386 2.455898 0.0146 
Deposits growth 0.114791 0.054388 2.110575 0.0357 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.099868 0.051085 1.954957 0.0503 
Financing growth 0.333797 0.132039 2.528022 0.0118 
Capital Based growth 0.293327 0.188686 1.554578 0.1211 
Regulatory Reserve growth -1.249227 0.618722 -2.019044 0.0444 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.414182     Mean dependent var 3.888035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.408866     S.D. dependent var 49.03926 
S.E. of regression 37.70396     Akaike info criterion 10.10812 
Sum squared resid 783295.1     Schwarz criterion 10.15468 
Log likelihood -2809.112     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.12631 
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F-statistic 77.91302     Durbin-Watson stat 1.946259 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: 
   Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 333
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 39 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 4.984947 3.384645 1.472812 0.1418 
GDP growth 0.248982 0.469176 0.530679 0.5960 
CPI growth 0.088057 0.269856 0.326313 0.7444 
M2 growth 0.013438 0.145015 0.092665 0.9262 
Net profit growth 0.126624 0.048062 2.634573 0.0088 
Deposits growth 0.111905 0.050800 2.202870 0.0283 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.116001 0.055182 2.102160 0.0365 
Financing growth 0.367097 0.121884 3.011844 0.0027 
Capital Based growth 0.361383 0.173503 2.082856 0.0380 
Regulatory Reserve growth -0.945240 0.572688 -1.650532 0.0998 
R-squared 0.483969     Mean dependent var 3.888035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.408426     S.D. dependent var 49.03926 
S.E. of regression 37.71799     Akaike info criterion 10.21826 
Sum squared resid 689983.5     Schwarz criterion 10.77701 
Log likelihood -2773.786     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.43649 
F-statistic 6.406556     Durbin-Watson stat 2.201438 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 39 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 288 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.083426 0.058143 -1.434843 0.1524 
R-squared 0.007028     Mean dependent var 0.246678 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007028     S.D. dependent var 25.39016 
S.E. of regression 25.30078     Akaike info criterion 9.303014 
Sum squared resid 183717.2     Schwarz criterion 9.315732 
Log likelihood -1338.634     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.308111 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.873292  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 51.33301 (1, 274)   0.0000 
Chi-square 51.33301 1   0.0000 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.416574 0.058143 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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Equation: Southeast Asia Islamic Banks Provision for Contingency Reserve  
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests Test cross-section and period fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 0.895035 (16,119) 0.5763 
Cross-section Chi-square 17.726745 16 0.3401 
Period F 0.809111 (11,119) 0.6309 
Period Chi-square 11.251804 11 0.4224 
Cross-Section/Period F 0.872089 (27,119) 0.6488 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 28.164890 27 0.4025 
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 
 
Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 3.425472 9.321447 0.367483 0.7138 
GDP growth 0.099475 0.356236 0.279240 0.7805 
CPI growth 0.606048 1.173250 0.516555 0.6063 
M2 growth 0.228297 0.667659 0.341936 0.7329 
Net profit growth 0.417924 0.065010 6.428597 0.0000 
Deposits growth 3.014570 0.352695 8.547240 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
1.155564 0.391393 2.952437 0.0037 
Financing growth 0.866899 0.071693 12.09179 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.801026 0.121886 6.571933 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -5.696958 0.600836 -9.481717 0.0000 
Effects Specification Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.843785     Mean dependent var -0.294675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.820642     S.D. dependent var 76.74502 
S.E. of regression 32.50206     Akaike info criterion 9.925133 
Sum squared resid 142611.8     Schwarz criterion 10.33569 
Log likelihood -753.1604     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.09188 
F-statistic 36.45961     Durbin-Watson stat 2.106228 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Period fixed effects test equation:  Dependent Variable: Contingency Reserve  
Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 11.38248 6.920201 1.644819 0.1024 
GDP growth 0.128457 0.216245 0.594036 0.5535 
CPI growth 2.151618 1.629988 1.320021 0.1891 
M2 growth 0.421557 0.422898 0.996828 0.3207 
Net profit growth 0.409405 0.067297 6.083593 0.0000 
Deposits growth 3.008332 0.362056 8.309031 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
0.817257 0.425619 1.920161 0.0570 
Financing growth 0.815656 0.072836 11.19852 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.806617 0.124896 6.458292 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -5.677387 0.602740 -9.419294 0.0000 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.850136     Mean dependent var -0.294675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.821316     S.D. dependent var 76.74502 
S.E. of regression 32.44092     Akaike info criterion 9.947730 
Sum squared resid 136813.7     Schwarz criterion 10.45604 
Log likelihood -749.9229     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.15418 
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F-statistic 29.49811     Durbin-Watson stat 2.286946 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Cross-section and period fixed effects test 
  
Dependent Variable: Contingency 
  Method: Panel Least Squares Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 156 
Sample: 1998 2009 Periods included: 12 Cross-sections included: 17 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 8.541219 6.264427 1.363448 0.1748 
GDP growth 0.102816 0.206817 0.497133 0.6198 
CPI growth 1.013702 0.986756 1.027308 0.3060 
M2 growth 0.521931 0.403663 1.292986 0.1981 
Net profit growth 0.428702 0.062651 6.842742 0.0000 
Deposits growth 3.069951 0.334317 9.182754 0.0000 
Non-Performing Financing 
  
1.005911 0.377254 2.666404 0.0085 
Financing growth 0.857096 0.069795 12.28016 0.0000 
Capital Based growth 0.787173 0.117479 6.700552 0.0000 
Regulatory Reserve growth -5.733595 0.569728 -10.06374 0.0000 
R-squared 0.832975     Mean dependent var -0.294675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822678     S.D. dependent var 76.74502 
S.E. of regression 32.31699     Akaike info criterion 9.851019 
Sum squared resid 152480.6     Schwarz criterion 10.04652 
Log likelihood -758.3795     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.930424 
F-statistic 80.90205     Durbin-Watson stat 2.125799 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Dependent Variable: Residuals Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2009 Periods included: 11 Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 137 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Residuals -0.098513 0.081275 -1.212094 0.2275 
R-squared 0.010041     Mean dependent var -0.847445 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010041     S.D. dependent var 45.57987 
S.E. of regression 45.35047     Akaike info criterion 10.47379 
Sum squared resid 287933.1     Schwarz criterion 10.49470 
Log likelihood -737.4018     Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.48228 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.267179  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
F-statistic 15.06520 (1, 119)   0.0002 
Chi-square 15.06520 1   0.0001 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
0.5 + C(1) 0.312721 0.080569 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
